Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration denied Hill's application. An ALJ also denied Plaintiff's application, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff's request for review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the ALJ failed to consider evidence favorable to Plaintiff and posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (2) therefore, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. View "Hill v. Astrue " on Justia Law

Plaintiff played professional football for nineteen years. When he retired in 2002, he was employed by the Tennessee Titans. In 2008, he filed a workers' compensation claim in California, alleging that he suffered pain and disability from injuries incurred during his career. Plaintiff asked the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate an arbitration award that prohibited him from pursuing workers' compensation benefits under California law, arguing (1) the award violated California public policy and federal labor policy, and (2) the award was in disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The district court confirmed the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege sufficient contacts with California to show his workers' compensation claim came within the scope of California's workers' compensation regime, and therefore, he did not establish that the arbitration award violated California public policy; (2) because Plaintiff did not show that the award deprived him of something to which he was entitled under state law, he did not show it violated federal labor policy; and (3) Plaintiff did not establish that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the Full Faith and Credit Clause. View "Matthews v. Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council " on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the proceeds of a life insurance policy. At issue was whether the federal interpleader remedy shields a negligent stakeholder from tort liability for its creation of a conflict over entitlement to the interpleaded funds. After analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not, and that a claimant may seek to recover all damages directly and proximately caused by the negligent stakeholder's conduct. In so holding, the Court reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments. View "Pac. Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc. v. Office of Worker Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Rosa was apprehended by police officers after one of the officers deployed his advanced Taser M26 ECD (M26). After officers had Michael in restraints, Michael stopped breathing and later died of ventricular arrhythmia. The doctor who performed the autopsy listed "Taser application and arrest by police" as contributing conditions. Michael's death was subsequently linked to metabolic acidosis, a condition under which lactic acid accumulates more quickly than the body can dispose of it, causing the pH in the body to decrease, making sudden cardiac arrest more likely. Plaintiffs, Michael's parents and his daughter sued TASER International, Inc. (Defendant) as manufacturer of the M26, asserting that Michael died because it had provided an inadequate warning of the dangers of the product to the officers who used it. Plaintiffs pursued both strict liability and negligence theories under California law based upon this failure to warn. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of TASER because the risk of lactic acidosis was not knowable in 2003 when the M26 at issue was distributed. View "Rosa v. TASER Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant CB&I Constructors, Inc. negligently caused a June 2002 wildfire that burned roughly 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest in Southern California. The United States brought a civil action against CB&I to recover damages for harm caused by the fire. The jury found CB&I liable and awarded roughly $7.6 million in fire suppression, emergency mitigation, and resource protection costs, and $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages. CB&I challenged the award for environmental damages. The district court held that the government provided sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages, and that the resulting award was not grossly excessive. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under California law, the government was entitled to full compensation for all the harms caused by the fire, including intangible environment harm; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's determination of the amount of environmental damages, and the award was not grossly excessive. View "United States v. CB&I Constructors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court against the United States government, alleging causes of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that agents from the DEA committed the torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress when they executed a search warrant at plaintiffs' mobile home. The court agreed with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents' use of force against the adult members of plaintiffs' family was reasonable. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents used reasonable force against the 11-year-old and 14-year-old plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs brought several state causes of action in Arizona state court against Medtronic for injuries sustained by Richard Stengel from his use of a pain pump manufactured by Medtronic. Medtronic timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law. The court held that even if some of plaintiffs' claims could be interpreted to escape express preemption, they could not be interpreted to escape implied preemption. Therefore, the district court correctly held that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was futile and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he was traveling collided with an automobile owned and driven by an off-duty sailor whose negligence was conceded. Plaintiff and his wife brought suit against the United States on a theory of respondeat superior. The court concluded that a servicemember en route to participation in a recreational activity, where participation was encouraged by the Navy but not required, was not acting in the line of duty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government.