Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

United Medical Caregivers Clinic ("UMCC") prevailed in a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated by the United States. UMCC moved for an award of attorneys fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1)(A), and requested that the fee award be paid directly to counsel. At issue was whether the amount requested for attorneys fees was appropriate and whether CAFRA permitted that the fee award be paid directly to UMCC's counsel. The court referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner and held that the lodestar method would be used to calculate the amount of an appropriate fee award and held that the actual fee agreement between UMCC and its attorney may be taken into account but was not by itself determinative in calculating the appropriate amount of the fee award. The court also held that attorney fee awards under CAFRA were payable to the claimant, UMCC, but not to the claimant's attorney.

Plaintiff filed for social security disability benefits as a result of left-knee chronic neuropathic pain, hypertension, and depression. At issue was whether the district court's decision to direct an award of benefits, rather than to remand for further agency proceedings, exceeded its statutory authority. The court held that the district court erred in awarding benefits based upon the ALJ's failure to follow its remand order rather than consider whether plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the statute or whether the evidence the ALJ improperly excluded or discounted was true.

Plaintiff sued defendant, the Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board ("CARB"), alleging that California's Vessel Fuel Rules ("VFR")violated federal statutory and constitutional grounds. At issue was whether the VFR was preempted by the Submerged Lands Act and whether the VFR was preempted by the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause. The court held that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly denied where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the VFR was "otherwise 'unlawful and impermissibly regulate navigation and foreign and domestic commerce as delegated to the United States Congress'" under the Submerged Lands Act. The court also held that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly denied where the Commerce Clause or general maritime law should be used to bar a state from exercising its own police powers when such powers were used to combat severe environmental problems.

Plaintiff sued defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendant violated plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech by retaliating against him for supporting defendant's opponent in the 2006 Sheriff's election. At issue is whether plaintiff was a "policymaker" under Branti v. Finkel or at the very least, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions retaliating against plaintiff while plaintiff was a Reserve Division Commander because plaintiff was a policymaker in that position. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity for any further retaliatory action against plaintiff once plaintiff was transferred to Court Operations because plaintiff was not a policymaker at Court Operations under clearly established law.

Plaintiff sued defendant alleging that defendant's 1979 mobile home rent control ordinance and its implementation guidelines adopted by a 2006 amendment violated plaintiff's constitutional rights where the ordinance and its guidelines deprived mobile home park owners of the value of their property and transferred it to park residents who are able to sell their mobile homes at a premium because they are located on rent-controlled spaces. At issue was whether plaintiff's facial takings claim was properly dismissed for being time-barred and plaintiff's takings claim properly dismissed for being unripe. Also at issue was whether plaintiff's due process claim was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's facial takings claim was properly time-barred where plaintiff did not timely file its claim and where the 2006 amendment cannot be reasonably read as a substantive amendment to the 1979 ordinance that altered its effect on mobile home park owners. The court held that plaintiff's takings claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff failed to seek relief via writ of mandate and a Kavanau adjustment. The court held that plaintiff's due process claim was properly dismissed where the factual allegations in the Complaint do not provide a sufficient basis for a claim that defendant's actions were arbitrary, irrational, or lacking any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government interest.

The government brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's sealed, ex parte order ("Sealed Order") containing the district court's decision to make all of its contents public. At issue was whether the sealed order should be made public under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") when the government withheld the documents at issue from the district court and therefore misled the district court into believing that the government had complied with all its statutory obligations under FOIA. The court held that poor litigation strategy by the government was not an independent basis to make information public and that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel were not permitted to see the Sealed Order where full disclosure of the Sealed Order would compromise the authorized secrecy from plaintiffs of some of the information it contained.