Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The court agreed to hear this case en banc in order to reconsider its precedent as to which parties could be sued as defendants in actions for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), part of ERISA. Some of the court's previous decisions had indicated that only a benefit plan itself or the plan administrator of a benefit plan covered under ERISA was a proper defendant in a lawsuit under that provision. The court concluded that the statute did not support that limitation, however, and that an entity other than the plan itself or the plan administrator could be sued under that statute in appropriate circumstances. Therefore, the court held that Reliance Standard Ins. Co. was a proper defendant in a lawsuit brought by plaintiff under ERISA and overruled its prior decisions to the contrary. To apply that decision and to resolve other issues raised in the appeal, the court transferred this case back to the three-judge panel to which the case was previously assigned.

Defendants, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lunde Electric Company ("company"), appealed convictions stemming from the misappropriation of employee 401(k) contributions to pay the company's operating expenses. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. 664, for embezzlement or conversion of elective deferrals, and 18 U.S.C. 1027, for false or misleading statements in a required Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C 1001 et seq., document. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Counts 17 and 18 under section 664 where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 1991 Profit Sharing Plan had been restated before defendants retained their employees' elective deferrals in the company's general account; where defendants commingled their employees' contributions with the company's assets to prop up their failing business and therefore, intentionally used their employees' assets for an unauthorized purpose; where they sent participants account statements showing 401(k) balances which were in fact non-existent; where defendants' decision to deviate was the wilful criminal misappropriation punished by section 664; and where defendants were alerted repeatedly about their obligation to remit the deferrals and defendants hid their actions from employees. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Count 21 under section 1027 where defendants' initial decision to mislead their own employees about the solvency of their retirement plans by filing false account statements and false Form 5500s were the behaviors targeted by section 1027.

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.

Plaintiffs sued Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas") and Pickens Kane Moving & Storage Co. ("Pickens") for carrier liability under the Carmack Amendment to recover damages plaintiff paid to its insureds after the insureds' shipment of household goods were destroyed by a fire while in transit. Pickens was the receiving carrier and the goods were destroyed in the custody of Atlas. At issue was whether the district court properly interpreted sections 14706(f) and 14706(b) of the Carmack Amendment when apportioning the replacement value of household goods and apportioning costs. The court held that the district court properly apportioned the damages as it did under section 14706(f)(2), (3) to limit Atlas' liability to the tariff amount of $5.00 per pound in the absence of a declared value. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs where Atlas had custody of the shipment when it was destroyed and was liable to Pickens.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("Insurer") filed a federal action against Lee Investments, LLC ("Employer") seeking rescission of a workers' compensation policy and related relief on account of the Employer's alleged misrepresentations when Employer's employee injured herself while assembling a water slide at Employer's California waterpark. At issue was whether a federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over an insurance company's diversity action seeking rescission of a workers' compensation policy and if so, whether it was required to dismiss the case because exclusive jurisdiction was vested by state law in a state workers' compensation agency. The court held that a federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction where the parties were diverse and the amount of controversy exceeded $75,000 and where the action did not arise under California's workers' compensation laws, Insurer filed an original claim in federal court, and Employer failed to demonstrate fraud or collusion. The court also held that the California's Workers' Compensation Appeals Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Insurer's claims. Therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction, correctly addressed the law, acted well within its discretion in making innumerable litigation decisions, and did not err in granting certification.