Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arises out of a longstanding jurisdictional dispute between two unions representing workers at Terminal 6 at the Port of Portland. In this appeal, the Board challenges the district court’s ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an interlocutory decision of the Board issued under section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(k). In Leedom v. Kyne, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the rule precluding jurisdiction over Board decisions beyond that provided in section 10(f). While the court was skeptical that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction was proper, the court need not and did not resolve the question. Whether or not the Board’s decision was ultra vires, the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Leedom was improper if PMA had some alternative means to challenge the Board’s section 10(k) decision. In this case, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying Leedom’s second prong because PMA had alternative means available to seek review of the Board’s section 10(k) decision. Because the court concluded that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction was improper, the court left it to the Board to render a final decision on its own jurisdiction in the first instance. Furthermore, the court concluded that PMA's argument on the basis of NLRB v. Noel Canning fails where it has the opportunity to raise its Noel Canning challenge as an intervenor in the section 8(b)(4)(D) case, or if it later files a petition as an aggrieved person under section 10(f). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed two complaints against APWU in federal court, alleging a contractual breach of APWU’s duty of fair representation in the first, and alleging a series of violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Nevada state tort laws in the second. One district court judge dismissed plaintiff's first complaint. The second district court judge dismissed the second complaint, ruling that, because a prima facie claim of disability discrimination against a union necessarily required a showing of a breach of the duty of fair representation, plaintiff's ADA claims were barred by the issue preclusion doctrine. The court endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Green v. American Federation of Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604, and held that a prima facie disability discrimination claim against a union does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation. In this case, plaintiff's ADA claims are not barred by issue preclusion. The court also found that plaintiff's second complaint survives APWU's claim preclusion challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garity v. APWU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former police officers employed by the City, filed suit against the City under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-19, alleging that the City failed to include payments of unused portions of plaintiffs’ benefits allowances when calculating their regular rate of pay, resulting in a lower overtime rate and a consequent underpayment of overtime compensation. Plaintiffs asserted that the City’s violation of the FLSA was “willful,” entitling them to a three-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that the City’s payment of unused benefits must be included in the regular rate of pay and thus in the calculation of the overtime rate for its police officers as well. Furthermore, because the City took no affirmative steps to ensure that its initial designation of its benefits payments complied with the FLSA and failed to establish that it acted in good faith in excluding those payments from its regular rate of pay, plaintiffs are entitled to a three-year statute of limitations and liquidated damages for the City’s violations. The court concluded, however, that the City has demonstrated that it qualifies for the partial overtime exemption under section 207(k) of the Act, limiting its damages for the overtime violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment partially in favor of plaintiffs. View "Flores v. City of San Gabriel" on Justia Law

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

Robert Carrion sustained a severe knee injury while working as a chassis mechanic, and continued to work at his physically demanding job for the next fifteen years before retiring early. After Carrion’s former employer ceased paying for treatment, he filed for disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or the Longshore Act), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq. The court affirmed the BRB’s decision upholding the ALJ’s conclusion that Carrion timely filed his claim against SSA where the ALJ and the BRB, in determining whether the one-year statute of limitations on disability claims was met pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 913(a), correctly looked to the date when Carrion became aware that his work for SSA caused a second, cumulative traumatic injury resulting in an impairment of his earning power. The court held that the prospect of a hypothetical future surgery and its anticipated benefits can not transform an otherwise permanent disability into a temporary one for purposes of the Longshore Act. In this case, Carrion's knee injury is a permanent disability. The court explained that evaluating an individual’s condition based on the presumed effect of a theoretical future treatment makes scant sense. Accordingly, the appropriate question to ask is not whether a future surgery would ameliorate Carrion’s knee condition, but whether there was actual or expected improvement to his knee after a normal and natural healing period. Finally, the court concluded that the doctrines of exhaustion and waiver are inapplicable because Carrion presented his claim of permanent disability well before the conclusion of the administrative process and neither SSA nor the agency were blindsided by the argument. Accordingly, the court denied SSA's petition for review of the BRB's decision and granted Carrion's cross-petition for review. View "SSA Terminals & Homeport Ins. v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., alleging that he lost $15.02 and one minute due to his employer's, TWEAN, compensation policy that rounds all employee time stamps to the nearest quarter-hour. The district court granted summary judgment to TWEAN. The court discerned no reason to analyze overtime minutes any differently than regular-time minutes, and the district court committed no error by treating them the same. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that TWEAN’s rounding policy violates 29 C.F.R. 785.48(b), the federal rounding regulation, because TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral on its face where TWEAN rounds all employee time punches and where his compensation records demonstrate that TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral in application. The court found that TWEAN’s rounding policy comports with the federal rounding regulation. The court also concluded that the district court properly classified the one minute of uncompensated time as de minimis and appropriately granted summary judgment to TWEAN on plaintiff's “logging-in” claim. Additionally, the district court did not err by limiting consideration of plaintiff’s rounding claim to the time period after the implementation of the Avaya/Kronos timekeeping system. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s pre-May 4, 2010 rounding claims; the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the California Labor Code 226 claim; and, because the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to TWEAN as to plaintiff’s individual rounding claim, there is no need to remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Corbin v. Time Warner Entm't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties contest the proper interpretation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., as it relates to the appointment of the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB. KTSS challenges the authority of Lafe E. Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, to authorize a petition for injunctive relief against KTSS after the President nominated him to the permanent position. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected KTSS’s argument that because Solomon’s appointment did not comply with section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 153(d), the appointment was necessarily invalid. The court concluded that, to be valid, a petition under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), must be authorized by the Board through one of two avenues: the first is for a quorum of three Board members to directly authorize the specific 10(j) petition, and the second is for the General Counsel to authorize the petition pursuant to a previous delegation of the Board’s 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. The Board concedes that the first avenue was not satisfied in this case. The court held that the second avenue was not satisfied either because Solomon was not properly serving as Acting General Counsel under the FVRA at the time that the petition was filed. In light of this holding, the court need not reach KTSS’s alternative argument that the Board never validly delegated its 10(j) authority to Solomon. Finally, the Board explicitly waived any arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause and it does not otherwise contest the remedy sought by KTSS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition. View "Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs." on Justia Law

Employer-Appellees required their employees to participate in tip pools. Unlike the tip pools contemplated by section 203(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), however, these tip pools were comprised of both customarily tipped employees and non-customarily tipped employees. In 2010, the court held in Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. that this type of tip pooling arrangement does not violate section 203(m), because section 203(m) was silent as to employers who do not take a tip credit. In 2011, shortly after Cumbie was decided, the DOL promulgated a formal rule that extended the tip pool restrictions of section 203(m) to all employers, not just those who take a tip credit. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that Cumbie foreclosed the DOL’s ability to promulgate the 2011 rule and that the 2011 rule was invalid because it was contrary to Congress’s clear intent. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada followed suit. Applying Chevron, the court concluded that Congress has not addressed the question at issue because section 203(m) is silent as to the tip pooling practices of employers who do not take a tip credit. There is no convincing evidence that Congress’s silence, in this context, means anything other than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands. In exercising its discretion to regulate, the DOL promulgated a rule that is consistent with the FLSA’s language, legislative history, and purpose. Having decided that the regulation withstands Chevron review, the court reversed both judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez" on Justia Law