Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a car dealership, employed or employs Plaintiffs as “service advisors.” Plaintiffs filed this action alleging, inter alia, that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay overtime wages. The district court dismissed the overtime claim, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within a statutory exemption from the the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements for “any salesman, parts man, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles.” Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the courts must defer to the United States Department of Labor’s regulatory definitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the FLSA overtime claim and supplemental state-law claims, holding that, where there are two reasonable ways to interpret the exemption, and the Department has chosen one interpretation, the Court must defer to that choice pursuant to Chevron; and (2) because Plaintiffs did not meet the regulatory definitions, they are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime wage provisions. Remanded. View "Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC" on Justia Law

Aircraft Service International, Inc. (“Employer”) sought an obtained a preliminary injunction from the district court prohibiting Employer’s employees from striking at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and vacated the preliminary injunction, holding (1) the district court erred in failing to consider whether, prior to seeking a preliminary injunction, Employer had made “every reasonable effort to settle [the labor] dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration,” as required by Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the record lacked any evidence that Employer did so; and (2) the Railway Labor Act creates an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but this exception does not include Section 8. View "Aircraft Serv. Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) led the effort to clean up nuclear waste at the Hanford Nuclear Site in Washington state. URS Energy & Construction, Inc. (“URS Energy”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of URS Corporation, worked as a subcontractor on the project. An employee of URS Energy brought this action alleging violations of the Energy Reorganization Act (“ERA”) whistleblower protection provision concerning the cleanup efforts. The district court dismissed the DOE from the suit and granted summary judgment in favor of URS Corp. and URS Energy. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the DOE and URS Corp. were correctly dismissed for lack of administrative exhaustion, but administrative exhaustion was sufficient as to URS Energy; and (2) the employee introduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether his whistleblowing activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action URS Energy took against him, and there were other existing genuine issues of fact that precluded summary judgment to URS Energy. Remanded. View "Tamosaitis v. URS Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Sears, alleging three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12940(a). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Sears terminated plaintiff because of his disability; that Sears declined to accommodate his disability; and that Sears did not engage in an interactive process to determine possible accommodation for his disability. In this case, plaintiff presented several state law claims that deserved trial and it should not take a whole lot of evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact in a disability discrimination case, at least where the fact issue on discrimination is genuine and the disability would not preclude gainful employment of a person working with accommodation. Moreover, it is entirely besides the point that some of plaintiff's evidence was self-serving, as it will often be the case in a discrimination case that an employee has something to say about what company representatives said to him or her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Nordstrom, alleging that it had violated California Labor Code sections 551 and 552 by failing to provide him with one day's rest on seven of three occasions. The court certified the following three questions to the California Supreme Court: (1) California Labor Code section 551 provides that “[e]very person employed in any occupation of labor is entitled to one day’s rest therefrom in seven.” Is the required day of rest calculated by the workweek, or is it calculated on a rolling basis for any consecutive seven-day period? (2) California Labor Code section 556 exempts employers from providing such a day of rest “when the total hours of employment do not exceed 30 hours in any week or six hours in any one day thereof.” Does that exemption apply when an employee works less than six hours in any one day of the applicable week, or does it apply only when an employee works less than six hours in each day of the week? (2) California Labor Code section 552 provides that an employer may not “cause his employees to work more than six days in seven.” What does it mean for an employer to “cause” an employee to work more than six days in seven: force, coerce, pressure, schedule, encourage, reward, permit, or something else? View "Mendoza v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any pretext for discrimination based on his hearing impairment and his EEOC complaint where plaintiff presented no evidence that the City's reliance on past threats was actually pretext for discrimination and, even if the fit-for-duty evaluation somehow undermined the credibility of the City's stated concern about plaintiff's threats, the City put forward other reasons for terminating him: nonperformance of duties, conducting personal business at work, and making disparaging remarks about his supervisors and the City. Likewise, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he cannot show pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City. View "Curley v. City of North Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality and others, alleging that Quality failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal under Rule 8. Post- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court reviewed plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the allegations plausibly state a claim that Quality failed to pay minimum wages and overtime wages, keeping in mind that detailed facts are not required. The court was persuaded by the rationale espoused in the First, Second, and Third Circuit cases that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek. The court further agreed with its sister circuits that, at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim for unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Landers v. Quality Communications" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (URS) and the DOE, alleging violations of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851(b)(4), whistleblower protection provision, and requested a jury trial. The district court partially dismissed the complaint, denied a jury trial, and granted summary judgment against plaintiff. The court held that before an employee may opt out of the agency process and bring a retaliation suit against a respondent in federal court, that respondent must have had notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, the agency action for one year. In this case, plaintiff's claim against DOE failed for lack of administrative exhaustion. The court concluded that the administrative exhaustion was sufficient as to URS E&C. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of URS Corp. for lack of administrative exhaustion. The court also concluded that, since plaintiff has shown that his protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employment action he suffered, he has met his burden for establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under the ERA. Further, the evidence created a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment were affected by his transfer. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment to URS E&C for ERA whistleblower retaliation. Finally, the court held that plaintiff has a constitutional right to a jury trial for his claims seeking money damages against URS E&C and the court reversed the district court's ruling. View "Tomosaitis v. URS Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Building Trades, an umbrella labor organization, launched the "Push-Back-Carpenters Campaign" to force the Carpenters to reaffiliate with the Building Trades. The Building Trades then enlisted the Metal Trades to expel the Carpenters from its membership. The Carpenters subsequently filed suit alleging that the Metal Trades, both by itself and through its non-party affiliates, breached the federal duty of fair representation. The district court dismissed the Carpenters' complaint and amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that a union's selecting stewards from whom it might expect undivided loyalty is not unreasonable discrimination and does not, without more, breach the duty of fair representation. In this case, the Carpenters failed to allege that the Metal Trades removed Carpenters' members from positions as stewards for any reason other than union affiliation. Even if the Metal Trades singled out Carpenters-affiliated workers because of their union affiliation, the Carpenters' complaint fails to state a breach of the duty of fair representation as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Carpenters v. Metal Trades" on Justia Law

This case concerns the "Push-Back-Carpenters Campaign," a campaign of intense economic pressure orchestrated by the Building Trades to force the Carpenters into paying what is called "monthly bloated per capita payments in perpetuity," that is, into reaffiliating with the Building Trades and paying dues. Carpenters filed suit alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), private cause of action and under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(5), as well as state law. The district court dismissed all of the Carpenters' federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the Carpenters' complaint does not allege a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, through the use of economic fear merely because the Building Trades might have committed some tort or breached some contract as part of the Campaign. The complaint does not plausibly allege that any defendant used threats of violence to obtain the Carpenters' property; the Carpenters' formulaic and conclusory allegations of conspiracy and agency do not suggest plausibly that the Building Trades or any named defendant attempted to acquire the Carpenters' property through violence or threats; and the district court correctly rejected the Carpenters' arguments under state extortion law. The court affirmed the judgment because the complaint failed to state a claim under civil RICO or the LMRDA by orchestrating the termination of an affiliation agreement against the Building Trades, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Carpenters v. Building Trades" on Justia Law