Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the IJ's determination that he lacked a reasonable fear of torture and is therefore not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) from his reinstated removal order. The court concluded that the IJ's determination is not limited to the question whether it was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” The court reviewed the IJ's negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. In this case, the court held that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in torture sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture under CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

After petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to violating California Penal Code 32, accessory to a felony, he was ordered removed. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 101(a)(43)(S). The BIA dismissed petitioner's appeal and announced a new interpretation of “obstruction of justice” that requires only “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Contrary to the prior construction, this interpretation of INA 101(a)(43)(S) requires no nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. The court agreed with petitioner that the agency's revised interpretation of the statute raises serious constitutional concerns about whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The court remanded to the agency so that it can either offer a new construction of INA 101(a)(43)(S) or, in the alternative, apply In re Espinoza-Gonzalez's interpretation to the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, appealed the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure because he lacked good moral character pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(1), as a "habitual drunkard." Petitioner is a chronic alcoholic and has a ten-year history of alcohol abuse. The court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a person’s medical disability lacks any rational relation to his classification as a person with bad moral character, and that section 1101(f)(1) is therefore unconstitutional. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Linares and Preciado challenged the denial of their applications for cancellation of removal based on the finding that they were ineligible for cancellation of removal because their convictions for identity theft under California Penal Code 530.5(a) and (d)(2) were categorical crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The court concluded that the BIA erred in finding that petitioners' convictions were CIMTs because sections 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are not categorical fraud crimes, nor do they necessarily involve vile, base, or depraved conduct. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. The court did not address the parties' remaining arguments. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ramirez-Munoz and Francia-Alvarez, a married couple and natives and citizens of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioners have not established that they are part of a narrowly defined or cognizable particular social group, and the court held that the proposed group of “imputed wealthy Americans” is not a discrete class of persons recognized by society as a particular social group. Nor is the proposed group sufficiently particular that it can be described with passable distinction that the group would be recognized as a discrete class of persons. Further, petitioners' evidence of changed country conditions does not point to either actual or imputed wealthy Americans as the targeted class of victims of increased violence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, pled no contest to a charge under California Penal Code section 118, a general perjury statute. Petitioner was charged with perjury - application for driver's license. The IJ and the BIA concluded that petitioner's conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and disqualified petitioner from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court held that section 118 is not categorically a CIMT; section 118 is divisible because it criminalizes two distinct offenses: written and oral perjury; and, applying the modified approach, petitioner's offense of conviction for written perjury is not a CIMT. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted that it took no position on California’s other, context-specific perjury statutes. View "Rivera v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant emigrated from China in 1985, and applied for naturalization in 1993. In 1994, defendant was found guilty of Robbery of the First Degree and False Imprisonment with Violence or Menace. On March 31, 1994, defendant took his oath of allegiance and became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Nearly 20 years later, the government filed a complaint to revoke defendant's naturalization. The district court granted the government's motion on the pleadings based on 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(3) (for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude during the statutory period); and (2) the “catch-all” provision of 8 U.S.C. 1101(f), as promulgated in 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (for having committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect on one’s moral character during the statutory period). The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that defendant could not establish good moral character under section 1101(f) and 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Therefore, the district court was required to enter a judgment of denaturalization. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Teng Jiao Zhou" on Justia Law

This court has held that an immigration judge may use the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—“false in one thing, false in everything”—to find that a witness who testified falsely in one respect at a removal hearing is also not credible in other respects. The court concluded that the BIA may not do the same thing when considering a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court explained that, in contrast to an immigration judge, the BIA is not a finder of fact, so it cannot make the kind of credibility determination inherent in a decision to apply the falsus maxim. The court granted the petition for review in this case because the BIA applied the falsus maximu in denying petitioner's motion to reopen. The falsus maxim cannot render petitioner’s affidavit “inherently unbelievable,” because the falsus maxim is discretionary rather than mandatory. View "Shouchen Yang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's finding of removability based on his two prior drug convictions. The court concluded that the IJ erred in concluding that petitioner’s two counts of drug possession would bar him from first-offender treatment under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), 18 U.S.C. 3607(a). The court held that the two counts amount to a single “offense” under the FFOA because they arose out of a single event, composed a single criminal case, and triggered a single, undivided sentence. While petitioner was charged with possession of two different drugs, that alone does not change petitioner’s status as a first-time drug offender under the FFOA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Villavicencio-Rojas v. Lynch" on Justia Law