Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Peabody mines coal on the Hopi and Navajo reservations in Arizona under leases with the tribes. The EEOC filed suit alleging, among other things, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(c), prohibits the tribal hiring preference contained in the Peabody leases. The district court granted summary judgment against the EEOC on the merits. The court affirmed, concluding that the Navajo hiring preference in the leases at issue is a political classification, rather than a classification based on national origin, and therefore does not violate Title VII. Further, the EEOC waived on appeal its record-keeping claim and the district court acted within its discretion in denying the EEOC's motion to supplement the record.View "EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co." on Justia Law

The Mall filed suit in state court alleging state-law claims for trespass and nuisance. The Union removed to federal court on the ground that the Mall had alleged the equivalent of unlawful secondary boycott activity in violation of the section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 187. At issue was whether section 303 preempts state-law claims for trespass and private nuisance related to union conduct that may also constitute secondary boycott activity. The court held that federal law does not so thoroughly occupy the field that it always preempts such claims, nor does it conflict with the state law claims in this case. Where state claims of trespass and nuisance touch interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility, and the plaintiff seeks only to enforce time, place, and manner restrictions against union protesters, the court was unwilling to presume that Congress intended to deprive the California courts of jurisdiction to hear the nuisance and trespass actions. The court found the Seventh Circuit's decision contrary to precedent and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Smart v. Local 702 Intl' Bhd. of Elec. Workers. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of defendant's motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings.View "Retail Prop. Trust v. UBCJA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth after she was terminated from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on her retaliation, breach of contract, and estoppel claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether she did not hold a policymaking or confidential position; properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim where it was undisputed that plaintiff held her position by virtue of appointment rather than by contract; and properly granted summary judgment on the estoppel claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether government officials engaged in any affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence as required for equitable estoppel, and where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the Commonwealth gained an advantage by asserting one position and then later sought an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position as required by judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court denied the Commonwealth's request for sanctions.View "Peter-Palican v. CNMI" on Justia Law

After petitioner was terminated from Union Pacific, he filed suit challenging the Public Law Board decision affirming his termination by the railroad. The court concluded that there was no violation of petitioner's due process rights where the railroad company was a private actor with respect to the on-property hearing; the Board provided petitioner with adequate due process where the Board's sufficient procedures provided him with an opportunity to be heard before he was terminated, and where the Board considered all the evidence it was required to consider; the Board did not err regarding on-property investigative hearing deficiencies; and the Board did not violate the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Bradford, Jr. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their First Amendment retaliation claims. Defendants cross-appealed a later order denying them attorneys' fees. The court remanded so that the district court could evaluate on a more detailed basis the incidents that it dismissed collectively as "petty workplace gripes" where there was evidence suggesting that some of these actions were taken as part of a more general campaign and hence might in context have greater materiality than when viewed in isolation. The court concluded that plaintiffs carried their burden of production sufficient to survive summary judgment as to the three involuntary transfers at issue. Plaintiffs presented a genuine factual dispute as to whether an internal investigation was retaliatory. Further, the district court erred in determining that defendant County was not subject to Monell liability. Defendants' cross-appeal is moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.View "Thomas v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit after he was terminated following severe interpersonal problems between him and other police officers. Plaintiff contended that these interpersonal problems resulted from his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that the police department discharged him based on his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, finding that he was disabled and that the City had discharged him because of his disability. The court reversed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could not have found plaintiff disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit plaintiff's ability to work or to interact with others. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law.View "Weaving v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit against the City and the LAPD alleging that he was fired in retaliation for testifying, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Plaintiff claimed that the real reason he was fired was not because he worked through lunch without requesting overtime, but rather because he testified in a lawsuit brought by a fellow officer. On appeal, the City and the LAPD contend that the jury was not correctly instructed. The court concluded that the Board of Rights recommendation that plaintiff's employment be terminated did not preclude his FLSA retaliation claim. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in declining to give the jury two requested special instructions and to submit several proposed special verdict questions tied to those instructions. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and liquidated damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Avila v. LAPD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, motor carriers, alleging that defendants routinely violate California's meal and rest break laws, Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512; Cal. Code Regs. tit.8, 11090. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. The court concluded that the Act does not preempt California's meal and rest break laws as applied to defendants because those laws are not related to defendants' prices, routes, or services. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law