Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose from California's implementation of a change to Medicare in 2006. The Centers argued that California mishandled the shift in payment responsibility for dual-eligibles' prescription drug costs from state Medicaid programs to the new, federal Medicare Part D Program. The Centers brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other things, the Centers urged the federal courts to declare unlawful California's "seizure" of the Centers' Medicare Part D funds, in excess of what would be owed under the per-visit rate for the Centers' expenses. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Centers' claims for retroactive monetary relief; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Centers' claims to the extent that they sought money damages; however, the court reversed the district court and remanded to allow the district court to assess Ex parte Young's application to the Center's remaining claims. View "North East Medical Services v. CA Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others sought and received LASIK eye surgery with a Nidek EC-5000 Excimer Laser System ("Laser") to correct farsightedness. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, claimed that, had they known that the FDA had not approved the Laser for this use, they would not have consented to the surgeries. The court held that the complaint did not state a claim under the California Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act, Cal. Health & Saf. Code 24171 et seq., because the surgeries were not "medical experiments" subject to the protection of the Act. Plaintiff did not have standing to sue for injunctive relief under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq., and his other substantive claim was preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. Plaintiff's common-law fraud by omission claim was expressly preempted by the preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments. Even if it were not, it was impliedly preempted because it amounted to an attempt to privately enforce the FDCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Perez, et al v. Nidek Co., Ltd., et al" on Justia Law

The Association sued the County, alleging that the County had breached its obligation to provide certain vested healthcare benefits in perpetuity. The Association alleged that the County had implicitly promised to provide these benefits. The California Supreme Court's recent decision in Retired Employees Ass'n of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (REAOC II) recognized that a county could form a contract with implied terms under specified circumstances. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. Nevertheless, in light of REAOC II, the court could not agree with the district court's decision to deny the Association leave to amend on the ground that such amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with REAOC II. View "Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emp. v. Sonoma Cnty." on Justia Law

In the four cases giving rise to these eleven consolidated appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs, various providers and beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal). At issue was the implementation of Medi-Cal reimbursement rate reductions. The court held that Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe did not control the outcome in these cases because it did not consider the key issue here - the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A); the Secretary's approval of California's requested reimbursement rates were entitled to Chevron deference; and the Secretary's approval complied with the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because the Secretary had reasonably determined that the State's reimbursement rates complied with section 30(A). The court finally held that none of the plaintiffs had a viable takings claim because Medicaid, as a voluntary program, did not create property rights. View "Managed Pharmacy Care, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Merck in their diversity action alleging wrongful death. Plaintiffs' son died after being administered a Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine manufactured by Merck. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in applying the standards of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-22, to their individual claims for damages. Having concluded that Section 22 of the Act generally applied to limit tort liability in a parent's claim for individual injuries, the court determined that plaintiffs' suit was a "civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine" and thus limited by the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Holmes, et al. v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Rosa was apprehended by police officers after one of the officers deployed his advanced Taser M26 ECD (M26). After officers had Michael in restraints, Michael stopped breathing and later died of ventricular arrhythmia. The doctor who performed the autopsy listed "Taser application and arrest by police" as contributing conditions. Michael's death was subsequently linked to metabolic acidosis, a condition under which lactic acid accumulates more quickly than the body can dispose of it, causing the pH in the body to decrease, making sudden cardiac arrest more likely. Plaintiffs, Michael's parents and his daughter sued TASER International, Inc. (Defendant) as manufacturer of the M26, asserting that Michael died because it had provided an inadequate warning of the dangers of the product to the officers who used it. Plaintiffs pursued both strict liability and negligence theories under California law based upon this failure to warn. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of TASER because the risk of lactic acidosis was not knowable in 2003 when the M26 at issue was distributed. View "Rosa v. TASER Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the constitutionality of certain California statutes and regulations that prohibit licensed opticians from offering prescription eyewear at the same location in which eye examinations were provided and from advertising that eyewear and eye examinations were available in the same location. Plaintiffs maintained that these statutes and regulations violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that there was no material issue of fact regarding whether the challenged laws placed a significant burden on interstate commerce and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of thousands of retired county employees participating in county-sponsored health care plans, filed suit against the county challenging changes it made to the structure of two health benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the county. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings and with the answer provided by the California Supreme Court to the certified question in the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc.(REAOC) litigation. The court took judicial notice of the documents; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' subsidy claims and remanded so that the district court could reassess those claims in light of the California Supreme Court's opinion, and coordinate those claims with the REAOC litigation; the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' grant claims because the court found that plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to set out specifically the terms of those memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on which their claim predicated; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 12940 et seq., claim because the court found that Mr. McConnell's timely filed administrative complaint was sufficient to establish exhaustion of the administrative remedies for all class members.

Plaintiffs, severely disabled California residents, alleged that conventional medical services, drugs, and medications have not alleviated the pain caused by their impairments. Therefore, each plaintiff has obtained a recommendation from a medical doctor to use marijuana to treat her pain. Plaintiffs obtained medical marijuana through collectives located in Costa Mesa and Lake Forest, California. These cities, however, have taken steps to close marijuana dispensing facilities operating within their boundaries. Plaintiffs brought an action in federal district court, alleging that the cities' actions violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that Congress has made clear that the ADA defined "illegal drug use" by reference to federal, rather than state law, and federal law did not authorize plaintiffs medical marijuana use. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs' medical marijuana use was not protected by the ADA.

Defendant, a former research assistant at UHS, entered a conditional guilty plea for violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(a)(2), because he accessed patient records without authorization after his employment terminated. Defendant moved to dismiss the information because it did not allege that he knew that the statute prohibited him from obtaining the health information. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the plain text of Section 1320d-6(a)(2) was not limited to defendants who knew that their actions were illegal. Rather, the misdemeanor applied to defendants who knowingly obtained individual identifiable health information relating to an individual, and obtained that information in violation of HIPPAA.