Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Musical artist George Clinton appealed the district court's order appointing a receiver and authorizing the sale of copyrights in an action against his former law firm. The firm obtained judgments against Clinton for past-due attorneys' fees and sought an order authorizing the sale of master recordings that Clinton recorded with the group Funkadelic (the "Masters") to satisfy the judgments. The court concluded that Clinton's copyrights in the Masters were subject to execution to satisfy judgments entered against him; Section 201(e) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 201(e), does not protect Clinton from the involuntary transfer of his copyrighted works; the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver to manage or sell ownership of these copyrights; Clinton may raise claims of fraud on the court and judicial estoppel for the first time on appeal, but both claims are meritless; and Clinton failed to raise his preemption, Erie Doctrine, and Due Process Arguments in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Alaska Stock, a stock photography agency, registered large numbers of photographs at a time under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., listing only some of the authors and not listing titles for each photograph. Alaska Stock licensed Houghton Mifflin to use pictures it had registered, for fees based on the number of publications. After Houghton Mifflin greatly exceeded the number of publications it had paid for, Alaska Stock filed suit for injunctive relief, actual and statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court concluded that Alaska Stock successfully registered the copyright both to its collections and to the individual images contained therein; the statute required identification of the author and title of the "work," which was the collective work, and extended registration to the component parts if the party registering the collective work owned the copyright to the component parts, as Alaska Stock did; the procedure applied for over three decades by the Register of Copyrights to registration by stock photo agencies complied with the statutory requirements and did not violate any clear requirement to list individual authors and titles of the components within the work; the Register of Copyrights' reading that a collection of stock photos may be registered without individual titles, and without naming more than three of the authors and merely designating the number of authors, pursuant to an assignment in the language Alaska Stock used, was reasonable and persuasive; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal. View "Alaska Stock v. Houghton Mifflin" on Justia Law

Airs International, a purported owner of an ANGEL DREAMS trademark, filed suit against Victoria's Secret alleging breach of contract claims and requesting cancellation of Victoria's Secret's registered DREAM ANGELS trademark. On appeal, Airs International challenged the district court's dismissal of its claims. The court held that Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1119, did not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Because Airs Aromatics had not appealed the dismissal of the only claims it brought that could support jurisdiction, the district court's judgment dismissing this action with prejudice must be affirmed. Airs Aromatics has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for trademark infringement where it failed to allege that the litigation was the kind of continuous, public usage of a trademark that served to identify the marked goods to the public as those of the mark's owner. Finally, leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Airs Aromatics v. Victoria's Secret" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cast in a minor role in an adventure film with the working title "Desert Warrior." The film never materialized and plaintiff's scene was used, instead, in an anti-Islamic film titled "Innocence of Muslims." The film was uploaded to YouTube.com and her brief performance was dubbed over so that she appeared to be asking, "Is your Mohammed a child molester?" An Egyptian cleric subsequently issued a fatwa, calling for the killing of everyone involved with the film. After Google refused to take it down from YouTube, plaintiff sought a restraining order seeking removal of the film, claiming that the posting of the video infringed the copyright in her performance. The district court treated the application as a motion for a preliminary injunction but denied the motion. The court concluded that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where plaintiff had an independent copyright interest in her performance; the work for hire doctrine was inapplicable in this instance because plaintiff was not a traditional employee and the filmmaker was not in the regular business of making films; and although plaintiff granted the filmmaker an implied license to use plaintiff's performance, the filmmaker exceeded the bounds of the license when he lied to plaintiff in order to secure her participation and she agreed to perform in reliance on that lie. The court also concluded that plaintiff faced irreparable harm absent an injunction where plaintiff took legal action as soon as the film received worldwide attention and she began receiving death threats; the harm plaintiff complained of was real and immediate; and plaintiff demonstrated a causal connection because removing the film from YouTube would help disassociate her from the film's anti-Islamic message and such disassociation would keep her from suffering future threats and physical harm. Finally, the balance of the equities and the public interest favored plaintiff's position. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed and remanded. View "Garcia v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Experience Hendrix filed suit against Pitsicalis alleging that Pitsicalis was infringing trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, and that the trademark infringement also amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice proscribed by Washington's Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.010-19.86.920. Determining that Pitsicalis had Article III standing, the court concluded, inter alia, that the WPRA was constitutional as applied to the narrow set of non-speculative circumstances at issue in this case; Pitsicalis was liable under the Lanham Act for using domain names that infringed Experience Hendrix's trademark "Hendrix"; and Paragraph 5 of the permanent injunction failed to state clearly the terms of the injunction and did not describe in reasonable detail the acts that were and were not restrained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that the Washington statute was unconstitutional and remanded Pitsicalis's declaratory judgment claims pertaining to the WPRA with instructions to enter judgment on those claims in favor of Experience Hendrix; affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment on Experience Hendrix's claim that Pitsicalis's use of domain names infringed Experience Hendrix's mark; vacated the permanent injunction and remanded so the district court could revise the language at issue; reversed the Rule 50(b)(3) decision to strike most of the jury's award of damages under both the Lanham Act and the WPRA; affirmed the district court's order granting a new trial on damages under both statutes; remanded for a new trial on such damages; vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees under the WCPA; and remanded the fee request for further proceedings. View "Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com" on Justia Law

