Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maner worked as a biomedical engineer in the laboratory of Dr. Garfield for several decades. Maner learned that Garfield and another employee, Shi, were engaged in a long-term romantic relationship. Garfield brought Shi with him to research conferences to which other employees were not invited and conferred upon Shi a greater share of workplace opportunities related to publications and intellectual property than Maner felt she should have received. In 2008, Maner was arrested at work for alleged aggravated sexual assault; he pleaded guilty to a lesser state law offense. Maner subsequently received positive performance reviews and merit pay increases. Garfield approved a remote work arrangement to enable Maner to serve his probation. Garfield’s lab began to suffer a decline in grant funding. In 2011, Garfield submitted a highly negative review of Maner’s performance under the remote work arrangement. Maner’s position was eliminated based on the poor performance review and lack of funding.Maner brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and a Title VII retaliation claim alleging that his termination was for protesting Garfield’s favoritism toward Shi. The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for the employer. Maner’s “paramour preference” reading of Title VII fails the Supreme Court’s test for assessing whether an adverse employment action violated Title VII—whether changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer. Maner failed to establish any causal connection between the claimed protected activity and the termination decision. View "Maner v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Romero, a truck driver employed by Watkins, an interstate trucking business, made deliveries only to retail stores in California. To complete paperwork and training, Romero periodically logged in to an online portal that required a unique employee identification number and password. Romero’s unique user account completed a set of “Associate Acknowledgements,” through which he clicked “I Agree,” signifying that he read and agreed to the Arbitration Policy, a stand-alone agreement that purports to waive any right to bring or participate in a class action; it states that the agreement is “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and purports to waive "any provision of the FAA which would otherwise exclude [the agreement] from its coverage.” However, if "this [agreement] and/or its Waiver Provisions are not subject to and governed by the FAA, then the laws of the State of Nevada . . . will be the applicable state law.” The Arbitration Policy was not a condition of employment. Romero did not opt-out. In August 2019, Watkins announced it would cease operations. Romero and other employees were laid off.Romero filed a putative class action under the California and federal WARN Acts, 29 U.S.C. 2101, which require advance notice to employees before being laid off. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration. The NInth Circuit affirmed, while noting that the Federal FAA exemption of employment contracts for transportation workers applies and cannot be waived by private contract. View "Romero v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Lim, formerly a TForce California delivery driver, alleged that TForce employs delivery drivers and misclassifies them as independent contractors in violation of California law. The drivers sign an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement, providing that the agreement is governed by the laws of Texas, that “any legal proceedings … shall be filed and/or maintained in Dallas, Texas,” that all disputes “arising under, out of, or relating to this Agreement … including any claims or disputes arising under any state or federal laws, statutes or regulations, … including the arbitrability of disputes … shall be fully resolved by arbitration," that any arbitration will be governed by the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, that class actions are prohibited, and that the parties shall share the costs except in the case of substantial financial hardship--the prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, referring to the Agreement as an adhesion contract. Based on the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions, the district court correctly concluded the delegation clause, which requires the arbitrator to determine the gateway issue of arbitrability, the agreement was substantively unconscionable as to Lim. View "Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

L.B. lived within the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. L.B. and her mother went to a bar and had alcoholic drinks. After they returned home, L.B.’s mother went for a drive. L.B. called the police and reported that her mother was driving while intoxicated. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Bullcoming determined that L.B.’s mother was safe and then went to L.B.’s residence, where her children were asleep in the other room. L.B. admitted to consuming alcoholic drinks. Bullcoming threatened to arrest L.B. for child endangerment because she was intoxicated while in the presence of her children. L.B. pleaded with Bullcoming not to arrest her because she would lose her job as a school bus driver. Bullcoming took L.B. outside for a breathalyzer test. L.B. believed that her choices were to go to jail or have sex with Bullcoming. L.B. and Bullcoming had unprotected sexual intercourse. L.B. became pregnant as a result of the encounter and gave birth.L.B. brought a Federal Tort Claims Act suit, seeking to hold the government liable for Bullcoming’s misconduct. The government asserted that Bullcoming was not acting within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B so his actions fell outside the scope of the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court: whether, under Montana law, OBullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. View "L. B. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration in a putative class action brought by Massachusetts residents who have worked as Uber drivers, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting Uber from classifying drivers in Massachusetts as independent contractors, as well as an order directing Uber to classify its drivers as employees and comply with Massachusetts wage laws.The panel concluded that Uber drivers, as a nationwide class of workers, do not fall within the so-called "interstate commerce" exemption to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The panel explained that Uber drivers, even when crossing state lines or transporting passengers to airports, are merely conveying interstate passengers between their homes and their destination in the normal course of their independent local service. Therefore, interstate movement cannot be said to be a central part of the class members' job description. The panel found the analysis of the minority of district courts that have found to the contrary unpersuasive.The panel also concluded that plaintiffs' claims and requested injunctive relief are arbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement and plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief would have upended the status quo rather than maintained it. Therefore, the district court properly addressed the motion to compel arbitration