Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native of Australia, appealed the BIA's order of removal as an alien convicted of a controlled substance, arguing that the BIA erred when it decided that she was not eligible to seek section 212(c) discretionary relief from removal pursuant to the former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), which was repealed in 1996 as to aliens with certain criminal convictions. The court concluded that the repeal of section 212(c) imposed an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens like petitioner, who in reliance on the possibility of discretionary relief, agreed to a stipulated facts trial. The record demonstrated that petitioner reasonably relied on the law that existed when she faced criminal proceedings in 1980; therefore, the repeal of section 212(c) could not be applied retroactively to her conviction. The court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded with instructions to consider the merits of her section 212(c) application.

Petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, petitioned for review of a decision by the BIA affirming the IJ, who made an adverse credibility determination and denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief pursuant to the CAT. The court held that the BIA sufficiently complied with the court's mandate because it considered the REAL ID Act's, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, impact on the IJ's finding that petitioner's claims were not sufficiently corroborated. Even assuming that the REAL ID Act mandated notice that corroborating evidence was required, such notice was provided in this case. Therefore, the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and petitioner's due process rights were not violated.

Defendant appealed his conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) for illegal reentry into the United States after being deported. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction based on a collateral attack of the underlying removal order. The court held that a defect in defendant's 1997 immigration proceedings, that he was not meaningfully informed of his eligibility for voluntary departure, violated his due process rights. However, the district court did not consider fully whether defendant suffered prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider this issue.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) properly terminated petitioner's lawful permanent resident status and dismissed his appeal. At issue was whether the CIS lost jurisdiction of a petition to remove conditions placed on residence if it did not adjudicate the petition within 90 days, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(3)(A). The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that the 90 day deadline did not start "running after the first scheduled interview" because this interview "was not intended by CIS to be the final interview." The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's due process argument. Accordingly, the petition was denied in part and dismissed in part.

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government provided clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that left no issue in doubt that defendant, a naturalized citizen, obtained his citizenship illegally. The court held that the district court improperly weighed the evidence in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the government could strip defendant of his citizenship. The existence and nature of the cooperation agreement were the subjects of pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests, and further evidence should have been allowed. Because of the importance of citizenship, which in turn conferred significant rights and responsibilities, the government bore a heavy burden when it sought to take away an individual's citizenship. The court also vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue, and remanded with instructions that the district court conduct the proper inquiry consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(33).

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal. The BIA found that petitioner was removable because he had committed a crime of violence and failed to establish entitlement to relief from removeability. The court held that the BIA committed no error when it dismissed petitioner's appeal because he failed to establish a claim of derivative citizenship due to his legitimation under Salvadoran law. In the absence of derivative citizenship, petitioner was subject to removal due to his commission of a crime of violence. Accordingly, the petition was denied.

Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA directing his removal, as well as the BIA's order denying reconsideration. The court held that the IJ was entitled to rely on petitioner's pleading-stage admission that he had been convicted of a removable drug offense; petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to relief from removal, or that the IJ violated his due-process rights; and therefore, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the crime of which he was convicted was an aggravated felony. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction of first-degree burglary was a conviction of an aggravated felony, and was sufficiently established by the state court's abstract of judgment. The court also rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and accordingly denied the petition for review.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA determining that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), because she was inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), and was not eligible for the exception to inadmissibility in INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). The court denied the petition and held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner returned to the United States after being "ordered removed under...any...provision of law, and...enter[ed] or attempt[ed] to reenter the United States without being admitted," which rendered her inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). The BIA also correctly concluded that petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)'s exception to inadmissibility. The court held that in order to be eligible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), an alien must register outside the United States for more than ten years before returning to the United States.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA dismissing his appeal of an IJ's order of removal. The IJ determined that, under 8 C.F.R. 245.13(k)(1), petitioner had abandoned his pending application for adjustment of status under Section 202 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 8 U.S.C. 1255, as of the moment he drove from the United States into Mexico, even if his unplanned departure was not desired and he immediately turned around and attempted to return. The court concluded that deeming petitioner's NACARA application abandoned was contrary to the regulation where petitioner's departure was not "desired," and ordering removal conflicted with NACARA itself. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.