Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This action stemmed from the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "ISP Remand Order", which imposed a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, i.e., internet service provider-bound traffic. Plaintiff, which was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC"), maintained that the ISP Remand Order applied when the carrier originating the call and the carrier terminating the call were both CLECs. Defendant and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") contended that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied only to traffic between a CLEC and an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). CPUC agreed with defendant's limited reading of the reach of the compensation regime, finding it inapplicable to the ISP-bound traffic originating with plaintiff and terminated by defendant, and so it assessed against plaintiff charges consistent with defendant's state-filed tariff. Plaintiff then sued defendant and the CPUC in federal district court, alleging that the ISP Remand Order preempted their attempts to assess plaintiff charges for ISP-bound traffic based on state-filed tariffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and CPUC, agreeing with their argument that the ISP Remand Order did not apply to CLEC-CLEC traffic. The court agreed with plaintiff and with the analysis contained in an amicus brief filed upon its request by the FCC, that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied to ISP-bound traffic exchanged between two CLECs. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies ("deputies") shot and killed Shane Hayes inside his home after the deputies arrived at Hayes' residence in response to a domestic disturbance call from a neighbor. Plaintiff, Hayes' daughter, asserted a claim for negligence based in part on the deputies' preshooting conduct, specifically their alleged failure to properly assess the situation before entering the house. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputies and found that the deputies owed Hayes no duty of care in their preshooting conduct. The district court did not address whether the deputies' preshooting conduct could be considered a breach of any standard of care, if such a duty were owed. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: "Whether under California negligence law, sheriff's deputies owe a duty of care to a suicidal person when preparing, approaching, and performing a welfare check on him." In light of the court's decision to certify the issue presented, the opinion filed in this case on March 22, 2011 was withdrawn.

This case arose from the controversial late-night arrests and subsequent release of two Phoenix newspaper executives. The newspaper executives and the Phoenix New Times, LLC (collectively, "plaintiffs") subsequently sued various officials connected with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and the Sheriff's Office, including the county attorney, the sheriff, and a special prosecutor, alleging that the special prosecutor and possibly others ordered the arrest of the newspaper executives at their homes in the middle of the night after The Phoenix New Times newspaper published various articles critical of the officials. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims and in remanding their remaining claims to state court. The court held that, while many of the actions alleged were protected by either absolute or qualified immunity, the actions of the special prosecutor in arranging the newspaper executives' arrest raised colorable claims of First and Fourth Amendment violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This appeal arose from a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, request concerning documents about individuals who reported to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") regarding their suspicions that appellant, a real estate company, was violating the law. HUD produced the documents with certain redactions, asserting that the redactions were justified pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6. At issue was whether the district court properly granted HUD's motion for summary judgment. In light of FOIA's strong presumption in favor of disclosure, and the narrow reach of FOIA exemptions, the court could not affirm the grant of summary judgment where HUD had conjured the specter of privacy interests but it had not adduced evidence establishing such interests were actually at stake, or if they were, how much weight they should be accorded. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment to HUD and remanded to allow the parties to develop an adequate factual basis for the district court to determine whether the information at stake could be withheld pursuant to Exemption 6.

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits based on combined impairments including bullous emphysema, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder and alleged that her disability began when her right lung collapsed. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. et seq. The court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred by failing to follow the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a) in determining whether plaintiff's mental impairments were severe and, if severe, whether they met or equaled a listed impairment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to remand to the ALJ to conduct a proper review of plaintiff's mental impairments.

Plaintiffs sued defendant to enforce the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") unilateral administrative order that commanded defendant to conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility study to assess the site conditions in the Columbia River and to implement a cleanup. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CLERCA"), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims for penalties for the 892 days of noncompliance with the unilateral administrative order and properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims where subsection (h)(2) did not apply to citizens suits.

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. ("Jensen") sued the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District ("District"), alleging that the District's Rules 220, 310, and 1010 were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; Rules 220 and 310 violated certain provisions of California law; and the Rules violated Jensen's due process rights. Jensen moved for summary judgment and while it's motion was pending, the district court granted the California Air Resources Board's ("CARB"), California's air pollution control agency, motion to intervene. CARB and the District (collectively, "defendants") subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jensen appealed the district court's judgment. The principal question in this case, among other questions, was whether the District's rules were preempted by the CAA. The court held that Rules 220 and 310 were not standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions and therefore, not preempted by CAA 209(e). The court also held that Rule 1010 did not apply to any "nonroad engines," as that term was used in the CAA and therefore, was not preempted under section 209(e). The court further held that there was no basis for Jensen's claim under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 93116 or Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 2450 et. seq.; that the Rules did not violate Jenson's due process rights where it admitted that the Rules served the legitimate government interest in minimizing air pollution from diesel engines; and the Rules did not violate California Constitution, Article 13A because Jensen waived this argument in its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.

Sierra Forest Legacy and other organizations (collectively, "Sierra Forest") appealed a largely unfavorable summary judgment against them and a favorable but limited remedial order in their National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., suit challenging the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment ("2004 Framework") and the Basin Project, a timber harvesting project approved under the 2004 Framework. The State of California ("California") also appealed a summary judgment against it and a limited remedial order in a related NEPA action. At issue was whether the process of establishing management guidelines governing 11.5 acres of federal land in the Sierra Nevada region complied with both the procedural requirements of NEPA and the substantive restrictions of NFMA. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the merits of Sierra Forest and California's NEPA claim and held that Sierra Forest and California had standing to assert a facial NEPA claim against the 2004 Framework but that the 2004 Framework supplemental environmental impact statement ("SEIS") adequately addressed short-term impacts to old forest wildlife and disclosed and rebutted public opposition. The court also held that the Forest Service did not violate NEPA when approving the Basin Project because the U.S. Forest Service and related federal defendants (collectively, "Federal Service") adequately addressed cumulative impacts of the proposed management act. The court further held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to update the alternatives from the 2001 Framework SEIS to reflect new modeling techniques used in the 2004 Framework SEIS. However, the court vacated the district court's orders granting a limited remedy and remanded for reconsideration of the equities of a "substantive" injunction without giving undue deference to government experts. The court remanded also because it reversed the district court's decision on Sierra Forests' NFMA claims.

Pinnacle Armor, Inc. ("Pinnacle") produced armor designed to protect buildings, vehicles, and the human body. Among Pinnacle's primary customers were local law enforcement agencies who depended in large part upon a federal subsidy to purchase the body arbor. The federal subsidy was conditioned on certification that the manufacturer's body armor was compliant with standards set by the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"). Pinnacle alleged that the NIJ's decision to revoke certification of one of its products violated its procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). The court held that the due process claims were properly dismissed because the NIJ afforded Pinnacle adequate process. The court also held that the NIJ's certification decision was not committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore reviewable under the APA where Pinnacle's claims were sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claim.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.