Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Energy Northwest, alleging claims of retaliation in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851. The whistleblower retaliation provision of the Act protects energy workers who report or otherwise act upon safety concerns. In this case, plaintiff's single expression of a difference of opinion about the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Energy Northwest because plaintiff's conduct falls outside the scope of the Act's protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sanders v. Energy Northwest" on Justia Law

Petitioner was awarded benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 928(a), for injuries he sustained while working for PacificRim. On appeal, petitioner challenged the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's award of attorney's fees under the Act. The court concluded that the proxy market rate relied upon by the ALJ does not adequately reflect market rates for Portland, Oregon, the relevant community, because it is based entirely on data not tailored to Portland, even though reliable information about attorney billing rates in Portland was readily available. Therefore, the court held that the Board erred in affirming the attorney’s-fee award based on a proxy market rate not tailored to the “relevant community.” Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shirrod v. OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a managerial employee, filed suit alleging that GlobalTranz and its executives fired her for engaging in protected activity. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the Supreme Court established a “fair notice” test for deciding whether an employee has “filed any complaint” under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Plaintiff alleged that defendants retaliated against her for complaining about defendants' failure to comply with the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that a complaining employee’s position as a manager is an important part of the “context” that the fact-finder must consider. A reasonable employer would understand many actions taken by a non-managerial employee differently than it would understand the same actions taken by a manager. However, the court declined to formulate or adopt a special bright-line rule to apply when considering whether a manager has “filed any complaint” within the meaning of section 215(a)(3). In this case, applying Kasten’s “fair notice” rule, the court held that a jury reasonably could find that plaintiff filed such a complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters." on Justia Law

The Union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Medical Center and dismissal of the Union's petition to compel arbitration. At issue was when the Union requested arbitration, and when the Medical Center unequivocally and expressly rejected that request. The court held that it is a breach of the duty of good faith performance under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, for an employer to fail to respond within a reasonable time to a union’s communication which seeks to abide by a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement. In this case, it was not reasonable for the Medical Center to wait in silence for more than five months following the Union’s letter demanding arbitration, and then claim in litigation that the Union missed the statute of limitations. The Medical Center's delay of five months is a length of time nearly as long as the six months statute of limitations itself. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and vacated in part. View "SEIU v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The EEOC brought a subpoena enforcement action against McLane where the EEOC is investigating a charge of sex discrimination filed against McLane by one of its former employees. At issue was whether the district court correctly held that some of the information sought by the subpoena is not relevant to the EEOC’s investigation. The court concluded that the district court erred by refusing to enforce the subpoena’s request for production of pedigree information where the information is relevant to the EEOC's investigation. In this case, the employee's charge alleges that McLane’s use of the strength test discriminates on the basis of sex. To decide whether there is any truth to that allegation, the EEOC wants to contact other McLane employees and applicants for employment who have taken the test to learn more about their experiences. For similar reasons, the district court erred when it held that pedigree information is irrelevant “at this stage” of the investigation. Finally, the court vacated the district court's order denying enforcement of the subpoena’s request for the reasons for termination, and remanded so that the district court can rule on whether requiring McLane to produce that information would in fact be unduly burdensome. View "EEOC V. McLane Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two Idaho unions, filed suit to enjoin Idaho's "Fairness in Contracting Act," Idaho Code 44-2012(2)–(4), as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that it is well settled that most of the conduct prohibited by Idaho’s statute is protected by the NLRA; as to the balance of the prohibited conduct — namely, the use of job targeting funds derived in part from wages earned on federal projects governed by the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3141 et seq. — Idaho’s proposed enforcement of federal rules governing wages on federal projects, including criminal penalties more onerous than the federal statute’s own civil and administrative enforcement provisions, is likely preempted by Davis-Bacon itself; and, in any event, the decisions of the NLRB make clear that the distribution of funds derived in part from Davis-Bacon wages is at least arguably protected by the NLRA, and so preempted under one strain of NLRA preemption law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in relevant part. View "Idaho Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Inland Pac. Chapter of Assoc'd Builders & Contractors" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court held that Michael's was not liable as a successor employer by weighing continuity of the workforce as the most important factor. At issue was: (1) whether a successor employer, both generally and in the construction industry in particular, can be subject to withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381–1453, amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; and (2) if so, what factors are most relevant to determining whether a construction industry employer is a successor for purposes of imposing MPPAA withdrawal liability. The court concluded that a construction industry successor employer can be subject to MPPAA withdrawal liability, so long as the successor took over the business with notice of the liability; that the most important factor in assessing whether an employer is a successor for purposes of imposing MPPAA withdrawal liability is whether there is substantial continuity in the business operations between the predecessor and the successor, as determined in large part by whether the new employer has taken over the economically critical bulk of the prior employer’s customer base; and, in this case, the district court erred in weighing continuity of the workforce as the most important factor and applying an incorrect test to determine whether there was continuity of the workforce. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Resilient Floor Covering Pension Trust Fund Bd. of Trs. v. Michael's Floor Covering" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute over a petition to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between IATSE and InSync. The district court granted IATSE’s petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ initial agreement and “stayed” the case. The court concluded that the district court's arbitration order was final under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the stay lacked any legal or practical effect. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the order. On the merits, the court concluded that, given the scope of the arbitration provision and the nature of the parties’ dispute, the arbitrator and not the district court must consider IATSE and InSync’s competing interpretations of the evergreen clause and decide whether the 2003–2007 CBA expired or was terminated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "IATSE Local 720 V. InSync Show Prod." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, firefighters and emergency medical personnel of the District, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 254(a), claiming that two of the District's policies violate the FLSA and claiming entitlement to overtime for taking their gear to temporary duty stations. Further, plaintiffs claimed that the District's system for paying cash in lieu of unused leave time violates the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment to the District. Under Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., it is not enough to make activity compensable under the FLSA that the employer requires it and it is done for the benefit of the employer. Even activities required by the employer and for the employer’s benefit are “preliminary” or “postliminary” if not integral and indispensable to “the productive work that the employee is employed to perform.” In this case, the court concluded that driving to the home station first is not indispensable to the firefighter's principal activities. Further, gathering and transporting turnout gear to a visiting station is a preliminary activity because it is not intrinsic to the firefighting activity that he is employed to perform. The court rejected the firefighters’ contention that leave buyback should be included in the calculation of the regular rate. The court concluded that plaintiffs cannot prevail under either conflicting standard among the court's sister circuits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Balestrieri v. Menlo Park Fire Prot. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of service technicians, filed suit against his employer, Hobart, and its parent company, ITW, alleging that Hobart did not compensate its technicians for the time they spent commuting in Hobart’s service vehicles from their homes to their job sites and from those job sites back home, and that Hobart failed to provide its technicians with meal and rest breaks. The district court denied the class certification and granted partial summary judgment to defendants. The district court also determined that plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements of California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698 et seq. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying class certification because it evaluated the merits rather than focusing on whether the questions presented - meritorious or not - were common to the class; the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed class failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(b) because questions as to why service technicians missed their meal and rest breaks would predominate over questions common to the class; in regard to plaintiff's commute-time claim, the court concluded that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hobart requires technicians to use its vehicles for their commute; and the district court properly dismissed the PAGA claim because plaintiff's letter is insufficient to allow the Labor and Workforce Development Agency to intelligently assess the seriousness of the alleged violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Alcantar v. Hobart Service" on Justia Law