Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appeared in ten photoshoots organized by Walmart for a total of fifteen days, in non-consecutive periods of one or two days. Plaintiff sued Walmart for its failure to pay her immediately after each photoshoot ended, seeking more than $540,000 in penalties. The district court denied summary judgment on Walmart’s defense that Plaintiff was an independent contractor outside the protection of the relevant Labor Code provisions due to disputes of material fact. However, it granted summary judgment on Walmart’s good-faith defense. The district court concluded that there was a good faith dispute about whether Plaintiff was an independent contractor that made it objectively reasonable for Walmart to believe Plaintiff was not an employee.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Walmart. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that Walmart was foreclosed from raising a good faith defense based on mistakenly classifying an employee as an independent contractor. The court held that Walmart’s argument that Plaintiff was an independent contractor was a good-faith dispute that any wages are due. The court further held that nothing in the record indicated bad faith on Walmart’s part and that there were some reasonable grounds for Walmart to believe that Plaintiff was an independent contractor. View "BIJON HILL V. WALMART INC." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of California to decide the certified questions:1.) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at his workplace and brings the virus home to his spouse, does California’s derivative injury doctrine bar the spouse’s claim against the employer?2.) Under California law, does an employer owe a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19?A married couple alleged that the husband’s employer negligently allowed COVID-19 to spread from its worksite into the couple’s household. The Plaintiffs contend that the employer knowingly disobeyed the San Francisco Health Order (the “Health Order”) by transferring workers from an infected site to the husband’s job site in disregard of the Health Order’s policies. According to Plaintiffs, the husband was forced to work in close contact with employees from the infected job site and developed COVID-19 which he brought back home. His wife contracted COVID-10 and was hospitalized for a month and kept alive on a respirator.The employer claimed that California law does not recognize the couple’s cause of action. Specifically, the employer argued that the wife’s matter is barred by the derivative injury doctrine, and even if the doctrine does not apply, the employer did not owe her a duty of care. The court concluded that the case presents questions for the California Supreme Court to address. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were six citizens of Mexico who were recruited to work as “Animal Scientists” at Funk Dairy in Idaho under the “TN Visa” program for “professional” employees established under the North American Free Trade Agreement. When Plaintiffs arrived at the dairy, they were instead required to work primarily as general laborers. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ bait-and-switch tactics violated applicable federal statutory prohibitions on forced labor by, among other things, abusing the TN Visa program in order to coerce Plaintiffs to provide menial physical labor.Defendants conceded that all Plaintiffs believed that their ability to remain lawfully in the U.S. depended on their continued employment at Funk Dairy. The court concluded that in light of that concession and its obligation, a reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy knowingly obtained Plaintiffs’ labor by abusing the TN Visa process in order to exert pressure on Plaintiffs to provide labor that was substantially different from what had been represented to them and to federal consular officials.The court held that Funk Dairy’s conduct violated provisions of 18 U.S.C. Chapter 77, prohibiting forced labor and trafficking of persons into forced labor. Plaintiffs, therefore, asserted triable causes of action under the civil suit provision of Chapter 77, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1595(a). The court held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, it also reversed the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under state law. View "CESAR MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ V. CURTIS GILES" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a Nevada limited liability partnership (“W&L Nevada”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court granted summary judgment for W&L Nevada on plaintiff’s ADA claims. The district court held that, as a matter of law, W&L Nevada was not a covered employer under the ADA because (1) it had fewer than 15 employees and (2) plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact whether W&L Nevada was an “integrated enterprise” with W&L California.The circuit court held that even when a defendant has fewer than 15 employees, a plaintiff can bring a statutory claim if she can establish that (1) defendant is “so interconnected with another employer that the two form an integrated enterprise” and (2) the integrated enterprise collectively has at least 15 employees. Here, the circuit court found that plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s two offices were an integrated enterprise. Further, defendant did not present evidence that the Nevada and California offices were separate operations and maintained separate books. Accordingly, the circuit court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s ADA claims. Further, the circuit court remanded the district court to address whether the integrated enterprise had fewer than 15 employees. View "AMY BUCHANAN V. WATKINS & LETOFSKY, LLP" on Justia Law

