Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A registered nurse working in a hospital’s Mother Baby Unit requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Her request, which cited Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity of life and objections to the use of abortion-derived cell lines in vaccine development and testing, was denied. The hospital had followed an executive order issued by the Oregon governor, requiring all healthcare workers to be vaccinated unless granted a medical or religious exemption. The nurse was subsequently terminated for failure to comply with the vaccination mandate.The nurse filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. She alleged a Free Exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual members of the hospital’s Board of Directors and Vaccine Exception Review Committee, and a Title VII claim against the hospital for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs. The district court granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the Free Exercise claim on qualified immunity grounds, finding that the right to refuse a state-mandated vaccine on religious grounds was not clearly established in 2021. The court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claim but later granted summary judgment for the hospital, holding that accommodating the nurse’s request would have imposed undue hardship due to health, safety, operational, and financial risks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Free Exercise claim, holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law in 2021 recognized a healthcare worker’s religious right to a vaccine exemption under those circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the hospital on the Title VII claim, concluding that the hospital demonstrated undue hardship in accommodating the nurse without substantial risk to patients and operations. View "MACDONALD V. OREGON HEALTH AND SCIENCE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

An airline operating among the Hawaiian Islands faced severe financial difficulties over several years, leading to its abrupt shutdown in November 2017. The airline had previously been owned by a trust affiliated with a prominent individual, then partially sold to entities controlled by other businessmen. When the airline closed, employees received only one day's notice and did not receive their final paychecks. Following the closure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was appointed. Together with two unions representing affected employees, the trustee initiated adversary proceedings against the airline’s former owners, directors, and lenders, alleging violations of Hawaii’s Dislocated Workers Act (DWA) and the federal WARN Act for failure to provide the required notice and compensation. Additional claims included breach of fiduciary duties and requests for equitable remedies such as veil piercing and equitable subordination.The proceedings began in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii, but the District Court for the District of Hawaii withdrew the reference, consolidated the cases, and conducted a jury trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for some claims and allowed others to proceed. The jury returned mixed verdicts, finding some defendants liable for statutory and fiduciary duty violations, but the court denied punitive damages and limited recovery to avoid double compensation. The court also ruled on equitable remedies, including piercing the corporate veil and equitably subordinating certain loans, and ordered contribution from a third-party defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The panel affirmed the trustee’s and unions’ Article III standing. It reversed in part on fiduciary duty claims, concluding that minority stakeholders and affiliated entities could owe fiduciary duties and be deemed “employers” under the DWA. The court clarified the statutory definition of “employer” and the scope of the DWA’s safe harbor defense, ruling it was unavailable absent a binding divestiture. The panel affirmed evidentiary rulings, vacated the nominal damages award due to erroneous jury instructions, affirmed the prohibition of punitive damages, and upheld the equitable remedies and contribution order. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

A white male employee of Seattle’s Human Services Department alleged that the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative (RSJI) classified employees according to race, and that a series of workplace incidents—including racially aligned affinity groups, race-specific trainings, and racially offensive remarks from coworkers and supervisors—created a hostile work environment. He asserted that the RSJI and workplace conduct led to discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and violation of his equal protection rights. After resigning in September 2021, he filed suit alleging claims under Title VII, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed as time-barred certain Title VII and WLAD claims based on acts predating statutory limitations periods. It granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims, finding insufficient evidence of actionable discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, or equal protection violations. The court partially granted the City’s evidentiary objections to exhibits offered by the plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the City on the constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims, and also affirmed summary judgment on the Equal Protection Clause claim for lack of Article III standing. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims under Title VII and WLAD, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

A registered nurse employed by a hospital system in Oregon requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. She objected on two grounds: concerns about vaccine safety for pregnant women and a religious objection to the use of fetal cells derived from abortions in vaccine development, citing her Christian beliefs and relevant biblical passages. After submitting her exemption request, the employer placed her on indefinite unpaid leave, leaving her without health insurance or income during her third trimester of pregnancy.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed her complaint, which referenced but did not attach the exemption letter. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to plausibly allege a conflict between the vaccination policy and the nurse’s bona fide religious beliefs. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding the allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, but the district court disagreed. It dismissed the complaint as too conclusory, without leave to amend and without considering the exemption letter attached to the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the exemption letter was central to the plaintiff’s claim and should have been considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Upon review of the letter, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RIDINGS V. PEACEHEALTH" on Justia Law

