Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion granting a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal to petitioner, a citizen of China, who sought relief based on his political opinion. The panel explained that there was no dispute that petitioner experienced past persecution at the hands of the local government. The appeal turned instead on whether the persecution he suffered was on account of an imputed or actual political opinion. The panel held that the evidence compelled a finding that petitioner was persecuted by Chinese authorities on account of an imputed or actual political opinion. View "Xinbing Song v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Anyone who under the relevant statutes is considered a minor child of a legal permanent resident (LPR) on the date of the parent's naturalization (and who is the beneficiary of a valid petition for an immigrant visa based on that status) can obtain a visa as the minor child of a citizen following his parent's naturalization. In this case, the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision rejecting petitioner's application for adjustment of status. The panel held that petitioner, a child of an LPR who was deemed by statute to be a minor child until the very day his father naturalized, still qualified as a minor on that day. The panel remanded to the BIA to find that petitioner had an immediately available visa as the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen and to conduct further proceedings regarding the other requirements for adjustment of status. View "Rodriguez Tovar v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Anyone who under the relevant statutes is considered a minor child of a legal permanent resident (LPR) on the date of the parent's naturalization (and who is the beneficiary of a valid petition for an immigrant visa based on that status) can obtain a visa as the minor child of a citizen following his parent's naturalization. In this case, the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision rejecting petitioner's application for adjustment of status. The panel held that petitioner, a child of an LPR who was deemed by statute to be a minor child until the very day his father naturalized, still qualified as a minor on that day. The panel remanded to the BIA to find that petitioner had an immediately available visa as the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen and to conduct further proceedings regarding the other requirements for adjustment of status. View "Rodriguez Tovar v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioners' claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review petitioners' administrative closure claim, because the Avetisyan factors, rooted in the regulatory grant of authority to IJs and the BIA, provided a sufficiently meaningful standard against which to review IJ and BIA decisions regarding administrative closure. The panel noted that, although remand would usually be appropriate where the IJ and BIA did not conduct an independent review of a request for administrative closure, petitioners here have not argued or shown how they were eligible for administrative closure under the Avetisyan factors. Furthermore, petitioners had no pending petitions or other requests for immigration relief that might make remand necessary. Finally, the panel held that substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA's decision denying CAT relief. View "Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioners' claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review petitioners' administrative closure claim, because the Avetisyan factors, rooted in the regulatory grant of authority to IJs and the BIA, provided a sufficiently meaningful standard against which to review IJ and BIA decisions regarding administrative closure. The panel noted that, although remand would usually be appropriate where the IJ and BIA did not conduct an independent review of a request for administrative closure, petitioners here have not argued or shown how they were eligible for administrative closure under the Avetisyan factors. Furthermore, petitioners had no pending petitions or other requests for immigration relief that might make remand necessary. Finally, the panel held that substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA's decision denying CAT relief. View "Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The limitation imposed by 8 U.S.C. 1429 applies only to the executive branch's adjudication of naturalization applications, and only when removal proceedings are pending pursuant to an arrest warrant. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of plaintiffs' complaint requesting adjudication of their naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). In this case, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where it was not the executive branch and there was no pending removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Therefore, section 1429 was not applicable. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Yith v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The limitation imposed by 8 U.S.C. 1429 applies only to the executive branch's adjudication of naturalization applications, and only when removal proceedings are pending pursuant to an arrest warrant. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of plaintiffs' complaint requesting adjudication of their naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). In this case, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where it was not the executive branch and there was no pending removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Therefore, section 1429 was not applicable. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Yith v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., creates a categorical right to court-appointed counsel at government expense for alien minors. The Ninth Circuit held that, to the extent the IJ failed to provide all the trappings of a full and fair hearing in this case, any shortcomings did not prejudice the outcome because the IJ adequately developed the record on issues that were dispositive to petitioner's claims for relief. The panel also held that the IJ was not required to advise petitioner of a separate state court process that could ultimately form the predicate for petitioner's application for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status with the IJ. Finally, the panel declined to reversed the Board's denial of petitioner's asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims, because substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that petitioner was ineligible for relief. View "C.J.L.G. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A California conviction for carjacking under Penal Code section 215(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of a final order of removal. The panel held that Nieves-Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction for carjacking under section 215 is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), cannot stand in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), which held that the physical force that a crime of violence entails must be violent force. Because section 215 did not require the use of violent force that Johnson required, the California statute was not a crime of violence. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

There is no reason to conclusively presume prejudice when an individual was denied the right to counsel during his initial interaction with DHS officers, provided the individual was able to consult with counsel before the removal order is executed. The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of DHS's final administrative order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). Assuming that a due process violation occurred when petitioner did not have counsel present at the outset of the removal process, the panel held that petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. In this case, petitioner failed to show that denial of the right to counsel during his initial interaction with DHS officers prejudiced him. In this case, petitioner has never attempted to contest the charges against him, even after having an opportunity to consult with counsel, so he could not contend that his un-counseled admissions cost him the chance to raise plausible grounds for contesting removal. Nor could he claim prejudice by virtue of his un-counseled waiver of the right to request withholding of removal. View "Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions" on Justia Law