Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting in part a union's motion to dismiss and holding that five claims brought by a union member were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and were thus "converted" into section 301 claims. In this dispute between union members and their union, plaintiff filed suit in state court challenging the trusteeship as violating the Nevada Service Employees Union's (the Local) constitution, the Service Employees International Union's (the International), and an affiliation agreement between the two organizations. After removal to federal court, the district court granted the Local's board's (the Union) motion to dismiss in part.The panel concluded that section 301 completely preempts claims that require interpretation of a union constitution, to the extent the constitution is a contract between unions. The panel explained that savings clauses included in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act did not repeal section 301's preemptive force. The panel also concluded that plaintiff's five claims required analysis of at least one section 301 labor contract. Therefore, plaintiff's claims were preempted and removable. View "Garcia v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, alleging various causes of action arising from his termination as a police officer with the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony, a federally recognized Indian Tribe.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that, to the extent that plaintiff's claims alleged that the Tribe's decision to fire him was retaliatory, those claims are barred by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel applied the two-part Gaubert-Berkovitz test and concluded that the discretionary function test bars plaintiff's two retaliation-based wrongful termination claims. In regard to plaintiff's third cause of action alleging that his termination was wrongful, the panel concluded that the first element of the Gaubert-Berkovitz test was not met and the discretionary function exception did not apply. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff's third cause of action was barred. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court erred in determining that the discretionary exception function barred the two additional claims plaintiff sought to raise in the Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Professor of Psychology at the University of Oregon, filed suit against the University, alleging claims under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Title IX, and Oregon law. Plaintiff claims that there is a gender disparity in pay that is department wide and is caused by the University's practice of granting "retention raises" to faculty as an incentive to remain at the University when they are being courted by other academic institutions. Plaintiff also alleges that female professors at the University are less likely to engage in retention negotiations than male professors, and when they do, they are less likely to successfully obtain a raise. The district court granted summary judgment for the University on all counts.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim because a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff and her comparators did substantially equal work. Furthermore, plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact under Oregon Revised Statute 652.220 for the same reasons she has done so under the Equal Pay Act. The panel also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Title VII disparate impact claim where there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact. However, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because equity raises and retention raises are not comparable and the panel could not say that plaintiff's comparators were treated "more favorably" than was plaintiff in this context. Consequently, summary judgment was also proper on plaintiff's claim under Oregon Revised Statute 659A.030. The panel also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title IX claim and state constitutional claim. View "Freyd v. University of Oregon" on Justia Law

A class of California-based flight attendants employed by Virgin America filed a putative class action, alleging that Virgin America violated California labor laws. The district court certified a class of similarly-situated plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on virtually all of their claims.As a preliminary matter, the Ninth Circuit held that the dormant Commerce Clause does not bar applying California law. The panel held that Virgin America's compensation scheme based on block time did not violate California law. The panel explained that the fact that pay was not specifically attached to each hour of work did not mean that Virgin America violated California law. The panel also held that Virgin America was subject to the overtime requirements of Labor Code section 510; California's meal and rest break requirements are not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act or the Airline Deregulation Act; Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 466 P.3d 309, 321 (Cal. 2020) -- which held that California Labor Code section 226(a) applied to workers who do not perform the majority of their work in any one state, but who are based for work purposes in California -- is applicable to the wage statement claim in this case; because the California Supreme Court held that section 226 applied under these circumstances, sections 201 and 202 apply as well; because applicability of California law has been adjudicated on a class-wide or subclass-wide basis, no individual choice-of-law analysis was necessary; and Virgin America was not subject to heightened penalties for any labor code violation that occurred prior to the district court's partial grant of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated. The panel also vacated the district court's order granting attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiffs, on behalf of two certified classes of employees, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that their weekly per diem benefits were improperly excluded from their regular rate of pay and thereby decreasing their wage rate for overtime hours.The panel held that the record establishes that the contested benefits functioned as compensation for work rather than as reimbursement for expenses incurred, and that the per diem benefits were thus improperly excluded from plaintiffs' regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. The panel remanded for the district court to enter partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor as to whether the per diem payments to class member employees should be considered part of the employees' rate of pay and to conduct further proceedings. View "Clarke v. AMN Services, LLC" on Justia Law

After the Ninth Circuit received an answer from the California Supreme Court to a certified question, the panel amended and reissued its opinion. The panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jan-Pro in a putative class action involving back wages and overtime claims, holding that the so-called ABC test in Dynamex Ops. W. Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), which determines whether workers are independent contractors or employees under California wage order laws, applies retroactively to this case.In this case, the district court had no opportunity to consider whether Plaintiffs are employees of Jan-Pro under the Dynamex standard, and neither party had the opportunity to supplement the record with regard to the Dynamex criteria. The panel remanded to the district court to consider the question in the first instance with the benefit of a more developed record. As an aid to the district court, the panel offered observations and guidance. On remand, the district court should consider all three prongs of the ABC test and, in doing so, may wish to consider authorities from other jurisdictions that apply the test. View "Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the FMCSA's determination that federal law preempted California’s meal and rest break rules (MRB rules), as applied to drivers of property-carrying commercial motor vehicles who are subject to the FMCSA's own rest break regulations.The panel held that the agency's decision reflects a permissible interpretation of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 and is not arbitrary or capricious. Applying Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute and the phrase "on commercial motor vehicle safety," the panel held that even assuming petitioners identified a potential ambiguity in the statute, the agency's reading was a permissible one. In this case, the FMCSA reasonably determined that a State law "on commercial motor vehicle safety" is one that "imposes requirements in an area of regulation that is already addressed by a regulation promulgated under [section] 31136." Furthermore, the FMCSA's 2018 preemption decision also reasonably relied on Congress's stated interest in uniformity of regulation.The panel concluded that the FMCSA permissibly determined that California's MRB rules were State regulations "on commercial motor vehicle safety," so that they were within the agency's preemption authority. The panel also concluded that the FMCSA faithfully interpreted California law in finding that California's rules were "additional to or more stringent than" federal regulations. Finally, the panel concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that enforcement of the MRB rules "would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

When an employee working a "one week on, one week off" schedule takes continuous leave, an employer may count both the on and off weeks against the employee's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave entitlement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary in an action alleging that Alaska miscalculated the amount of FMLA leave that certain employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) were entitled to take.The panel held that the term "workweek" in 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) has the same meaning it carries under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The panel explained that it is a fixed, pre-established period of seven consecutive days in which the employer is operating. Under that reading of the term, when a rotational employee takes continuous leave, both his on and off weeks count as "workweeks of leave" under section 2612(a)(1). Thus, the panel concluded that Alaska may insist that rotational employees who take 12 workweeks of continuous leave return to work 12 weeks later. The panel also held that it need not defer to the Secretary's contrary interpretation of the statute under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). View "Scalia v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank on plaintiff's claim of gender harassment under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Bank, alleged that a bank customer stalked and harassed her in her workplace and that the Bank failed to take effective action to address the harassment.The panel held that to establish sex discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must show she was subjected to sex-based harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and that her employer is liable for this hostile work environment. Because the panel concluded that a trier of fact could find that the harassment altered the conditions of plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working environment, it turned to the question of the Bank's liability. In this case, there is more than enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the sufficiency of the Bank's response. Because a jury reasonably could conclude that the Bank ratified or acquiesced in the customer's harassment, the panel held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Christian v. Umpqua Bank" on Justia Law