Six former employees of a regional public transportation agency challenged the agency’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy, asserting that it failed to accommodate their sincere religious objections to vaccination. In late 2021, the agency required all employees to be fully vaccinated unless exempted for medical or religious reasons. The agency’s leave management department evaluated religious exemption requests and determined that 70 employees qualified for potential accommodations but ultimately concluded that none could be accommodated without undue hardship. These employees were told to get vaccinated or lose their jobs; many resigned, retired, or were terminated.A group of former employees who lost their jobs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, bringing claims under Title VII, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging a violation of their right to free exercise of religion). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the § 1983 claim and denied summary judgment on the other claims. After consolidation and a first trial that ended in a mistrial on the defendant’s undue hardship defense, six employees proceeded to a second trial. There, a jury found in their favor, awarding over $7.8 million in damages. The district court denied the defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and its request for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the employer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The court concluded that the employees established a prima facie case and that the employer failed to prove that accommodating the employees’ religious objections would have caused an undue hardship, as required by law. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court also found no reversible error in the remedial order and deemed the cross-appeal on the free exercise claim moot. View "LEWIS-WILLIAMS V. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A former police officer for a federally recognized Indian tribe was terminated from his position and subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against several of his superior officers and the tribe's general counsel. His claims, brought against these individuals in their personal capacities, included federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3), a Bivens claim, and a state tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. He did not sue the tribe itself. The complaint alleged that the defendants treated him less favorably than Native American employees, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, interfered with his court testimony, and conspired to deprive him of due process in his employment and reputation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the action. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity, and, alternatively, that the tribe was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that could not be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity. The court did not address arguments regarding tribal sovereign immunity or qualified immunity as independent grounds for dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking money damages from tribal officials in their individual capacities where any judgment would not operate against the tribe itself. The court further held that the individual defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity, as the functions at issue—personnel and employment decisions—were not historically protected by such immunity at common law. Additionally, the tribe was not a required party under Rule 19 because it lacked a legally protected interest that could be impaired by the litigation’s outcome. The court remanded for the district court to address any qualified immunity defenses in the first instance. View "ERWINE V. WESTBROOK" on Justia Law

A woman participated in an employee pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After being diagnosed with cancer and while hospitalized, she initiated an online election to receive her accrued pension benefits as a lump sum and designated her sister as the beneficiary. She died three days later, before completing a required second step of confirming her election and beneficiary designation, according to the plan’s administrative process. After her death, her sister submitted a claim seeking the lump sum benefit.The plan administrator denied the claim, reasoning that the decedent had not finalized her election and beneficiary designation, and that “substantial compliance” with the plan’s requirements was not sufficient under ERISA. On administrative appeal, the committee upheld the denial for the same reasons. The sister then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging entitlement to the benefits. The district court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that she was entitled to the benefits, even under a substantial compliance theory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, just as it is for beneficiary designations, consistent with its previous decision in Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The court clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not eliminate the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged substantial compliance with the plan’s requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings. View "LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Ernesto and Marilyn Patacsil operated group care homes, and in 2012, eight of their employees brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of California labor laws, including failure to provide breaks, pay lawful wages, and maintain accurate records. The employees sought damages and civil penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the district court awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and PAGA penalties. Of the PAGA penalties, 75% were designated for the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% for the aggrieved employees.Shortly after the judgment, the Patacsils filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The employees (creditors) initiated an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking to have the PAGA judgment debts declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and (7). The bankruptcy court determined that a trial was needed to resolve whether most of the judgment was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6, which requires a showing of willful and malicious injury. Under § 523(a)(7), the court found that only the portion of PAGA penalties payable to the LWDA was excepted from discharge, not the 25% allocated to employees or the attorney fees.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted leave for an interlocutory appeal on the § 523(a)(7) issue, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and determined that because the dischargeability proceeding was not yet final—trial on the § 523(a)(6) issue was still pending—it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "CABARDO V. PATACSIL" on Justia Law

Five employees of the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife sought and received religious exemptions from a statewide COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued in August 2021. However, the Department informed these employees that it could not accommodate them in their current positions due to job requirements involving in-person work. Instead, it offered them the opportunity to pursue possible reassignment through a process that historically resulted in successful placements only 14 percent of the time, with no assurances that new positions would preserve pay or resolve the religious conflict. The employees did not complete this process, doubting its efficacy, and were subsequently terminated.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the employees brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and both federal and state constitutions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on all claims, finding that the Department’s offer of the reassignment process satisfied its duty to provide a reasonable accommodation under Title VII and WLAD. The court also dismissed certain federal claims on procedural grounds and excluded three expert witnesses, while issuing a protective order limiting discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, as a matter of law, merely offering a limited reassignment process with uncertain prospects does not fulfill an employer’s obligation under Title VII to propose a reasonable accommodation that eliminates the conflict between religious beliefs and job duties. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on most of the Title VII claims and all WLAD claims (except for two employees who failed to meet procedural requirements), but affirmed the dismissal of federal and state constitutional claims, the exclusion of expert testimony, and the issuance of the protective order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CHERRY V. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE" on Justia Law

Two labor unions, each with a collective bargaining agreement covering the same maintenance and repair work at a Seattle shipping terminal, both claimed the right to this work when the terminal was modernized and reopened. The employer, SSA Terminals, was contractually obligated to both the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) to assign the work to their members. When the work was assigned to ILWU, IAM threatened to strike. To resolve the conflict, SSA Terminals invoked the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provision allowing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to determine which union should be awarded the work in such jurisdictional disputes.The NLRB conducted a hearing under Section 10(k) of the NLRA and awarded the disputed work to IAM, finding that employer preference, skills, efficiency, and past practice favored IAM. After the decision, ILWU filed a grievance and won an arbitration award against SSA Terminals, arguing that the employer had not adequately defended ILWU’s contractual rights. In response, IAM and SSA Terminals filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that ILWU’s actions were intended to coerce the employer to reassign the work, violating Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. The NLRB’s administrative law judge and the Board found that ILWU had violated the Act and rejected ILWU’s defense that its actions were permissible work-preservation activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the “work-preservation” defense recognized in National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Association does not apply to unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(b)(4)(D) for failing to respect the Board’s resolution of a jurisdictional dispute. The court overruled its prior contrary precedent and enforced the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION" on Justia Law