Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose concerning the payment rate for a surgical procedure performed at an out-of-network facility. The patient receiving the surgery was covered by an ERISA-governed health plan provided by the employer and administered by an insurance company. Prior to the surgery, the facility contacted the plan administrator to verify coverage and was told that the plan would reimburse at the usual, customary, and reasonable (“UCR”) rate, not the lower Medicare rate. Relying on this representation, the facility performed the surgery. However, the plan later paid only at the Medicare rate, far less than the full billed amount. The facility’s successor in interest, having obtained the rights to the claim, sought to recover the unpaid balance.The action was first brought in California state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff asserted both ERISA and state law claims. The district court dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of derivative standing, as the plaintiff was not properly assigned the right to sue under ERISA. The court also dismissed the state law claims for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel, holding that these claims were preempted by ERISA because they related to an ERISA-covered plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim, holding that, under circuit precedent, such claims are preempted by ERISA. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that ERISA does not preempt a negligent misrepresentation claim by a provider’s successor in interest when the claim arises from representations made by the plan administrator during a pre-service verification call. The court concluded that such a claim does not sufficiently “relate to” an ERISA plan to trigger preemption, as it is not based on an ERISA-regulated relationship or enforceable under ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the negligent misrepresentation claim. View "HEALTHCARE ALLY MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLC V. WSP USA, INC." on Justia Law

A former employee brought suit against her previous employer and associated fiduciaries, alleging that they mismanaged the employer's retirement savings plan, which is a defined contribution plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She claimed that the fiduciaries retained underperforming investment options in the plan’s menu to generate transaction fees, in violation of their duties of prudence and loyalty, and sought plan-wide monetary and equitable relief on behalf of the plan.Previously, the United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on provisions in the plan requiring arbitration of disputes and waiving participants’ rights to bring claims on a “class, collective, or representative basis.” The plaintiff argued that this waiver impermissibly precluded her from enforcing statutory rights under ERISA, which allow participants to sue on behalf of the plan for plan-wide relief. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the waiver unenforceable under the effective-vindication doctrine and holding that the waiver provision was expressly non-severable, thus requiring the claims to proceed in court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that the plan’s waiver provision was unenforceable because it prevented the plaintiff from asserting her right under ERISA to bring representative claims for plan-wide relief—a right that ERISA expressly provides. The court further held that, under the plan’s own terms, once the waiver was found unenforceable, any representative claim must be adjudicated in court, not arbitration. Thus, the plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims would proceed before the district court. View "POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC." on Justia Law

David Krzesni was employed by Wellpinit School District (WSD) as Project Director for a federally funded Native Youth Community Project Grant. Prior to Krzesni’s hiring, WSD had planned a trip to Hawaii for students and staff, believing it would further the grant’s objectives. After Krzesni started, he helped facilitate funding for the trip using grant money. However, federal approval for the trip was not obtained, and the grant’s federal contact later indicated such funding would not be approved. Krzesni participated in the trip, prepared an Annual Performance Report describing it, and later learned the trip expenses had already been paid from grant funds. He also contemplated leaving his position and discussed grant compliance concerns with colleagues and the federal grant contact.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington reviewed Krzesni’s claims for whistleblower retaliation under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and wrongful discharge under Washington law. Krzesni alleged that his contract was not renewed in reprisal for disclosures regarding the unauthorized use of grant funds for the Hawaii trip. The district court granted summary judgment for WSD and its superintendent, reasoning that Krzesni did not make protected disclosures under the NDAA and was not “discharged” under Washington law, as his contract simply expired without renewal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Krzesni’s reporting of the Hawaii trip in the performance report and a rhetorical question to a supervisor did not constitute protected disclosures, as they did not objectively indicate misconduct. Additionally, even if a protected disclosure occurred during Krzesni’s call with the federal grant contact, WSD had already decided not to renew his contract beforehand, so no reprisal could be shown. The court further held that the nonrenewal of Krzesni’s contract was not considered a discharge under Washington law, thus defeating his wrongful discharge claim. View "KRZESNI V. WELLPINIT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

An employee of The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. worked remotely as a Managerial Senior Consultant. After the employer instituted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated or to obtain a valid exemption, the employee requested a religious exemption, citing her beliefs as a Christian Jew and referencing relevant religious texts. The employer initially granted her a provisional exemption but later required more information to assess the sincerity of her beliefs. When she did not fully answer the supplemental questions, particularly declining to disclose information about her medical history, the employer revoked her exemption and terminated her employment for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate.After her termination, the employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as a claim under the California Constitution. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss her statutory claims, holding that she had failed to allege that she adequately notified the employer of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. The court reasoned that her initial exemption request and responses to supplemental questions provided insufficient notice and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the employee’s allegations regarding notice of a religious conflict. The Ninth Circuit held that to satisfy the notice requirement for a prima facie case of religious accommodation under Title VII and FEHA, an employee must provide enough information for the employer to understand an actual conflict between religious beliefs and work requirements. The court found that the employee’s allegations met this standard at the pleading stage, reversed the district court’s dismissal of her statutory claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

