Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Teradata Corporation sued SAP SE, alleging that SAP illegally conditioned sales of its business-management software (S/4HANA) on the purchase of its back-end database engine (HANA) in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and misappropriated Teradata’s trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Teradata claimed that SAP’s tying arrangement forced customers to buy HANA, harming competition in the enterprise data warehousing (EDW) market. Teradata also alleged that SAP used its confidential batched merge method, a technique for efficient data aggregation, without authorization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of SAP. The court excluded Teradata’s expert testimony on market definition and market power, finding the methodology unreliable. Without this testimony, the court concluded that Teradata failed to create a material dispute on its tying claim. The court also ruled against Teradata on the trade secret claim, stating that Teradata did not properly designate the batched merge method as confidential and that the agreements between the parties gave SAP the right to use the method.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the expert’s testimony, which was based on reasonable methodologies. The court found that Teradata raised a triable issue regarding SAP’s market power in the tying market and the anticompetitive effects in the tied market. The court also determined that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Teradata properly designated the batched merge method as confidential and whether the agreements allowed SAP to use the method. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TERADATA CORPORATION V. SAP SE" on Justia Law

Oracle International Corporation sued Rimini Street, Inc. for copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act. Oracle alleged that Rimini, a third-party provider of software support services, infringed on its copyrights by using Oracle's software in unauthorized ways. Rimini had previously been found to infringe Oracle's copyrights and had changed its business model, seeking a declaratory judgment that its new processes did not infringe Oracle's copyrights. Oracle counterclaimed, leading to a bench trial.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that Rimini's new processes still infringed Oracle's copyrights and issued a permanent injunction against Rimini. The court ordered Rimini to delete various software files and issue a press release correcting alleged misstatements. Rimini appealed the decision, challenging several aspects of the district court's rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's holding that Rimini created infringing derivative works based solely on interoperability with Oracle's programs. The court explained that a derivative work must incorporate Oracle's copyrighted work, either literally or nonliterally. The court also vacated the district court's ruling striking Rimini's affirmative defense under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), which allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to make another copy for certain purposes.Additionally, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling that Rimini's creation of "gap customer" environments and use of automated tools to deliver PeopleSoft updates constituted copyright infringement. The court also reversed the district court's ruling that Rimini's security-related statements, except for one about "holistic security," constituted false advertising under the Lanham Act. The court vacated the portions of the injunction appealed by Rimini and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION V. RIMINI STREET, INC." on Justia Law

CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd. sought discovery from Apple Inc. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for use in a prospective patent infringement lawsuit in Germany. CPC aimed to obtain documents describing the functionality of Apple’s biometric security technology. The district court granted CPC’s application, allowing them to serve a subpoena on Apple, but the scope of the discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce remained unresolved.Initially, a magistrate judge denied CPC’s application, finding the discovery requests unduly burdensome. CPC sought review, and the district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision under a clear error standard. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court should have reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision de novo, as the ruling on a § 1782 application is dispositive. The case was remanded, and the district court, applying de novo review, granted CPC’s application. Apple objected, particularly concerned about the potential requirement to produce source code, but the district court’s order did not definitively resolve these objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the district court’s decision was not final because the scope of discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce were still undetermined. The lack of a final judgment meant that the Ninth Circuit could not evaluate the Intel factors used to determine whether discovery was warranted under § 1782. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the district court to resolve the remaining discovery issues. View "CPC PATENT TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a trademark infringement dispute between two Arizona-based personal injury law firms. The plaintiff, Lerner & Rowe, PC, owns three registered trademarks, including the name "Lerner & Rowe." The defendant, Brown, Engstrand & Shely, LLC, doing business as The Accident Law Group (ALG), used a marketing strategy called "conquesting" by purchasing the term "Lerner & Rowe" as a Google Ads keyword. This caused ALG's advertisements to appear when users searched for "Lerner & Rowe" on Google.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of ALG on Lerner & Rowe's claims of trademark infringement and unjust enrichment but denied summary judgment on the unfair competition claims. ALG moved for reconsideration, and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. Lerner & Rowe appealed the ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lerner & Rowe failed to establish that ALG's use of the "Lerner & Rowe" mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. The court found that while the strength of the mark favored Lerner & Rowe, the evidence of actual confusion was de minimis, the reasonably prudent consumer's degree of care and the labeling and appearance of ALG's advertisements weighed in favor of ALG. The court concluded that Lerner & Rowe did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, which is essential for a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. The judgment was affirmed. View "LERNER & ROWE PC V. BROWN ENGSTRAND & SHELY LLC" on Justia Law

