Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiffs, on behalf of two certified classes of employees, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that their weekly per diem benefits were improperly excluded from their regular rate of pay and thereby decreasing their wage rate for overtime hours.The panel held that the record establishes that the contested benefits functioned as compensation for work rather than as reimbursement for expenses incurred, and that the per diem benefits were thus improperly excluded from plaintiffs' regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. The panel remanded for the district court to enter partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor as to whether the per diem payments to class member employees should be considered part of the employees' rate of pay and to conduct further proceedings. View "Clarke v. AMN Services, LLC" on Justia Law

After the Ninth Circuit received an answer from the California Supreme Court to a certified question, the panel amended and reissued its opinion. The panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jan-Pro in a putative class action involving back wages and overtime claims, holding that the so-called ABC test in Dynamex Ops. W. Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), which determines whether workers are independent contractors or employees under California wage order laws, applies retroactively to this case.In this case, the district court had no opportunity to consider whether Plaintiffs are employees of Jan-Pro under the Dynamex standard, and neither party had the opportunity to supplement the record with regard to the Dynamex criteria. The panel remanded to the district court to consider the question in the first instance with the benefit of a more developed record. As an aid to the district court, the panel offered observations and guidance. On remand, the district court should consider all three prongs of the ABC test and, in doing so, may wish to consider authorities from other jurisdictions that apply the test. View "Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the FMCSA's determination that federal law preempted California’s meal and rest break rules (MRB rules), as applied to drivers of property-carrying commercial motor vehicles who are subject to the FMCSA's own rest break regulations.The panel held that the agency's decision reflects a permissible interpretation of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 and is not arbitrary or capricious. Applying Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute and the phrase "on commercial motor vehicle safety," the panel held that even assuming petitioners identified a potential ambiguity in the statute, the agency's reading was a permissible one. In this case, the FMCSA reasonably determined that a State law "on commercial motor vehicle safety" is one that "imposes requirements in an area of regulation that is already addressed by a regulation promulgated under [section] 31136." Furthermore, the FMCSA's 2018 preemption decision also reasonably relied on Congress's stated interest in uniformity of regulation.The panel concluded that the FMCSA permissibly determined that California's MRB rules were State regulations "on commercial motor vehicle safety," so that they were within the agency's preemption authority. The panel also concluded that the FMCSA faithfully interpreted California law in finding that California's rules were "additional to or more stringent than" federal regulations. Finally, the panel concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that enforcement of the MRB rules "would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

When an employee working a "one week on, one week off" schedule takes continuous leave, an employer may count both the on and off weeks against the employee's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave entitlement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary in an action alleging that Alaska miscalculated the amount of FMLA leave that certain employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) were entitled to take.The panel held that the term "workweek" in 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) has the same meaning it carries under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The panel explained that it is a fixed, pre-established period of seven consecutive days in which the employer is operating. Under that reading of the term, when a rotational employee takes continuous leave, both his on and off weeks count as "workweeks of leave" under section 2612(a)(1). Thus, the panel concluded that Alaska may insist that rotational employees who take 12 workweeks of continuous leave return to work 12 weeks later. The panel also held that it need not defer to the Secretary's contrary interpretation of the statute under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). View "Scalia v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank on plaintiff's claim of gender harassment under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Bank, alleged that a bank customer stalked and harassed her in her workplace and that the Bank failed to take effective action to address the harassment.The panel held that to establish sex discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must show she was subjected to sex-based harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and that her employer is liable for this hostile work environment. Because the panel concluded that a trier of fact could find that the harassment altered the conditions of plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working environment, it turned to the question of the Bank's liability. In this case, there is more than enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the sufficiency of the Bank's response. Because a jury reasonably could conclude that the Bank ratified or acquiesced in the customer's harassment, the panel held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Christian v. Umpqua Bank" on Justia Law

Innova, wanting to hire a citizen of India with a bachelor’s degree as a computer programmer, sought an H-1B “specialty occupation” visa on his behalf. Under the relevant regulation, Innova had to establish that a “baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.” Although the Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) provides that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree,” and that a bachelor’s degree is the “[t]ypical level of education that most” computer programmers need, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the application, concluding that “the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required.”The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that USCIS’s denial was arbitrary and capricious. USCIS’s suggestion that there is “space” between "typically needed," per the OOH, and "normally required," per the regulation is "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." The regulation is not ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted. USCIS misrepresented the OOH and failed to consider key evidence, namely, OOH language providing that a “bachelor’s degree” is the “[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation.” View "Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of California: Does the evidentiary standard set forth in section 1102.6 of the California Labor Code replace the McDonnell Douglas test as the relevant evidentiary standard for retaliation claims brought pursuant to section 1102.5 of California’s Labor Code? View "Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the BPA, in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that BPA violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by willfully interfering with her rights under the Act. The district court found that plaintiff did not prove that BPA willfully interfered with her FMLA rights and, therefore, that her claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations.The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in determining that, even if plaintiff had proven a violation of her FMLA rights, BPA's interference was not willful. In this case, the district court applied the McLaughlin standard for willfulness, and properly concluded that there is little evidence in the record that BPA either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. The district court did not clearly err in finding that these facts did not constitute willfulness. Therefore, plaintiff's claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. 2617(c)(1), rather than the three-year statute of limitations under section 2617(c)(2). View "Olson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the class action to state court because defendant based the claimed amount in controversy on unreasonable assumptions. Plaintiff filed a class action against his former employer, KMI, alleging that KMI violated several provisions of the California Labor Code.The panel held that KMI failed to sufficiently demonstrate that it met the Class Action Fairness Act's requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $5 million. The panel explained that, once plaintiff contested the reasonableness of KMI's assumptions, KMI had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its assumptions were reasonable. The court concluded that KMI did not carry its burden because it relied on assumptions regarding the Meal Period and Rest Period subclasses that were unreasonable. In this case, KMI failed to provide any evidence to support its assumption that all 442 Hourly Employee Class members were the same as the members of the Meal Period Sub-Class or the Rest Period Sub-Class or that they all worked shifts long enough to qualify for meal or rest periods. Finally, a remand to the district court for further factfinding is not required. View "Harris v. KM Industrial, Inc." on Justia Law