Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the mother of a developmentally disabled high school student, alleged that the several sexual encounters her daughter had with another developmentally disabled student in a school bathroom were the result of the school's failure to properly supervise her daughter. At issue was whether plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her daughter, had a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the daughter's special education teacher. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claim at summary judgment where the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception did not apply in this case. The court held that whatever liability the special education teacher faced, that liability must come from state tort law, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Resolute Industries, Inc. ("Resolute"), appealed an adverse summary judgment on its products liability claims against Webasto Products NA, Inc. ("Webasto"), the manufacturer of a heater that caught fire on Curtis Oswalt's boat during repairs performed by Resolute's employee. Resolute also challenged a judgment in Oswalt's favor on his claim against Resolute for breach of the implied warranty of workmanlife performance. At issue was whether the district court correctly rejected Resolute's products liability claims, correctly found Resolute liable to Oswalt, and properly awarded Oswalt and his insurer damages for surveyor's fees and for the loss of use of the boat during repairs. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Webasto on Resolute's inadequate warnings claim, but erroneously granted summary judgment on the design defect claim. The court further held that the court properly held Resolute liable on Oswalt's implied warranty claim and properly awarded damages for loss of use and surveyor's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings on Resolute's design defect claim.

This case arose from the parties' insurance agreement where appellant insured appellees against borrower defaults on appellees' loans. Appellant appealed the district court's decision to remand the case back to state court pursuant to its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"), 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202. At issue was whether the district court was required to consider appellant's motion under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 3, before exercising its discretion under the DJA. The court held that, because the federal court's jurisdiction was proper, it was required under the mandatory terms of the FAA to consider appellant's motion before it remanded the case pursuant to its discretion under the DJA. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order of remand and remanded for its consideration of appellant's FAA motion.

San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies ("deputies") shot and killed Shane Hayes inside his home after the deputies arrived at Hayes' residence in response to a domestic disturbance call from a neighbor. Plaintiff, Hayes' daughter, asserted a claim for negligence based in part on the deputies' preshooting conduct, specifically their alleged failure to properly assess the situation before entering the house. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputies and found that the deputies owed Hayes no duty of care in their preshooting conduct. The district court did not address whether the deputies' preshooting conduct could be considered a breach of any standard of care, if such a duty were owed. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: "Whether under California negligence law, sheriff's deputies owe a duty of care to a suicidal person when preparing, approaching, and performing a welfare check on him." In light of the court's decision to certify the issue presented, the opinion filed in this case on March 22, 2011 was withdrawn.

Plaintiff appealed a district court order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his suit against defendants, asserting that federal constitutional and state common law torts arising out of allegations that defendant fraudulently enlisted plaintiff into the National Guard. At issue was whether plaintiff's suit was barred by the doctrine of intra-military immunity in Feres v. United States because it sought monetary damages for injuries arising out of or were in the course of activity incident to military service. The court held that the Feres doctrine did not bar a discharged serviceman, who remained in the Individual Ready Reserve, from suing active duty National Guard recruiters whom he accused of forging his signature on re-enlistment papers where the alleged injury was not incident to the plaintiff's service. The court also held that defendants met the prima facie test as federal employees under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, and remanded for further factual determinations on this issue.

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.

Plaintiffs, twenty-two Argentinian residents, brought suit against DaimlerChrylser Aktiengesellschaft ("DCAG") alleging that one of DCAG's subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz Argentina ("MBA"), collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, torture, and kill plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina's "Dirty War." At issue was whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over DCAG. The court held that DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction in California through the contacts of its subsidiary Mercedes-Benz USA ("MBUSA") where MBUSA was DCAG's agent, at least for personal jurisdiction purposes, and that exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

Defendant appealed a restitution order directing him to pay the victim's mother to cover costs that she incurred in making a series of trips between her home and the victim's boarding school 150 miles away after defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual contact and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. At issue was whether the mother's travel expenses were "incurred by the victim" and subject to restitution under the applicable statute. Also at issue was whether the restitution award was issued in violation of the procedural and evidentiary requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3664. The court initially held that defendant's waiver of appeal was ineffective as to the restitution order and so would consider his challenges to that order on the merits. The court then held that the mother's travel expenses could have been "incurred by the victim" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2248(b)(3) where the mother could have made trips in her capacity as a loved family member but she incurred the costs of the trips in her capacity as legal guardian, on behalf of her daughter. The court also held that the district court's restitution order violated the requirements of section 3664 where the district court set forth no explanation of its reasoning and where a spreadsheet was an inadequate evidentiary basis to support the restitution award.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant negligently allowed an unreasonably dangerous condition to exist in its store after she fell over an end cap and injured herself. The district court prohibited plaintiff's medical experts from testifying about causation in her case-in-chief due to her failure to comply with expert disclosure rules. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant breached its duty to her and that plaintiff's injuries were caused by her fall. Also at issue was whether the district court properly precluded nonmedical expert testimony. The court reversed summary judgment on the breach of duty ruling and held that there were genuine issues of material facts as to whether the end cap was an open and obvious condition and, even assuming obviousness, whether defendant should have anticipated the danger nevertheless. The court also held that when a treating physician morphs into a witness hired to render expert opinions that go beyond the usual scope of a treating doctor's testimony, the proponent of the testimony must comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 26(a)(2). Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment on the causation ruling and held as a matter of discretion that plaintiff should be allowed to rectify her error by disclosing reports for her treating physicians. The court further held that, because plaintiff's failure to disclose her nonmedical experts' reports in a timely manner was neither substantially justified nor harmless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding those experts from testifying in plaintiff's case-in-chief.