C.R. Bard, Inc. (Bard), a medical device company, held patents on a vascular graft and entered into a licensing agreement with Atrium Medical Corporation (Atrium) to settle a patent infringement lawsuit. The agreement required Atrium to pay Bard a 15% per-unit royalty on U.S. sales until the U.S. patent expired in 2019 and on Canadian sales until the Canadian patent expired in 2024. Additionally, Atrium was to pay a minimum royalty of $3.75 million per quarter until the FDA approved the iCast stent for vascular use or rescinded its approval for all uses. Atrium ceased minimum royalty payments after the U.S. patent expired, leading Bard to sue for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held a bench trial and found that the minimum royalty provision was primarily intended to compensate Bard for U.S. sales, thus constituting patent misuse under Brulotte v. Thys Co. The court concluded that the provision violated Brulotte because it effectively extended royalties beyond the patent's expiration based on the parties' motivations during negotiations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court clarified that the Brulotte rule requires examining whether a contract explicitly provides for royalties on the use of a patented invention after the patent's expiration. The court held that the licensing agreement did not violate Brulotte because it provided for U.S. royalties only until the U.S. patent expired and Canadian royalties until the Canadian patent expired. The minimum royalty payments were not tied to post-expiration use of the U.S. patent but were instead based on Canadian sales, which continued to be valid under the Canadian patent. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by considering the parties' subjective motivations and reversed the judgment for Atrium on Bard’s breach of contract claim. View "C.R. BARD, INC. V. ATRIUM MEDICAL CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to rule on a trademark infringement case brought by BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP against Central Coast Agriculture, Inc. BBK, a distributor and seller of smoking-related products with trademarked "RAW" branding, alleged that CCA infringed on its mark by selling cannabis products under the mark "Raw Garden." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CCA on BBK’s trademark claims, but in favor of BBK on its counterclaims to invalidate several of CCA’s trademark applications and CCA’s counterclaim to cancel BBK’s trademark applications for unlawful use.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BBK on its claim to invalidate four of CCA’s trademark applications. The court held that, under 15 U.S.C. § 1119, when an action involves a claim of infringement on a registered trademark, a district court also has jurisdiction to consider challenges to the trademark applications of a party to the action. The court also held that lack of a bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce is a valid basis to challenge a trademark application.However, in a separately filed memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment on BBK’s trademark claims and affirmed the summary judgment on CCA’s counterclaim to cancel BBK’s trademark for unlawful use. View "BBK TOBACCO & FOODS LLP V. CENTRAL COAST AGRICULTURE, INC." on Justia Law

In a trademark dispute between two companies that used the word "Punchbowl" in their marks, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgement in favor of AJ Press, LLC. The court held that AJ Press, LLC's use of the Punchbowl mark was not outside the scope of the Lanham Act under the "Rogers test". The Rogers test, which governs disputes over trademarks that are used in expressive works protected by the First Amendment, does not apply when the accused infringer uses a trademark to designate the source of its own goods. The court found that AJ Press, LLC was using the Punchbowl mark to identify and distinguish its news products. The court reversed the district court's judgement and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to proceed to a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under the Lanham Act. View "Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge initiated a class action lawsuit against Google, LLC. The plaintiffs argued that Google, through its Search App on Android phones, displayed their websites in a way that occupied valuable space for which Google should have paid. They contended that Google received all the benefits of advertising from the use of that space. The plaintiffs made state-law claims for trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment, and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law.The court reviewed questions certified by the district court for interlocutory review. In response to the first question, the court ruled that the website copies displayed on a user's screen should not be protected as chattel, concluding that a cognizable property right did not exist in a website copy. As a result, the plaintiffs’ trespass to chattels claim was dismissed.Addressing the third question, the court held that website owners cannot invoke state law to control how their websites are displayed on a user's screen without being preempted by federal copyright law. The court determined that the manner in which the plaintiffs’ websites were displayed fell within the subject matter of federal copyright law. It also found that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs’ implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment claim were equivalent to the rights provided by federal copyright law. Thus, the plaintiffs’ state-law claim was preempted by federal copyright law.Given these findings, the court did not address the other certified questions. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in denying Google’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Zachary Silbersher, a relator, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and others. Silbersher alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. He also claimed that Valeant defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable.The district court dismissed Silbersher’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, ruling that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.The Court of Appeals held that an inter partes patent review proceeding, in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated one of Valeant's patents, did not qualify as a public disclosure under the False Claims Act because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and its primary function was not investigative. The Court of Appeals also held that the allegations in Silbersher's qui tam action were not "substantially the same" as the information that had been publicly disclosed. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Therefore, the public disclosure bar did not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SILBERSHER V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L" on Justia Law

Choreographer Kyle Hanagami claimed that Epic Games, Inc., the creator of the videogame Fortnite, infringed the copyright of a choreographic work when the company created and sold a virtual animation, known as an “emote,” depicting portions of the registered choreography. The district court dismissed his action under the Copyright Act and remanded for further proceedings on claims of direct and contributory infringement of a choreographic work.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that, under the “extrinsic test” for assessing substantial similarity, Hanagami plausibly alleged that his choreography and Epic’s emote shared substantial similarities. The panel held that, like other forms of copyrightable material such as music, choreography is composed of various elements that are unprotectable when viewed in isolation. What is protectable is the choreographer’s selection and arrangement of the work’s otherwise unprotectable elements. The panel held that “poses” are not the only relevant element, and a choreographic work also may include body position, body shape, body actions, transitions, use of space, timing, pauses, energy, canon, motif, contrast, and repetition. The panel concluded that Hanagami plausibly alleged that the creative choices he made in selecting and arranging elements of the choreography—the movement of the limbs, movement of the hands and fingers, head and shoulder movement, and tempo—were substantially similar to the choices Epic made in creating the emote. The panel held that the district court also erred in dismissing Hanagami’s claim on the ground that the allegedly copied choreography was “short” and a “small component” of Hanagami’s overall work. View "KYLE HANAGAMI V. EPIC GAMES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law