Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit filed an order amending its opinion, denying petitions for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court petitions for rehearing en banc; and an amended opinion in which the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the district court's judgment in a putative class action, brought by a plaintiff class of California-based flight attendants who were employed by Virgin, alleging that Virgin violated California labor laws.As a preliminary matter, the panel held that the dormant Commerce Clause does not bar applying California law. The panel reversed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their claims for minimum wage and payment for all hours worked. The panel explained that Virgin's compensation scheme based on block time did not violate California law. The panel also held that Virgin was subject to the overtime requirements of Labor Code section 510. The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their rest and meal break claims, rejecting Virgin's contention that federal law preempted California's meal and rest break requirement in the aviation context because federal law occupied the field. Contrary to Virgin's characterization, the panel explained that the relevant regulations defined safety duties for a minimum number of flight attendants. The panel agreed with the district court, which held that airlines could comply with both the Federal Aviation Administration safety rules and California's meal and rest break requirements by staffing longer flights with additional flight attendants in order to allow for duty-free breaks.The panel also held that the meal and rest break requirements were not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. Applying Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 466 P.3d 309, 321 (Cal. 2020), the panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their wage statement claim. The panel also affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their waiting time penalties claim; affirmed the district court's decision on class certification; reversed the district court's holding that Virgin was subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations under California's Private Attorney General Act; vacated the attorneys' fees and costs award; and remanded. View "Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its decision holding that management of a television station committed unfair labor practices under subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by making two unilateral changes to the existing terms of the conditions of employment after a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.The panel rejected management's argument that it was entitled to make changes to the terms and conditions of employment under the "contract coverage" doctrine. Rather, the panel found that the Board's decision was rational and consistent with the NLRA. In this case, the Board applied its longstanding rule that after a CBA has expired, unilateral changes by management are permissible during bargaining only if the CBA "contained language explicitly providing that the relevant provision" permitting such a change "would survive contract expiration." Nexstar Broad. Inc., 369 NLRB No. 61, 2020 WL 1986474, at *3 (Apr. 21, 2020). Furthermore, there was no explicit language in the CBA to allow management to make unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment in the post-expiration period. Finally, the panel rejected management's arbitration claims. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc." on Justia Law

A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is precluded by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) when the right or duty upon which the claim is based is created by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or resolution of the claim substantially depends on analysis of a CBA.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Columbia Export's action under RICO against the union and individual union workers. Applying Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991), the panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that Columbia Export's RICO claims required interpretation of the CBA under which the workers were employed, that the CBA provided a process for arbitration of disputes, and that the LMRA precluded court adjudication of the RICO claims before the arbitration process had been exhausted. View "Columbia Export Terminal, LLC v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walmart, alleging three violations of California Labor Code's wage-statement and meal-break requirements; first, plaintiff alleged that Walmart did not provide adequate pay rate information on its wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code 226(a)(9); second, he claimed that Walmart failed to furnish the pay-period dates with his last paycheck, section 226(a)(6); and third, he asserted that Walmart did not pay adequate compensation for missed meal breaks, section 226.7(c). Plaintiff sought relief under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the meal-break claim because he did not suffer injury himself. The panel explained that PAGA's features diverge from the assignment theory of qui tam injury in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. V. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), and they depart from the traditional criteria of qui tam statutes. In regard to the two wage-statement claims, the panel held that plaintiff had standing but that Walmart did not breach California law. The panel explained that, because Walmart must retroactively calculate the MyShare overtime adjustment based on work from six prior periods, the panel did not consider it an hourly rate "in effect" during the pay period for purposes of section 226(a)(9). Therefore, Walmart complied with the wage statement law here. The panel also held that Walmart's Statements of Final Pay do not violate the wage statement statute. View "Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Franklin, a nurse, was employed by a staffing agency, USSI, and had signed an Arbitration Agreement. USSI assigned Franklin to work at the Hospital. Franklin signed a Travel Nurse Assignment Contract that also includes an arbitration provision. The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement or the Assignment Contract. There is no contract between Franklin and the Hospital nor between the Hospital and USSI. The Hospital contracts with RightSourcing, which contracts with USSI to provide the contingent nursing staff. The Hospital retains supervision over the provision of clinical services. RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI.Franklin brought a class and collective action against the Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code, alleging that the Hospital required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but failed to pay her for that work and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or reimburse travel