Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiffs, machinists at Pearl Harbor, filed suit against defendants under state tort law on the theory that defendants failed to warn them of the hazards posed by asbestos used in and around equipment defendants sold to the Navy. Defendant Crane removed the actions to federal court under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. The district court denied plaintiffs' motions to remand to state court and certified their orders for interlocutory appeal. The federal officer removal statute authorizes removal of a civil action brought against any person "acting under" an officer of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." In this instance, Crane established that it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute, a causal nexus exists between plaintiffs' claims and the actions Crane took under the federal officer's direction, and it has a "colorable" federal defense to plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders. View "Leite v. Crane Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging sexual assault committed by a sergeant of the Corps while he was on recruitment detail at her middle school. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim accrued when she became aware of her injury and its immediate cause, not when she learned of the Corps' negligence. Because plaintiff did not file her administrative claim until four years later, the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations, absent tolling, had run. When the district court dismissed plaintiff's claim, equitable tolling was not available under the FTCA. During plaintiff's appeal, the court held in Wong v. Beebe, that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was available in FTCA actions. The court held that Wong's conclusion that section 2401(b) was nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling applied to the entirety of that subsection. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's equitable tolling argument. View "Gallardo v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Novartis, manufacturer of Zometa, alleging products liability, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and loss of consortium. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred by excluding the causation testimony offered by her expert when it found the testimony to be irrelevant and unreliable. The court concluded that the expert's testimony was relevant because it indicated that plaintiff's bisphosphonate use was a substantial factor in her development of bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court also concluded that the expert's testimony was reliable where he used a differential diagnosis grounded in significant clinical experience and examination of medical records and literature. Accordingly, the court concluded that the expert's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the specific causal link between plaintiff's bisphosphonates treatment and her development of osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Novartis and remanded. View "Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp." on Justia Law

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Peabody appealed the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's decision ordering Peabody to pay a coal miner's surviving spouse all the benefits to which the coal miner was entitled to receive under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 20 C.F.R. 718.201(a). The court concluded that the ALJ did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, by considering the regulatory preamble to the Black Lung Benefits Act in his decision and the ALJ's award of benefits to the coal miner was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied Peabody's petition for review. View "Peabody Coal v. OWCP" on Justia Law

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Panansam Narayanan suffered from an advanced-stage lung disease. While he was aboard a British Airways international flight, he was allegedly denied supplemental oxygen. When Narayanan died six months after the plane landed, his heirs and estate filed suit pursuant to Article 17(1) the Montreal Convention, S. Treaty Doc. No 106-45, alleging that the denial of supplemental oxygen on his flight to London hastened Narayanan's death. The action was filed more than two years from the date of the flight's arrival, but within two years of Narayanan's death. The court held that Article 35(1) of the Convention was clear: a claim for damages based on an injury incurred aboard an international flight must be filed within two years of the date upon which the aircraft arrived at its destination. In this case, plaintiffs' wrongful death claim was not timely filed and the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Narayanan v. British Airways" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a defamation suit against defendant where defendant published blog posts on several websites that she created accusing plaintiffs of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and other illegal activities. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that the protections of the First Amendment did not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story; therefore, the court held that the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'s negligence requirement for private defamation actions was not limited to cases with institutional media defendants; because defendant's blog post addressed a matter of public concern, even assuming that Gertz was limited to such speech, the district court should have instructed the jury that it could not find defendant liable for defamation unless it found that she acted negligently; the district court also should have instructed the jury that it could not award presumed damages unless it found that defendant acted with actual malice; the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs are public officials; and the court found no error in the district court's application of the Unelko Corp. v. Rooney test and rejected plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers in the Army caused his infant son's death by ordering his pregnant wife, a servicewoman on active duty, to perform physical training in contravention of her doctors' instructions, which ultimately induced premature labor. The district court held that the suit was barred by the Feres doctrine and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Feres doctrine immunizes the United States from liability for tort claims arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that, under its own precedent, Feres barred plaintiff's wrongful death claim. The court employed the "genesis test," by asking whether the family member's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., claim had its genesis in injuries to members of the armed forces. In this case, the infant's injury derived from his mother's military service. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that genetic injuries differed from claims based upon injuries incurred in utero. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law

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Loops, designer of a flexible toothbrush made for safe use in prisons, bid on a contract with the NYC-DOC. Amercare ultimately won the contract using a similar toothbrush. Amercare filed a defamation suit against Loops after Loops alleged that Amercare had engaged in procurement fraud. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entertaining Washington's anti-SLAPP motion, Wash. Rev. Code 4.25.510; under section 4.25.510, Loops was immune for all statements made to government agencies; the statute of limitations barred claims regarding the product alteration and counterfeiting accusations; and Americare did not show a likelihood of satisfying the elements of defamation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, guardian to Madlyn Liebsack, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., after Madlyn was left in a permanent vegetative state when she was treated with an elevated level of lithium to treat her schizoaffective disorder. Plaintiff contended that federal healthcare providers negligently failed to monitor Madlyn's lithium levels and the government's primary defense was that an advanced nurse practitioner who was responsible for Madlyn's psychiatric care was at fault. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's liability and damages rulings and the government challenged the damages ruling. The court held that Alaska Statute 09.20.185 was a state rule of "witness competency" that applied to this action under Federal Rule of Evidence 601, as well as part of Alaska's substantive law, making it applicable to FTCA actions under section 2674; none of the government's evidence regarding the nurse's negligence complied with section 09.20.185; and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Liebsack v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law