Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm in California in 1981. After serving most of his sentence, Rivera was deported in 1984. Since then, Petitioner twice reentered the country without inspection. The government began a removal proceeding against Rivera in 2004. Rivera admitted removability and sought adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, Because his 1981 conviction rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), Rivera applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 1182(h)(1)(A) and (B). The immigration judge denied Rivera's application for wavier of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Rivera failed to satisfy the hardship standard of 8 C.F.R. 1212.7(d). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and denied the application, holding that the BIA properly applied section 1212.7(d) to Rivera. View "Rivera-Peraza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Bao Tai Nian (Bao), a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Bao arrived in the United States as an alien crew member. His asylum proceeding was thus limited in scope to a so-called "asylum-only" proceeding. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA did not issue a final order of removal, and thus the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether the BIA's denial of asylum in "asylum-only" proceedings was the equivalent of a final order of removal such that the Court had jurisdiction. The Court held that denial of an alien crew member's petition for asylum and other relief in "asylum-only" proceedings was the functional equivalent of a final order a removal, and thus, the Court had jurisdiction to review Bao's petition from the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The Court then denied Bao's petition for review in a separate memorandum disposition. View "Nian v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rene Lopez-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was paroled into the United States to face immigration and criminal charges following his initial detention at a port of entry when marijuana was discovered in a truck he was driving. No criminal charges were filed against Lopez-Rodriguez, but he was later charged with being ineligible for admission because there was "reason to believe" he was or had been an illicit trafficker of a controlled substance. After a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), the IJ found (1) there was "no reason to believe" that Lopez-Rodriguez was an elicit trafficker in a controlled substance, and (2) Lopez-Rodriguez was admissible. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, concluding that the IJ's decision to admit Lopez-Rodriguez was clearly erroneous. Lopez-Rodriguez petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, holding that the Board committed legal error by making its own factual determination and engaging in de novo review of the IJ's factual findings. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial. View "United States v. Ramos-Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in 2007 to felony domestic battery and was charged with removability based on this conviction. Petitioner subsequently petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to affirm the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal, arguing inter alia that the video-conference hearing violated his right to due process. The court held that the video-conference hearing in this case did not violate due process where petitioner failed to establish that the outcome of his hearing could have been affected by the fact that his hearing was conducted by video-conference; the agency considered the factors relevant to petitioner's application for cancellation of removal; and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision to deny his application. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Vilchez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his daughter appealed the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff submitted an application for an immigrant visa based on an approved I-130 petition filed by his daughter. The United States Consulate in Mexico denied the application. The district court found that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to review the consular official's discretionary decisions. The district court also found that it had no jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., or the Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 U.S.C. 702. The court affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims as to Form I-160 and vacated that part of the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims as to his request for reconsideration. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether it had jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, the APA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The court remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that his conviction for misprision of a felony was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court held that misprision of a felony was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude where the BIA relied on a flawed rationale. That an offense contravenes "societal duties" was not enough to make it a crime involving moral turpitude; otherwise, every crime would involve moral turpitude. The court remanded to allow the BIA to conduct a modified categorical analysis of petitioner's conviction and to consider whether he was alternatively removable as an alien who "has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance."

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Lebanon, petitioned for review of a decision from the BIA which upheld the IJ's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The BIA also affirmed the IJ's finding that conditions had changed in Lebanon such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return. The court affirmed the IJ and BIA's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime by committing a complex mail fraud scheme to defraud victims of nearly $2 million and was therefore, not eligible for asylum or withholding removal. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that conditions in Lebanon had changed such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return there. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

This case involved the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), which repealed the waiver of deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) 212(c). Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of section 212(c) relief. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied petitioner a continuance because she was eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation under INA 212(c). The court held that the BIA did not err when it held that INA 212(h)'s seven-year continuous presence requirement was not impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the petition for review was granted and the case remanded to allow petitioner a continuance to apply for the former 212(c) waiver of removal. The petition was denied as to petitioner's claims arising under section 212(h).

Petitioner, born in England to an American serviceman father and an English mother, petitioned for review of his removal proceedings. At issue was a 1952 statute, 8 U.S.C. 1409(a), regarding "legitimation" and Arizona state law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-601. Because petitioner was a legitimate son of his natural parents under Arizona law, and because the identity of his natural father is and has always been undisputed, he appeared to have met the requirements of Former 1401(a)(7). However, the court must address whether legitimation required an affirmative act, as the district court held, rather than simply the status of being legitimate; and whether petitioner's paternity was "established" under Arizona law. The court answered the first issue in the negative and the second issue in the affirmative, holding that petitioner was a citizen of the United States. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review in No. 08-73946 and remanded with instructions for the agency to vacate the removal order against him. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review in No. 07-074042, and dismissed as moot the appeal in No. 10-16491.