A group of former employees of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families challenged the agency’s implementation of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the Governor of Washington. After their requests for religious exemptions were granted, the agency denied their requests for reasonable accommodations that would allow them to remain unvaccinated and continue in their positions. The agency explained that, due to the nature of their roles, unvaccinated employees could not safely perform essential functions without posing a risk to others. The employees were ultimately separated from employment. They alleged constitutional violations and state law claims, asserting that the agency and certain officials discriminated against them based on religion and failed to provide required procedural protections.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed all claims. It found that the employees had not sufficiently alleged ongoing violations of federal law for injunctive relief, nor had they adequately alleged personal involvement by any official in the claimed constitutional violations. The court dismissed the federal claims and all state law claims, initially granting leave to amend. After the employees filed an amended complaint naming additional officials and asserting similar legal theories without new factual allegations, the district court dismissed the case without leave to amend and denied reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the employees failed to plausibly allege personal involvement by any official in constitutional violations, and that official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because there was no ongoing violation of federal law. It further concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend, as amendment would have been futile. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend. View "SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES" on Justia Law

The plaintiff accepted a job at the defendant company in May 2017, signing an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. Over several years, the plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a sexually charged work environment and specific instances of sexual harassment. She repeatedly complained internally to supervisors and management from 2017 through 2021, but claims her concerns were ignored and that no corrective action was taken. The plaintiff further alleges she experienced retaliation, humiliation, and targeted harassment following her complaints, culminating in her termination by the defendant in December 2021, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the workplace environment.After her termination, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in August 2023 and received a right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she initiated a lawsuit in California state court raising claims of discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment agreement. The district court granted the motion, finding that the dispute between the parties arose and the plaintiff’s claims accrued before the effective date of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which was March 3, 2022.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The court held that the EFAA applies only to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Because the plaintiff’s dispute with the defendant arose and her claims accrued before that date, the statutory exception to arbitration in the EFAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC." on Justia Law

Two former flight attendants alleged that their employer terminated them because of their religious beliefs after they commented on the company’s internal communications platform regarding the company’s public support for proposed federal legislation expanding protections for LGBTQ individuals. One plaintiff’s comment explicitly referenced religious concerns, while the other plaintiff’s comment raised a question about the regulation of morality. Both plaintiffs were members of the flight attendants’ union, which actively participated in the internal investigation and disciplinary process. The union representatives made statements that could be interpreted as disparaging the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Both plaintiffs had good employment records, though one had a prior disciplinary history.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the employer and the union on the federal Title VII claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the terminations were motivated by religious discrimination. The district court also ruled that the Railway Labor Act preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law anti-discrimination claims against the union, dismissing those claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The appeals court held that, based on the evidence and under both direct/circumstantial and burden-shifting standards, there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer terminated the plaintiffs because of their religious beliefs, and as to whether the union attempted to cause or acquiesced in their terminations for the same reason. The court also held that the Railway Labor Act’s duty of fair representation does not impliedly preempt state anti-discrimination claims against unions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. View "BROWN V. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC." on Justia Law

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

Several unions representing approximately 800,000 federal civilian employees challenged an executive order issued by the President in March 2025. This order, Executive Order 14,251, invoked statutory authority to exclude various federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining rights, citing national security concerns. The agencies affected included the Departments of State, Justice, Veterans Affairs, and others, and the order was accompanied by White House and Office of Personnel Management statements which asserted that union activities impeded national security functions. The unions alleged that the President’s action constituted unlawful retaliation against them for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, including lawsuits and public criticism of the Administration.The case originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. There, the judge granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of Executive Order 14,251 on the grounds that the unions raised a serious question as to whether the order was issued in retaliation for their protected speech. The district court focused on statements in the White House’s supporting materials, finding these reflected hostility toward the unions’ activities. The court did not address the merits of the unions’ other claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the unions’ claims, rejecting the government’s argument that the unions were required to pursue administrative remedies before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that, even if the unions made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the government demonstrated that the President would have issued the order regardless of the unions’ protected conduct, due to legitimate national security concerns. Because the unions did not show a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits, the preliminary injunction was vacated. View "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

A former seasonal employee of a package delivery company filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of California labor laws, including wage-related claims and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim. She had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, which included a class action waiver and a delegation clause assigning threshold arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. The agreement specified that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would govern unless it did not apply, in which case state law would control. After her work schedule was repeatedly changed or canceled with little notice, she was not given further work despite her inquiries and subsequently initiated legal action on behalf of herself and proposed classes.After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims and stayed class claims. The district court declined to decide whether the FAA or the California Arbitration Act (CAA) governed the agreement, reasoning that the result would be the same under either statute. The court also denied the employee’s motion for clarification, maintaining that the question of which law applied and whether the FAA’s “contracts of employment” exclusion was relevant could be resolved by the arbitrator rather than the court.On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court committed clear legal error by failing to determine whether the FAA or state law governed the arbitration agreement before compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, under New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether the FAA applies, including any statutory exclusions. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its prior order and to determine the statutory basis for its authority to compel arbitration before referring the parties to arbitration. View "ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE" on Justia Law