first.Finally, the panel concluded that the injunctive relief requested, reclassification of drivers' status from "independent contractors" to "employees" is not a public injunctive relief that may be allowed to them to avoid arbitration. In this case, the relief sought by plaintiffs is overwhelmingly directed at plaintiffs and other rideshare drivers, and they would be the primary beneficiaries of access to overtime and minimum wage laws. View "Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Petrochem's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims that Petrochem violated California's wage and hour laws. Plaintiff alleged that Petrochem failed to provide adequate meal and rest periods to workers on oil platforms off the coast of California.The panel held that, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, all law on the Outer Continental Shelf is federal, and state law is adopted only to the extent it is applicable and not inconsistent with federal law. The panel explained that, pursuant to Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019), there must be a gap in federal law before state law will apply on the Outer Continental Shelf. In this case, the panel concluded that the Fair Labor Standards Act addresses meal and rest periods, and thus there was no gap in the applicable federal law. View "Mauia v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order amending its opinion, denying petitions for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court petitions for rehearing en banc; and an amended opinion in which the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the district court's judgment in a putative class action, brought by a plaintiff class of California-based flight attendants who were employed by Virgin, alleging that Virgin violated California labor laws.As a preliminary matter, the panel held that the dormant Commerce Clause does not bar applying California law. The panel reversed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their claims for minimum wage and payment for all hours worked. The panel explained that Virgin's compensation scheme based on block time did not violate California law. The panel also held that Virgin was subject to the overtime requirements of Labor Code section 510. The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their rest and meal break claims, rejecting Virgin's contention that federal law preempted California's meal and rest break requirement in the aviation context because federal law occupied the field. Contrary to Virgin's characterization, the panel explained that the relevant regulations defined safety duties for a minimum number of flight attendants. The panel agreed with the district court, which held that airlines could comply with both the Federal Aviation Administration safety rules and California's meal and rest break requirements by staffing longer flights with additional flight attendants in order to allow for duty-free breaks.The panel also held that the meal and rest break requirements were not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. Applying Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 466 P.3d 309, 321 (Cal. 2020), the panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their wage statement claim. The panel also affirmed the district court's summary judgment to plaintiffs on their waiting time penalties claim; affirmed the district court's decision on class certification; reversed the district court's holding that Virgin was subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations under California's Private Attorney General Act; vacated the attorneys' fees and costs award; and remanded. View "Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its decision holding that management of a television station committed unfair labor practices under subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by making two unilateral changes to the existing terms of the conditions of employment after a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.The panel rejected management's argument that it was entitled to make changes to the terms and conditions of employment under the "contract coverage" doctrine. Rather, the panel found that the Board's decision was rational and consistent with the NLRA. In this case, the Board applied its longstanding rule that after a CBA has expired, unilateral changes by management are permissible during bargaining only if the CBA "contained language explicitly providing that the relevant provision" permitting such a change "would survive contract expiration." Nexstar Broad. Inc., 369 NLRB No. 61, 2020 WL 1986474, at *3 (Apr. 21, 2020). Furthermore, there was no explicit language in the CBA to allow management to make unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment in the post-expiration period. Finally, the panel rejected management's arbitration claims. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc." on Justia Law

A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is precluded by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) when the right or duty upon which the claim is based is created by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or resolution of the claim substantially depends on analysis of a CBA.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Columbia Export's action under RICO against the union and individual union workers. Applying Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991), the panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that Columbia Export's RICO claims required interpretation of the CBA under which the workers were employed, that the CBA provided a process for arbitration of disputes, and that the LMRA precluded court adjudication of the RICO claims before the arbitration process had been exhausted. View "Columbia Export Terminal, LLC v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walmart, alleging three violations of California Labor Code's wage-statement and meal-break requirements; first, plaintiff alleged that Walmart did not provide adequate pay rate information on its wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code 226(a)(9); second, he claimed that Walmart failed to furnish the pay-period dates with his last paycheck, section 226(a)(6); and third, he asserted that Walmart did not pay adequate compensation for missed meal breaks, section 226.7(c). Plaintiff sought relief under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the meal-break claim because he did not suffer injury himself. The panel explained that PAGA's features diverge from the assignment theory of qui tam injury in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. V. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), and they depart from the traditional criteria of qui tam statutes. In regard to the two wage-statement claims, the panel held that plaintiff had standing but that Walmart did not breach California law. The panel explained that, because Walmart must retroactively calculate the MyShare overtime adjustment based on work from six prior periods, the panel did not consider it an hourly rate "in effect" during the pay period for purposes of section 226(a)(9). Therefore, Walmart complied with the wage statement law here. The panel also held that Walmart's Statements of Final Pay do not violate the wage statement statute. View "Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law