Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Peng Shen, a Chinese citizen, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming she was subjected to a forced abortion in China in 2003. Shen testified that a mandatory premarital health exam revealed her pregnancy, leading to the forced abortion. During cross-examination, DHS counsel suggested that the Chinese government had eliminated the premarital health check-up requirement by January 2003, causing Shen to become flustered and change her testimony.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Shen's application, finding her not credible based on her demeanor and inconsistencies in her testimony. The IJ noted Shen's initial confusion about the abortion date, her inconsistent statements about the premarital check-up, and discrepancies in her documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, focusing on Shen's inconsistent testimony about the premarital check-up and the notarial certificate's incorrect date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that DHS counsel had misstated Chinese law regarding the premarital check-up requirement, which was repealed effective October 1, 2003. This misstatement likely affected the IJ's adverse credibility determination. The court concluded that Shen's flustered response to the incorrect information could have been due to the pressure of the situation rather than dishonesty.The Ninth Circuit granted Shen's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agency to reassess Shen's credibility without the influence of the incorrect legal information provided during cross-examination. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances in making credibility determinations. View "SHEN V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves several companies that post immigration surety bonds challenging a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule. The rule, promulgated by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf in 2020, allowed DHS to refuse business from certain surety firms. The plaintiffs argued that Wolf was not duly appointed and thus lacked the authority to issue the rule. In 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, who was duly appointed, ratified the rule.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary when he promulgated the rule and that Mayorkas's ratification was barred by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The district court vacated the rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the rule was improperly promulgated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FVRA did not bar Mayorkas from ratifying the rule and that the ratification cured any defects in the rule’s promulgation. The court explained that the Ratification Bar in the FVRA applies only to nondelegable functions or duties, which are those required by statute or regulation to be performed by the applicable officer and only that officer. Since the promulgation of the rule was a delegable duty, the ratification by Mayorkas was valid.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that the ratification by a duly appointed Secretary cured any defects in the rule’s initial promulgation by an improperly appointed Acting Secretary. View "GONZALES & GONZALES BONDS & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Gilberto Azael Leon Perez, a Mexican national and legal permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, in violation of Nevada law. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged Perez as removable based on his conviction, which they argued constituted an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). An immigration judge agreed, finding that the conviction was for an attempted aggravated felony that rendered Perez removable from the United States. Perez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, thus affirming the immigration judge's removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was tasked with reviewing the case. The court had to decide whether their precedent, which sets out the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor, was clearly irreconcilable with a Supreme Court decision, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. The court held that it was not. The court also held that the BIA did not err in concluding that Perez’s conviction categorically constituted an attempted “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony that renders him removable. Therefore, the court denied Perez's petition for review. View "PEREZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Purushothaman Rajaram, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc., refused to hire him because it preferred to hire noncitizens holding H1B visas, to whom it could pay lower wages. Rajaram claimed that this constituted employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens based on their citizenship.The district court dismissed Rajaram's complaint, ruling that section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination based on U.S. citizenship. Rajaram appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 1981. The appellate court held that the statutory text of section 1981 prohibits employers from discriminating against U.S. citizens. The court reasoned that an employer that discriminates against U.S. citizens gives one class of people—noncitizens—a greater right to make contracts than U.S. citizens. This interpretation, the court held, is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which guarantees that all persons shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Rajaram's employment discrimination action and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that section 1981 does prohibit discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens on the basis of their citizenship. View "RAJARAM V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Gerson Eduardo Alfaro Manzano, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who fled to the United States after being persecuted for his Jehovah's Witness faith. In El Salvador, Alfaro Manzano preached to the youth of his hometown to dissuade them from joining gangs. This led to him being attacked, threatened, and nearly killed by gang members. He sought asylum in the United States, arguing that his faith would be a central reason for his persecution in El Salvador.The immigration judge (IJ) granted Alfaro Manzano withholding of removal but denied asylum, finding that his religion would be "a reason" for his persecution but not "one central reason" sufficient for asylum eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that the gang's desire to increase its wealth and power was the primary reason for targeting Alfaro Manzano, while religion provided only an incidental or subordinate reason.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that Alfaro Manzano's faith would be "one central reason" for his persecution. The court clarified that a motive can be a central reason if it, standing alone, would lead the persecutors to harm the individual. The court found that even in the absence of the gang's desire to extort him, Alfaro Manzano's religion, standing alone, would lead the persecutors to harm him. The court remanded the case for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in determining whether to grant Alfaro Manzano asylum. View "MANZANO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Leopoldo Rivera-Valdes, a Mexican citizen who unlawfully entered the United States in 1992. In 1994, Rivera-Valdes failed to appear at his deportation hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. He was finally deported in 2006 after being apprehended. After being deported, Rivera-Valdes again unlawfully entered the United States. In 2019, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged the indictment, alleging that his 1994 in absentia deportation order violated due process. The district court denied the motion, and Rivera-Valdes entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the constitutional challenge to his deportation.The district court denied Rivera-Valdes's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that his 1994 in absentia deportation order did not violate due process. Rivera-Valdes had argued that immigration authorities violated his due process rights by ordering him deported in absentia despite the notice of the deportation hearing being returned as undeliverable or unclaimed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the deportation in absentia did not violate due process. The court found that whether Rivera-Valdes actually received the notice, the government followed its statutory obligations and reasonably attempted to inform him of the hearing by mailing notice to his last (and only) provided address. The court rejected Rivera-Valdes's argument that additional steps to notify him of his deportation hearing were required under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006). The court concluded that even if Jones's "additional reasonable steps" standard did supersede the constitutional adequacy of notice as recognized in this court’s cases, the government still satisfied due process because no additional reasonable steps existed that were practicable for it to take. View "USA V. RIVERA-VALDES" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Tania Lizeth Gonzalez-Lara, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying her motion to remand to apply for voluntary departure and dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Gonzalez-Lara, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in December 2017. She claimed persecution on account of her membership in particular social groups, including family members of Salvadoran police officers and Salvadoran women. The IJ found Gonzalez-Lara credible but denied her applications, finding that she had not suffered harm that rose to the level of past persecution and that her fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and denied Gonzalez-Lara's motion to remand to apply for voluntary departure. The BIA reasoned that Gonzalez-Lara did not show a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not present evidence that the gangs have shown interest in her, her former partner, or family since she left El Salvador in 2017. The BIA also found that Gonzalez-Lara had waived the IJ’s denial of her CAT claim because she did not raise any specific argument on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court found that the BIA erred in denying the motion to remand on the basis that Gonzalez-Lara had not previously applied for voluntary departure. However, the court concluded that the BIA’s error was harmless because Gonzalez-Lara did not allege facts to satisfy all elements of voluntary departure, and the record did not independently establish her prima facie eligibility. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Gonzalez-Lara’s fear of harm was too speculative to support her claim for relief. View "GONZALEZ-LARA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Marlon Alonzo Smith, a native and citizen of Guyana, who was found removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Smith challenged the authenticity and reliability of three documents the agency relied upon for its removability ruling: a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien; an FBI rap sheet; and a criminal judgment. He argued that these documents were not authenticated by any method and that an amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Smith had not preserved his challenge to the authenticity of three of the Government’s exhibits, and they sufficed to establish his removability. The BIA also rejected Smith’s due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Smith's petition for review. The court found that Smith did not preserve his challenge to the authenticity of the documents, and they were sufficient to establish his removability. The court also rejected Smith's due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection. The court did not resolve the issue of whether the amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated, leaving that analysis for another day. View "SMITH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law