After discovering apparent financial malfeasance by the plaintiff, then president of Local 1637, the Amalgamated Transit Union (“ATU”) imposed the trusteeship, thereby removing plaintiff and the other Local 1637 executive board members from office. Plaintiff filed a single-plaintiff action against ATU and several of its officers. Later, while that action was still pending, plaintiff filed a second, multiplaintiff action in which he and a majority of the other former executive board members of Local 1637 asserted related claims against ATU, the same ATU officers, and several other defendants.Because the claims against these defendants in the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the second suit violated the doctrine of claim-splitting. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court correctly concluded that, with respect to the claims against ATU and its officers, the additional plaintiffs in the multi-plaintiff action were adequately represented by the plaintiff in the single plaintiff action. Because the claims against these defendants in the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the second suit violated the doctrine of claim splitting. The circuit court affirmed the district court finding that the court properly dismissed the duplicative claims against the ATU Defendants in the multiplaintiff suit. View "JOSE MENDOZA, JR. V. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination suit as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegations that UtiliQuest promised him that if he convinced all of his fellow employees to "sign away" their union rights, they would each receive a ten percent raise. However, plaintiff ended up being the only one with the raise. After confronting UtiliQuest of the breach in promise, he was terminated. Plaintiff alleged several California state law claims relating to his termination.The panel concluded that plaintiff's arguments are subject to Garmen preemption, concluding that the risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction was sufficient to outweigh the state's interest in plaintiff's claims; the Board could consider plaintiff's advocacy for his fellow coworkers as concerted activity; and the Board could arguably consider plaintiff as an employee, rather than a supervisor. The panel also concluded that plaintiff's wage and hour claims were subject to claim preclusion in light of the California Superior Court's settlement judgment, which was entitled to full faith and credit. View "Moreno v. UtiliQuest, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Syrian national living in California as a legal permanent resident and is now a U.S. citizen. She is not and has never been a Kuwaiti national. In 2014, Plaintiff entered into a written employment contract with the Consulate to work as a secretary. Plaintiff alleges that the Consulate created a hostile work environment by harassing, discriminating, and retaliating against her on the basis of her gender, religion, and Syrian national origin, violated various wage and hour laws, and breached her employment contract. Claiming that she was constructively terminated from her employment, she filed suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Consulate’s motion to dismiss. The commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applied. The employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial unless the foreign state shows that the employee’s duties included “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” The district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Plaintiff, who was employed as an administrative assistant, was not a civil servant and that her duties did not include “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” View "Mohammad v. General Consulate of the State of Kuwait in Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of California the following question: Does California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer,” Cal. Gov’t Code 12926(d), permit a business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable for employment discrimination? View "Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment to DePuy and Plaintiff Waber. Waber was hired by HOC and signed an employment contract with HOC's parent company, Stryker, which included restrictive one-year non-compete clause and forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring adjudication of contract disputes in New Jersey.The panel concluded that, as the actual employer that participated in the proceedings to enforce its parent corporation’s forum-selection clause, HOC has a right to appeal the adverse decision of the district court on that issue. Furthermore, HOC properly became a party to this litigation in the district court case, albeit after the district court denied the motion to transfer. Accordingly, the panel has jurisdiction to hear HOC's appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1201. The panel held that the state law applicable here, Cal. Labor Code 925(b), which grants employees the option to void a forum-selection clause under a limited set of circumstances, determined the threshold question of whether Waber's contract contained a valid forum-selection clause. In this case, Waber satisfied all the prerequisites of section 925 and effectively voided the forum-selection clause under section 925(b). Finally, HOC presents no persuasive reason for the panel to overturn the district court's ruling of partial summary judgment in favor of DePuy and Waber that the forum-selection, non-compete and non-solicitation clauses were void under California law. View "DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law