Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Five corporate jet pilots worked for Sands Aviation, LLC and Las Vegas Sands Corp., earning between $125,000 and $160,000 annually. Their primary duties included ensuring the safety of passengers, crew, and aircraft, which involved complex decision-making and discretionary actions. The pilots were required to be on call for pop-up flights, typically scheduled 24 hours in advance, and had to respond to flight notifications within 30 minutes. Despite being on call, they engaged in various personal activities and secondary employment.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Sands. The court found that the pilots were highly compensated employees performing primarily non-manual labor and making significant discretionary decisions, thus exempting them from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime requirements. Additionally, the court determined that the pilots' on-call time did not constitute work requiring overtime pay because they could freely engage in personal activities during this time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the pilots were exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements as highly compensated employees performing non-manual labor and making significant discretionary decisions. The court also held that the pilots' on-call time did not count as work for overtime purposes, as they were free to engage in personal activities and there was no agreement suggesting that on-call time was compensable. Thus, the pilots did not meet the 40-hour workweek threshold for overtime pay. View "KENNEDY V. LAS VEGAS SANDS CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A group of non-convicted individuals detained in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail filed a lawsuit against Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, Alameda County, and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern. The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay under California’s Labor Code for work performed without pay for Aramark while detained. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that the plaintiffs' compensation was governed by the California Penal Code, which allows counties to pay prisoners at rates below minimum wage.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the minimum wage and overtime claims, holding that the California Penal Code did not preclude non-convicted detainees working for a private company from the protections of the Labor Code. The district court allowed the plaintiffs' claims to proceed, leading the defendants to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and certified a question to the California Supreme Court regarding whether non-convicted detainees working for a private company in county jails have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under the California Labor Code. The California Supreme Court responded that such detainees do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code. The court clarified that section 4019.3 of the California Penal Code applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, and does not depend on the identity of the employer.Based on the California Supreme Court's response, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' minimum wage and overtime claims. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims failed under the current law and reversed the district court's decision. View "RUELAS V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA" on Justia Law

A staff psychologist at a federal prison discovered that a corrections lieutenant operated an Instagram account with sexually offensive content, some of which targeted her. When she reported this to prison leadership, her complaints were dismissed, and the lieutenant's posts became more aggressive. Despite her repeated complaints, the prison's response was slow and ineffective, leading her to feel unsafe and eventually leave her job.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the psychologist had not shown an objectively hostile work environment and that the prison had taken reasonable remedial actions. The court limited its consideration to five specific posts and determined that these did not occur within the physical workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred by not considering the totality of the circumstances, including the broader context of the harassment and the prison's inadequate response. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that evidence of sexually harassing conduct, even if not expressly targeting the plaintiff, and non-sexual conduct that could be seen as retaliatory or intimidating, should be considered. The court also rejected the notion that only conduct occurring inside the physical workplace is actionable, especially given the prevalence of social media. The court found that the plaintiff had raised triable issues of fact regarding the hostile work environment and the prison's failure to take prompt and effective remedial measures. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "OKONOWSKY V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Danny Lopez, an airline fuel technician, filed a wage-and-hour lawsuit under California law against his employer, Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. Lopez alleged that Menzies violated state requirements for meal periods, rest periods, overtime wages, minimum wages, and other employment conditions. Menzies sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Lopez signed as part of his employment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Lopez, as a transportation worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, was exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under 9 U.S.C. § 1. The court reasoned that Lopez’s role in fueling airplanes used in interstate and foreign commerce was integral to the transportation process, thus qualifying him for the exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a fuel technician who places fuel in planes used for foreign and interstate commerce is a transportation worker engaged in commerce. The court emphasized that such a worker plays a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The court clarified that there is no requirement for the worker to have hands-on contact with goods or be directly involved in their transportation to fall within the FAA exemption. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was exempt from the arbitration requirements of the FAA and affirmed the district court’s denial of Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. View "LOPEZ V. AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

A former transportation security officer (TSO) with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) alleged that his termination was an act of retaliation under Title VII. The TSA terminated his employment for failing to cooperate in an investigation into whether he received illegal compensation for serving as a personal representative during internal agency investigations. The plaintiff argued that this reason was a pretext for retaliation due to his prior complaints to the TSA’s Equal Employment Office (EEO) about a hostile work environment and denial of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the TSA’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual. The court noted that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s last EEO complaint and his termination (56 days) was not enough to establish pretext, especially given the concurrent timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the 56-day gap between the plaintiff’s final EEO complaint and his termination was insufficient by itself to show pretext. The court also noted that the timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation supported the TSA’s stated reason for termination. Additionally, the court found that other circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. The court concluded that the TSA had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment and affirmed the summary judgment. View "KAMA V. MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

