Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction of plaintiff's complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Plaintiff sought damages suffered as a result of his removal from the United States in violation of this court's temporary stay of removal.The panel held that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) did not deprive it of jurisdiction to hear the FTCA claims of a noncitizen who was wrongfully removed in violation of a court order. Therefore, the district court erred in holding otherwise. The panel held that a decision or action to violate a court order staying removal fell outside of the statute's jurisdiction-stripping reach. Even if the panel agreed that plaintiff's claims tangentially arose from the execution of his removal order, the panel would still retain jurisdiction because the Attorney General lacked the authority, and thus the discretion, to remove him. Finally, the panel rejected the government's alternative argument that plaintiff's claims were barred by the FTCA's foreign country exception. View "Arce v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in finding that petitioner's conviction for child abuse and neglect under Nevada law was categorically a "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The panel held that it was bound by this circuit's opinion in Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions, No. 14-71742, 2018 WL 3520402 (9th Cir. July 23, 2018), which deferred to the BIA's interpretation, in Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), that the generic crime of child abuse includes acts and omissions that create at least a "reasonable probability" that a child will be harmed. In this case, the Nevada statute was broader than the federal generic crime and there was a realistic probability that Nevada could prosecute conduct under its statute that fell outside the scope of the federal generic crime. Therefore, the panel granted the petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner was removable. View "Alvarez-Cerriteno v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed, based on lack of jurisdiction, a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate asylum-only proceedings and denial of his application for asylum. Petitioner entered the United States in 2000 pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), but the INS issued a notice in 2002 concluding that he was removable and had waived his right to contest his removeability as a VWP entrant after he was arrested for credit card fraud. As part of his plea agreement in the credit card prosecution, petitioner agreed to testify against his co-conspirators, in exchange for help resolving his immigration status. Petitioner was issued an I-94 Departure Record, paroling him into the United States for "significant public interest," so he could testify against his co-conspirators. After petitioner's parole had expired, DHS took him into custody pursuant to his 2002 removal order and petitioner then requested asylum.The panel held that the 2002 removal order was executed when petitioner briefly departed the United States in 2004. Because the 2002 order had already been executed when petitioner entered the United States in 2004, he was no longer an applicant under the VWP, but an applicant for admission. Therefore, there was no final removal order over which the court had jurisdiction. View "Nicusor-Remus v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for unlawful reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The panel held that defendant's prior 2008 and 2011 removals were fundamentally unfair and thus could not serve as a predicate removal for purposes of section 1326.The panel held that because the 2008 removal proceeding was in absentia, defendant satisfied the exhaustion and deprivation-of-judicial-review requirements for bringing a collateral attack on the validity of that removal. Furthermore, it was error to remove defendant for a crime of domestic violence under Immigration and Nationality Act 237(a)(2)(E)(i) based on his California battery conviction because circuit precedent established that California battery was not a categorical crime of violence. The panel also held that the due process defects in the 2008 removal proceeding infected the 2011 expedited removal for presenting invalid entry documents. In this case, the 2011 expedited removal order was also fundamentally unfair because it violated the process due to lawful permanent residents. View "United States v. Ochoa-Oregel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal. The panel held that the Chinese police prevented petitioner from practicing his faith and did so through coercive means. In this case, petitioner suffered physical mistreatment that caused him to seek medical attention and the police effectively prevented him from practicing his religion and living a Christian life. Therefore, petitioner suffered ongoing harm which, under circuit precedent, compelled a finding of past persecution. The panel remanded for the BIA to apply the rebuttable presumption that petitioner will experience further persecution if returned to China. However, the panel held that petitioner failed to establish a clear probability of torture. View "Zhihui Guo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted Frimmel's petition for review of the ALJ's final decision and order declining to suppress employment records ICE obtained through an investigation of Frimmel's compliance with employment verification requirements. ICE had initiated an investigation of Frimmel after the Maricopa Sheriff's Office (MCSO) conducted illegal raids of two restaurants and the home of Bret Frimmel, owner of Frimmel.The panel held that MCSO committed knowing or reckless material omissions and distortions in search warrant affidavits that resulted in a search violating the Fourth Amendment, and the violation was egregious because a reasonable officer should have known the conduct was unconstitutional. The panel also held that ICE's investigation was not attenuated from MCSO's illegal raid and ICE's evidence was the fruit of MCSO's illegal raid. Finally, the panel held that MCSO's conduct easily met the flagrancy standards and it had immigration enforcement in its "zone of primary interest." Therefore, the exclusionary rule would serve to deter MCSO from Fourth Amendment violations by the probability that illegally obtained evidence would not be useful to ICE, even in a civil proceeding. The panel reversed the ALJ's ruling that denied suppression of ICE's evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule, remanding for further proceedings. View "Frimmel Management, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging the U.S. Consulate's denial of his visa application filed on behalf of his wife, who is a native and citizen of Germany. Determining that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not strip the district court of that jurisdiction, the panel held that the APA provides no avenue for review of a consular officer's adjudication of a visa on the merits. The panel explained that, rather, the only standard by which it could review the merits of a consular officer's denial of a visa was for constitutional error, where the visa application was denied without a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. In this case, the consular officer's citations to the Immigration and Nationality Act and identification of the wife's criminal history constituted facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for rejecting her visa application. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Allen v. Milas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony child endangerment constituted a crime of child abuse that rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Petitioner's conviction of felony child endangerment under California Penal Code 273a(a) was for driving under the influence with a child in his car who was not wearing a seat belt. The panel held that the Board's interpretation of a crime of child abuse, neglect or abandonment in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), was entitled to Chevron deference. Applying that definition in this instance, the panel held that petitioner's California conviction was a categorical match to the crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Furthermore, the Board's interpretation applied retroactively to Martinez-Cedillo's 2008 conviction, which occurred before the Board's decisions in Velazquez-Herrera and Soram. View "Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the Board's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (bribery). The panel applied Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), and held that a crime involving moral turpitude is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel held that Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), does not foreclose consideration of whether a crime committed by a non-citizen constitutes a crime of moral turpitude so as to render her inadmissible. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), extending to the immigration context its earlier opinion in Johnson, did not eviscerate the panel's holding in Tseung Chu such that the panel should overrule it. Therefore, the panel remained bound by Jordan and Tseung Chu. View "Martinez-de Ryan v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Bermudez-Ariza, a citizen of Colombia, alleges that he fled Colombia to escape persecution by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia on account of his political opinions. He entered the United States illegally in 2002, and, in removal proceedings, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ initially denied all relief but, on subsequent remand from the BIA, reconsidered and granted asylum. The BIA vacated the IJ’s decision, holding that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to reconsider asylum on remand. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded to the BIA for consideration, on the merits, of the grant of asylum. For the BIA to retain jurisdiction when remanding to an IJ, it must expressly retain jurisdiction, and qualify or limit the scope of the remand. If the BIA fails to do either of those things, the scope of the remand is general and the IJ may reconsider any prior decisions, 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1). Because the BIA did not expressly retain jurisdiction when it remanded to the IJ in this case, the IJ had jurisdiction to reconsider his initial denial of Bermudez-Ariza’s application for asylum. View "Bermudez-Ariza v. Sessions" on Justia Law