Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The court certified to the Washington Supreme Court the two questions: (1) Does the Washington Farm Labor Contractor Act, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.010(2), include in the definition of a “farm labor contractor” an entity who is paid a per-acre fee to manage all aspects of farming - including hiring and employing agricultural workers as well as making all planting and harvesting decisions, subject to approval - for a particular plot of land owned by a third party? and (2) Does the FLCA, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.200, make jointly and severally liable any person who uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor without either inspecting the license issued by the director of the Department of Labor & Industries to the farm labor contractor or obtaining a representation from the director of the Department of Labor & Industries that the contractor is properly licensed, even if that person lacked knowledge that the farm labor contractor was unlicensed? View "Saucedo v. Farmland Mgmt. Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a border patrol agent, filed suit against DHS, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), because the agency did not promote him based on his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's rebuttable presumption approach and held that an average age difference of ten years or more between the plaintiff and the replacements will be presumptively substantial, whereas an age difference of less than ten years will be presumptively insubstantial. The court concluded that, in this case, the average age difference between plaintiff and the selected Assistant Chief Patrol Agent is eight years, which is presumptively insubstantial. However, the court concluded that, although less than ten years older than his replacements, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that the agency considered age in general to be significant in making its promotion decisions, and that the Tucson Chief Patrol Agent considered plaintiff’s age specifically to be pertinent in considering plaintiff’s promotion. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting plaintiff where plaintiff did not meet the leadership and judgment required for the GS-15 positions. The court concluded, however, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Chief influenced or was involved in the hiring decisions of the GS-15 positions, despite that he was not the final decisionmaker. Further, the district court erred in concluding that the Chief had a limited role in the hiring decision and did not consider the Chief's repeated retirement discussions with plaintiff in assessing whether the Chief's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment and the court reversed and remanded. View "France v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCC, his former employer, on his claim of discrimination in violation of Oregon disability law. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. In this case, plaintiff had threatened to kill co-workers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

California enacted Senate Bill 863 to combat an acute “lien crisis” in its workers’ compensation system. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that SB 863 violates the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the Takings claim because the economic impact of SB 863 and its interference with plaintiffs’ expectations is not sufficiently severe to constitute a taking; the lien activation fee does not burden any substantive due process right to court access; assuming, without deciding, that the lien activation fee is analogous to a tax, its retroactive effect does not violate due process because its retroactivity is justified by a rational legislative purpose; the district court abused its discretion in finding that a “serious question” exists as to the merits of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim; in the absence of a “serious question” going to the merits of this claim, the preliminary injunction must be vacated; the exemption provision is rationally related to the purpose of clearing the lien backlog amounts to a determination that plaintiffs have no chance of success on the merits because, regardless of what facts plaintiffs might prove during the course of litigation, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data;" the presence in the Commission Report of evidence suggesting that non-exempt entities are the biggest contributors to the backlog is sufficient to eliminate any chance of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits; and the court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and reversed. View "Angelotti Chiropractic v. Baker" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over an integrated seniority list of pilots after US Airways merged with America West Airlines. East Pilots and West Pilots were both represented by the ALPA where East Pilots advocated a list based on date of hire, while West Pilots advocated a list based on the strength of their pre-merger airline. After an unfavorable arbitration result, the East Pilots forced the decertification of ALPA and the creation of a new union, the USAPA. USAPA was expressly opposed to the enforcement of the arbitrator's award and openly committed to a seniority list based on date of hire. At issue on appeal is whether USAPA violated its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots. The court first determined that the case was ripe for review. On the merits, the court concluded that USAPA breached its duty of fair representation to the West Pilots where USAPA’s manifest disregard for the interests of the West Pilots and its discriminatory conduct towards them constitutes a clear breach of duty. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that the statements he made to his supervisors regarding the alleged unlawful hiring and use of temporary exempt employees, such as himself, in contravention of the San Francisco Charter were related to a matter of public concern and protected under the First Amendment. The district court concluded that defendant failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint, while potentially significant in their implications, arose primarily out of concerns for his own professional advancement and his dissatisfaction with his status as a temporary employee; the form and context of plaintiff's speech weighs strongly against finding that First Amendment protection is warranted; and, in this case, plaintiff voiced his grievances internally - at union meetings, to his supervisor, and to Human Resources - and they were specifically related to the conditions of his employment. Because plaintiff did not engage in protected speech, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. View "Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Teamsters filed suit against Allegiant, an airline operating from Las Vegas, seeking a preliminary injunction that would prevent Allegiant from making any policy changes to the Pilot Work Rules while they negotiated a new contract. The district court found that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined Allegiant from making several policy changes until the parties had completed the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 181, mandated mediation. The court concluded that this case does not raise a representation dispute and federal courts have jurisdiction to resolve it, and the district court properly asserted jurisdiction over the parties' dispute. Because AAPAG sought neither Board certification nor voluntary recognition, the court found that it was not an RLA representative. Because AAPAG was not an RLA representative, the Work Rules were not a collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of the RLA. Thus, when the Teamsters and Allegiant met to draft a collective bargaining agreement, there was no agreement in place. Therefore, the RLA therefore did not prevent Allegiant from changing the Work Rules, and the district court erred in entering an injunction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to permit the Teamsters and Allegiant to continue negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Allegiant Air" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Here a panel of the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion filed on February 25, 2015 and replaced it with this amended opinion. The panel reversed the district’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in a suit filed by Plaintiff, a former employee of Sears. Plaintiff alleged three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The panel concluded that Plaintiff presented triable claims under FEHA that deserved trial. The panel additionally noted (1) it was beside the point that some of Plaintiff’s evidence was self-serving because such testimony was admissible, though absent corroboration, it may have limited weight; and (2) a district court could disregard a self-serving declaration that stated only conclusions and not facts that would be admissible evidence. Remanded. View "Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a physician, filed an employment discrimination action against the California Emergency Physicians Medical Group (CEP) in state court. CEP removed the suit to federal court. Prior to trial, the parties agreed in writing to settle the case. The settlement agreement included a provision that Plaintiff waive his rights to employment with CEP or at any facility that CEP may own or with which it may contract in the future. Plaintiff refused to execute the written agreement and attempted to have it set aside. The district court ultimately ordered that the settlement be enforced and dismissed the case, concluding that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 16600, which provides that a contract is void if it restrains anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, did not apply because the no-employment provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a covenant not to compete. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the parties’ dispute regarding whether the no-employment provision voided the settlement agreement was ripe for review under the traditional ripeness standard; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the settlement agreement from the ambit of 16600 solely on the ground that it did not constitute a covenant not to compete. Remanded. View "Golden v. Cal. Emergency Physicians Med. Group" on Justia Law