Alexander Behrend, a Work Practice Apprentice (WPA) at the San Francisco Zen Center, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Behrend, who lived and worked at the Center, performed various tasks including meditation, cleaning, cooking, and maintenance. He argued that his role was not ministerial because it involved mostly menial work and did not include teaching or leading the faith.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center. The court found that Behrend's role fell within the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment laws in relation to their ministers. The court determined that Behrend’s duties, although menial, were integral to the Center’s religious mission and practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to Behrend’s role as a WPA. The court emphasized that the exception is broad and includes roles that are essential to carrying out a religious organization’s mission, even if they do not involve teaching or leadership. The court concluded that Behrend’s work was a vital part of Zen training and practice, thus fitting within the ministerial exception. The court rejected Behrend’s argument that only those with key roles in preaching and transmitting the faith qualify for the exception, noting that precedent supports a broader application. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the application of the ministerial exception. View "BEHREND V. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a collective action brought by call-center workers against their employer, Customer Connexx LLC, for failing to pay overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The workers claimed they were entitled to overtime pay for the time spent booting up and shutting down their computers each day. Connexx required employees to be ready to take calls at the start of their shifts, necessitating pre-shift computer engagement. The workers were prohibited from clocking in more than seven minutes before their shift, and time was rounded to the nearest quarter-hour, leading to uncompensated work time.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially granted summary judgment in favor of Connexx, holding that the time spent on these tasks was not compensable under the FLSA because it was de minimis. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to determine whether the time was de minimis and whether Connexx had knowledge of the overtime work. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Connexx, maintaining that the time was de minimis and that Connexx had policies allowing employees to request time adjustments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the de minimis doctrine remains applicable to FLSA claims but found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the time spent booting up and shutting down computers was de minimis. The court also found that there were factual disputes about whether Connexx’s policies allowed employees to be compensated for this time. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Cadena v. Customer Connexx LLC" on Justia Law

Domingo Musquiz, a former rail industry employee, petitioned for review of a decision by the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). The RRB had adopted a hearing officer's finding that Musquiz was at fault for an overpayment of his reduced-age annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and denied his request for a waiver or reduction of repayment of the overpayment and penalty. Musquiz had failed to report his re-employment and additional income to the RRB, leading to the overpayment.The RRB's decision was based on the fact that Musquiz had received a booklet of regulations, including reporting requirements, when he applied for his annuity. The RRB concluded that Musquiz should have known about his reporting duties and was at fault when he did not report his change in employment and additional outside income.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the RRB that Musquiz was at fault for the overpayment that occurred from August 2012 to June 2, 2013. However, the court concluded that Musquiz was without fault for the RRB’s overpayment of his annuity from June 3, 2013, onward. The court reasoned that by then, the RRB had informed Musquiz that they had taken his outside earnings into account and adjusted his annuity payments.The court granted Musquiz's petition, vacated the RRB's decision, and remanded the case to the RRB for further proceedings. The court instructed the RRB to develop a factual record and determine whether recovery of the overpayment from June 3, 2013, onward would be contrary to the purpose of the RRA, against equity, or against good conscience. View "Musquiz V. United States Railroad Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Tomas Perez, an underground haul truck driver, sued his former employer, Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., alleging that the company wrongfully interfered with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when it terminated his employment. Perez claimed that he had suffered a serious health condition that prevented him from performing his job, and that Barrick terminated his employment because he sought protected leave. Barrick, however, argued that Perez had faked his injury and violated company policy.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The jury found in favor of Barrick, concluding that Perez failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a serious health condition preventing him from performing his job or that Barrick terminated his employment because he sought protected leave. Perez appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that only contrary medical evidence could defeat his doctor’s certification of a serious health condition.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court held that the FMLA does not require an employer to present contrary medical evidence before contesting a doctor’s certification of a serious health condition. Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that only contrary medical evidence could defeat Perez’s doctor’s certification. The jury was allowed to properly consider the non-medical evidence that Barrick offered at trial in support of its argument that Perez did not have a serious health condition within the meaning of the Act. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Barrick. View "Perez v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Purushothaman Rajaram, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc., refused to hire him because it preferred to hire noncitizens holding H1B visas, to whom it could pay lower wages. Rajaram claimed that this constituted employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens based on their citizenship.The district court dismissed Rajaram's complaint, ruling that section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination based on U.S. citizenship. Rajaram appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 1981. The appellate court held that the statutory text of section 1981 prohibits employers from discriminating against U.S. citizens. The court reasoned that an employer that discriminates against U.S. citizens gives one class of people—noncitizens—a greater right to make contracts than U.S. citizens. This interpretation, the court held, is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which guarantees that all persons shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Rajaram's employment discrimination action and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that section 1981 does prohibit discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens on the basis of their citizenship. View "RAJARAM V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law