expenses.The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Hospital, a nonsignatory, could compel arbitration because Franklin’s claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with her contracts with USSI; under California law, she was equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions. View "Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center, FKA" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought an enforcement action against Larry Browne and his companies, alleging that Browne and his entities violated the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) minimum wage, overtime, record-keeping, and antiretaliation requirements by misclassifying delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court denied Browne's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).The Ninth Circuit concluded, in light of Waffle House, that a private arbitration agreement does not bind the Secretary of Labor when bringing a FLSA enforcement action that seeks relief on behalf of one party to the arbitration agreement against the other party to that agreement. In Waffle House, the Supreme Court ruled that the EEOC was not party to Waffle House's arbitration agreement, and it was not bound by the agreement because the FAA "does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so." The panel explained that this same reasoning dictates that the Secretary cannot be compelled to arbitrate this case. Here, as in Waffle House, the remedial statute at issue unambiguously authorizes the Secretary to obtain monetary relief on behalf of specific aggrieved employees. The panel explained that, like the EEOC in Waffle House, the Secretary is not party to the arbitration agreement between Browne and his entities and the delivery drivers. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Walsh v. Arizona Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the union's petition for review, challenging the Board's decision holding that janitorial employees had lost the protection of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) due to unlawful picketing. In this case, with the help of a union, janitorial employees picketed outside the commercial office building where they worked to protest their low wages and poor working conditions. The employees were consequently terminated from their jobs.The panel concluded that the Board erred in determining that the employees' picketing violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA, a provision that prohibits various unfair labor practices, including what is known as "secondary picketing." The panel explained that, while the union may have engaged in coercive activity (picketing and patrolling), the Board's finding that it constituted secondary, as opposed to primary, activity is not supported by substantial evidence. The panel further explained that the union never made any statements or took any actions indicating that an objective of its picketing was to coerce Harvest into pressuring Preferred to meet the employees' demands. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Service Employees International Union Local 87 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining enforcement, against any motor carrier doing business in California, of California's Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made "ABC test" for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors.After determining that CTA has standing to bring suit, the panel held that application of AB-5 to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA), because AB-5 is a generally applicable labor law that affects a motor carrier's relationship with its workforce and does not bind, compel, or otherwise freeze into place the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers. In this case, because CTA is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court erred by enjoining the state from enforcing AB5 against motor carriers operating in California. The panel explained that, by failing to follow precedent regarding labor laws of general applicability, the district court committed a legal error to which the panel cannot defer, even at the preliminary-injunction stage. View "California Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's statutory employment discrimination and civil rights claims. Plaintiff, a former corporate attorney who became an investment banker with defendants, entered into an agreement that set her compensation and benefits, as well as provided that all disputes arising from her employment would be resolved through binding arbitration. Plaintiff also signed a second document that specified the arbitration procedures.The panel concluded that employment disputes are encompassed by the arbitration provisions, and plaintiff knowingly waived her right to a judicial forum. The panel applied Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), where the Supreme Court has held that, while not all statutory claims may be appropriate for arbitration, if a party agreed to arbitration, the party will be held to that agreement unless the party could prove a congressional intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. In this case, plaintiff carries the burden to show such an intention. The panel extended Gilmer to Title VII claims and held that there must be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to have waived judicial remedies.The panel assumed, without deciding, that the knowing waiver requirement remains good law and is applicable to these statutes despite the district court's failure to utilize the proper analysis to establish that the standard applies to these statutory claims. Instead, the panel held that this appeal is resolved on the arbitration agreement's clear language encompassing employment disputes and evidence that plaintiff knowingly waived her right to a judicial forum to resolve her statutory claims. The panel remanded to the district court with the direction that all claims be sent to arbitration and the case be dismissed without prejudice. View "Zoller v. GCA Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the Commission's decision concluding that petitioner failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 105(c) of the Mine Safety and Health Act. Petitioner, a dredge operator, claimed that his former employer, CalPortland, discriminated against him for engaging in protected activities related to safety issues.The panel concluded that Section 105(c)'s unambiguous text requires a miner asserting a discrimination claim under Section 105(c) to prove but-for causation. Therefore, the panel rejected the Pasula-Robinette framework and concluded that the Commission applied this wrong causation standard. The panel explained that the Supreme Court has instructed multiple times that the word "because" in a statutory cause of action requires a but-for causation analysis unless the text or context indicates otherwise. Section 105(c) contains no such indication. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. CalPortland Co." on Justia Law