Inhale claimed copyright protection in the shape of a hookah water container that it first published in 2008 and registered with the United States Copyright Office in 2011. Inhale filed suit against Starbuzz for copyright infringement, claiming that Starbuzz sold water containers that were identical in shape to Inhale's container. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Starbuzz after determining that the shape of the water container was not copyrightable. The court concluded that the shape of a container is not independent of the container's utilitarian function - to hold the contents within its shape - because the shape accomplishes the function. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the shape of Inhale's hookah water container was not copyrightable. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion under 17 U.S.C. 505 by awarding attorneys' fees to Starbuzz. Moreover, the court awarded attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of this appeal to Starbuzz under section 505 in an amount to be determined by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc." on Justia Law

Hokto USA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hokuto Co., Ltd., filed suit against Concord Farms for violating its rights to marks under which it markets its Certified Organic Mushrooms, which are produced in the United States. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hokto USA and Hokuto Japan on all claims and entered a permanent injunction against Concord Farms. Determining that this was a classic gray-market case, the court concluded that, because Concord Farms offered no other evidence that its imported mushrooms were not "materially different" from Hokto USA's mushrooms, the district court correctly concluded that they were not genuine Hokto USA goods; the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Concord Farms's importation of Hokuto Japan mushrooms was likely to confuse consumers; and the district court did not err in concluding that Hokuto Japan did not engage in naked licensing where, given the close working relationship, Hokuto Japan was familiar with and reasonably relied upon Hokto USA's efforts to control the quality of the mushrooms it distributed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Hokto USA's and Hokuto Japan's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the permanent injunction, denying Concord Farms's motion for summary judgment. View "Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Petronas is a major oil and gas company located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and GoDaddy is the world's largest domain name registrar. After a third party registered the domain names "petronastower.net" and "petronastowers.net" and then used GoDaddy's domain name forwarding service to direct the disputed domain names to an adult entertainment web site, Petronas filed suit against GoDaddy alleging contributory cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GoDaddy. The court affirmed, holding that the Act did not include a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting because: (1) the plain text of the Act did not apply to the conduct that would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines applicable to trademark infringement because the Act created a new cause of action that was distinct from traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would not advance the goals of the statute. View "Petronas v. GoDaddy.com" on Justia Law

Marshak appealed the district court's preliminary injunction for HRE enjoining Marshak from using the "The Platters" mark in connection with any vocal group with narrow exceptions. At issue was whether the likelihood of irreparable harm must be established - rather than presumed, as under prior Ninth Circuit precedent - by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in the trademark context. Following eBay v. MarcExchange and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case must establish irreparable harm. The court concluded that HRE was not foreclosed from bringing the underlying suit where prior New York actions (Marshak I and Marshak II) did not have res judicata effect; HRE's trademark infringement claim and request for preliminary injunction was not precluded by the doctrine of laches; the record supported the district court's determination that HRE did not abandon "The Platters" mark; but the fact that the district curt made no factual findings that would support a likelihood of establishing irreparable harm, led the court to reverse the preliminary injunction and to remand to the district court. View "HRE v. Florida Entertainment Mgmt." on Justia Law

HFI filed suit against the Bank alleging trademark infringement and related claims, contending that the Bank's use of its "Hana Bank" mark infringed HFI's "Hana Financial" mark because its use of the word "Hana" in connection with financial services would likely cause confusion. A party claiming trademark ownership must establish priority and one of the ways that a party could establish priority was through the constructive use doctrine known as "tacking." Tacking required a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, and the jury decided the issue after receiving an instruction that correctly conveyed the narrowness of the doctrine. In this instance, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on trademark priority where, viewing the marks in context and in their entirety, the ordinary purchasers could perceive them as conveying the same idea or meaning or evoking the same mental reaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of HFI's motion for judgment as a matter of law on trademark priority and upheld the jury's verdict. View "Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, et al." on Justia Law