Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current or former "franchisee" shuttle van drivers for SuperShuttle in various parts of California, filed a putative class action alleging that plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when, in truth, they were "employees" under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that they had consequently been deprived of the full protections provided to employees under the California Labor Code, including overtime and minimum wages, reimbursement of business expenses and deductions wrongfully taken from wages, and meal period pay. The district court granted SuperShuttle's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the third prong in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (Covalt) was not satisfied, the California Public Utilities Code 1759 was not implicated, and the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On remand, the district court could determine whether the SuperShuttle drivers were employees or independent contractors under California law without hindering or interfering with PUC decisions or policies.

This case stemmed from defendant's operation of a fraudulent investment fund. Defendant's Ponzi scheme took almost $13 million from over 50 investors and petitioners were among the investors. Petitioners appealed the district court's order dismissing their third-party petition to adjudicate property interests in forfeited property. The court held that the district court erred in holding that petitioners lacked prudential standing. The court also held that the district court erred when it found that the Government's interest in the funds was superior to petitioners' interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose from a deadly use of force lawsuit filed by decedent's family against defendants. The district court issued an in limine order precluding defendants from arguing that decedent was armed when he was shot. In his summation, defense counsel argued that the police sergeant who shot decedent thought decedent failed to surrender because he had shot a man just moments earlier. Plaintiffs' counsel objected, apparently based on the in limine order and the court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore defense counsel's statement. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for sanctions against defense counsel for his statements. The district court granted the motion and sanctioned defendants. Defendants appealed. The court reversed the district court's order imposing sanctions. On remand, the district court could, if it chose, hold further proceedings, consistent with the court's opinion, to determine whether any sanction was warranted for defense counsel's conceded violation.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that because the SSA took nearly two years to investigate whether to reopen a favorable determination on one of plaintiff's applications, much longer than the presumptive time of six months, and because the record did not show that the investigation was diligently pursued, the court reversed.

This case stemmed from FERC's statutory mandate set out in the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824-824w, to ensure that all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by power wholesalers were just and reasonable. Petitioners subsequently sought review of FERC's final order (Order 697), contending that the order violated FERC's governing statutes. In Order 697, FERC codified the existing limited market-based policy, along with multiple enhancements, in a final rule. At issue was whether the market-based regulatory policy established by FERC's order was permissible under the law. Taking into account Chevron deference, the law of the circuit, other relevant precedent, and the direction of the Supreme Court as to how the court should approach such administrative law issues concerning federal agencies, the court concluded that Order 697 did not per se violate the FPA.

This case stemmed from the USFS's issuance of a revised Travel Management Plan governing recreational motorized and nonmotorized use on 1.1 million acres of the Lewis and Clark National Forest, including the Middle Fork Judith Wilderness Study area. At issue was whether the Travel Management Plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977 (Study Act), Pub. L. No. 95-150, section 3(a), 91 Stat 1243, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that nothing in the Study Act, which required the USFS to manage a wilderness study area so as to "maintain" its wilderness character as it existed in 1977, prohibited the USFS from exercising its discretion to enhance the wilderness character of a study area. The court also held that NEPA did not require the USFS to prepare a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (EIS) where, as here, the final decision made only minor changes and was qualitatively within the spectrum of the alternatives discussed in the draft EIS. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant, owner and operator the Custer Battlefield Museum, was investigated in 2005 for unlawfully attempting to sell migratory bird parts and for fraudulently misrepresenting the provenance of historical artifacts for sale. During that investigation, two search warrants were executed and the court sealed the affidavits supporting the warrant applications. The government ultimately declined prosecution of any criminal charges. In 2010, appellant asked the district court for a copy of the search warrant applications and supporting affidavits. At issue was whether the public had a common law or First Amendment right of access to materials filed in support of search warrant applications after an investigation had been terminated. The court held that the public had a qualified common law right of access to warrant materials after an investigation had been terminated. The court also held that the district court properly recognized that right here, but it erred by granting appellant only restricted access to the warrant materials without articulating a compelling reason for its ruling or making specific factual findings. Therefore, the district court's order was vacated and the matter remanded to the district court to reapply the common law standard to appellant's request.

The Attorneys General of Washington and California filed parens patriae actions in their states' courts alleging that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) panels, and that state agencies and consumers were injured by paying inflated prices for products containing TFT-LCD panels. At issue was whether parens patriae actions filed by state Attorneys General constituted class actions within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court held that under the plain text of section 1332(d), the parens patriae suits were not class actions within the meaning of CAFA. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the actions and properly remanded them to state court. Given this conclusion, the court need not, reach any other issue raised by the party.

Plaintiff brought this suit in 2004, challenging the constitutionality of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 10 U.S.C. 654(b). While an appeal was pending in this case, Congress enacted the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Consequently, the court held that this case became moot when the repeal of section 654 took effect on September 20, 2010. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Taxpayers appealed the district court's denial of their Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a 1967 tax judgment against them. Taxpayers argued that the government committed fraud on the court during their 1967 suppression hearing and their subsequent appeal to this court. Taxpayers also argued that the judgment should be vacated under United States v. Throckmorton because taxpayers' business associate who sometimes served as their attorney, gave information to the government. The court concluded that, although the evidence uncovered by taxpayers showed some misconduct on the part of the government, it was insufficient to demonstrate fraud on the court. The court also held that because taxpayers have not shown that the business associate was their attorney rather than their business associate at the time he informed on taxpayers, the court rejected taxpayers' Throckmorton claim.