Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These consolidated appeals arose from claims that major telecommunications carriers assisted the government with intelligence gathering following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the telecommunications companies' participation in the surveillance program. At issue was the constitutionality of section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, which allowed for immunity for the telecommunications companies. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did not violate Articles I and III of the Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss was affirmed as to the challenged section 802 claims.

Plaintiffs contended that Barack Obama was constitutionally ineligible to be President of the United States. In addition to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their quo warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., claims for failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for failure to state a claim. The court adopted the district court's classification of the parties and held that each plaintiff lacked standing; the proper venue for plaintiffs' quo warranto claims was in the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code 16-3503; FOIA did not apply to any of defendants because they were all individuals, not agencies; and plaintiffs had six months between the original complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO allegations and their failure to do so was inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims for lack of Article III standing and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. The dismissal of the district court was affirmed and the emergency petition for writ of mandamus was denied.

Plaintiffs, Washington Medicaid beneficiaries with severe mental and physical disabilities, appealed the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a regulation promulgated by Washington's DSHS that reduced the amount of in-home "personal care services" available under the state's Medicaid plan. The court concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury because they have shown that reduced access to personal care services would place them at serious risk of institutionalization. The court further concluded that plaintiffs have raised serious questions going to the merits of their Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), claims, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor, and that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Accordingly, the court remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs challenged the 2006 Gallatin National Forest Management Plan prepared by the United States Forest Service, arguing that the travel plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. 1131. The court held that the Study Act required the Service to ensure that current users of a wilderness study area were able to enjoy the wilderness character of the area as it existed in 1977, pending a congressional decision on whether to designate the area as wilderness. In this case, the Service had not adequately explained how the 1977 wilderness character of the relevant study area had been maintained despite an increase in the volume of motorized and mechanized recreation in the area. Therefore, the court concluded that the Service's adoption of the travel plan was arbitrary and capricious and affirmed the district court's decision finding that the Service's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.

Defendant appealed the district court's preliminary injunction precluding enforcement of California Welfare and Institutions Code 14105.191(f), which amended California's Medicaid Plan and set provider reimbursement rates for the 2009-2010 rate year, and for each year thereafter. Plaintiffs challenged the law under 42 U.S.C 1983 and the Supremacy Clause because the State did not obtain federal approval of its State Plan Amendment (SPA) prior to implementing the rate changes. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and held that plaintiffs have not shown that they have an unambiguously conferred right to bring a section 1983 claim.

After his unsuccessful cataract surgery, plaintiff brought a claim for battery against the United States government and his United States Navy surgeon. The United States invoked the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. 1089, immunizing individual military medical personnel from malpractice liability. At issue was whether section 1089(e) waived the government's sovereign immunity for common law battery claims. The court held that it did not and affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court did not address plaintiff's remaining claims.

Plaintiff filed a Federal Employee Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8131, 8132, claim after he was injured in a helicopter crash and received benefits totaling $409,838.11. Plaintiff then filed a civil suit against the helicopter operator and eventually the lawsuit settled for $2.3 million. At issue was whether plaintiff could deduct his litigation costs from a refund to the United States under FECA. The court held that no reading of section 8132 allowed for a FECA beneficiary to obtain a civil award and then deduct the costs of obtaining that award from a refund of benefits owed to the United States. The only plausible reading of section 8132 was to the contrary: A beneficiary could deduct his litigation costs only from his gross recovery to determine the amount, if any, of the surplus he must credit to the United States for future benefits.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Revett Silver Company in an action brought pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), which required federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service before undertaking any action "authorized, funded, or carried out" by the agency that might "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat" used by any endangered or threatened species. The court held that the Fish and Wildlife Service's determination that a copper and silver mine in northwest Montana would entail "no adverse modification" to bull trout critical habitat and would result in "no jeopardy" to grizzly bears was not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued defendants, employees of the State of Washington's State Operated Living Alternative (SOLA) program, on behalf of herself and her daughter's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her daughter of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe physical conditions while in involuntary state custody. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that defendants had no constitutionally required duty of care towards plaintiff's daughter because there was no special relationship between her daughter and the state and there was no state-created danger. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, county officers and the county, alleging a state law wrongful death claim and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment when her 18-year-old son was shot and killed in his driveway by the officers. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants after concluding there was no constitutional violation. The court held that there were material questions of fact about plaintiff's son's and the officers' actions that precluded a conclusion that the officers' rapid resort to deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. The court concluded that resolution of these issues was critical to a proper determination of the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the use of lethal force. The court also reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether plaintiff's state law wrongful death claim could properly be resolved on summary judgment.