Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on their challenge to the SFSD's policy prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in the housing units of SFSD's jails. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims and derivative claims where the County was not entitled to summary judgment because it was unable to bear its burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was entitled to a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense. On summary judgment, the County may not rely on deference to the Sheriff's judgment in order to meet its burden of proving that it was entitled to a BFOQ defense. In the absence of deference to the Sheriff's judgment, the County was also unable to meet its burden of proving that there was no issue of material fact as to whether its policy of excluding all male deputies from the female housing units was a legitimate proxy for excluding only those deputies that truly pose a threat to the important interests SFSD rightfully sought to protect. Because the district court's conclusion that the County was entitled to a BFOQ defense was also the basis for its denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court also vacated the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion. The court dismissed plaintiffs' evidentiary challenges; affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees; and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Plaintiff Gray's retaliation claims. View "Ambat, et al. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a class action suit to recover unpaid overtime wages from her former employer, Bloomingdale's. The district court granted Bloomingdale's motion to compel arbitration, determining that shortly after being hired by Bloomingdale's, plaintiff entered into a valid, written arbitration agreement and that all of her claims fell within the scope of that agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff had the right to opt out of the arbitration agreement, and had she done so she would be free to pursue this class action in court. Having freely elected to arbitrate employment-related disputes on an individual basis, without interference from Bloomingdale's, she could not claim that enforcement of the agreement violated either the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the arbitration agreement was valid and, under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., it must be enforced according to its terms. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a class action suit alleging that Nordstrom violated various state and federal employment laws by precluding employees from bringing most class action lawsuits in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. Nordstrom, relying on the revised arbitration policy in its employee handbook, sought to compel plaintiff to submit to individual arbitration of her claims. The district court denied Nordstrom's motion to compel. The court concluded that Nordstrom satisfied the minimal requirements under California law for providing employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee handbook, and Nordstrom was not bound to inform plaintiff that her continued employment after receiving the letter constituted acceptance of new terms of employment. Accordingly, the court concluded that Nordstrom and plaintiff entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes on an individual basis. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to address the issue of unconscionably. View "Davis v. Nordstorm, Inc." on Justia Law

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Drivers, California residents who worked for Affinity, filed suit alleging that Affinity wrongfully classified them as independent contractors, failed to pay them sick leave, vacation, holiday, and severance wages; and improperly charged them workers' compensation insurance fees. The court concluded that the undisputed facts indicated that Affinity had the right to control the details of the drivers' work, and the application of the secondary factors weigh in favor of a finding that the drivers were employees. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision that the drivers were independent contractors and held that they were Affinity's employees under California law. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging claims under MCA 39-2-703, which governs the liability of a railway for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-88. Applying the Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's state claim concerning a collision was not preempted. The right of railway employees to sue on the basis of negligence or mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized in Montana. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim concerning the conduct leading to the collision was independent of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and did not require interpretation by the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the RLA. The court also concluded that BNSF's disciplinary proceedings were not the legal cause of plaintiff's suspension and termination. Consequently, plaintiff's punitive damages claim was reinstated. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wolfe v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

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Peabody appealed the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's decision ordering Peabody to pay a coal miner's surviving spouse all the benefits to which the coal miner was entitled to receive under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 20 C.F.R. 718.201(a). The court concluded that the ALJ did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, by considering the regulatory preamble to the Black Lung Benefits Act in his decision and the ALJ's award of benefits to the coal miner was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied Peabody's petition for review. View "Peabody Coal v. OWCP" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, employed by the City as dispatchers or aeromedical technicians, filed suit alleging that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(k), by compensating them as "fire protection" employees under section 207(k). The court affirmed the district court's finding that section 207(k)'s exemption did not apply to dispatchers and aeromedical technicians because plaintiffs did not qualify as "employees engaged in fire protection" as defined by section 203(y); affirmed the district court's findings that a three-year statue of limitations applied and liquidated damages were proper because the City acted in willful violation of the law; and affirmed the district court's decision that previously-paid overtime should be offset using a week-by-week calculation because the statutory language of section 207(h), as well as persuasive authorities, supported this method of calculation. View "Haro v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit in California state court under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698-2699.5, and then removed to district court. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action. In Urbino v. Orkin Services, the court held that potential PAGA penalties against an employer may not be aggregated to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The remaining issue was whether a district court may instead exercise original jurisdiction over a PAGA action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15. The court held that PAGA was not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 to establish the original jurisdiction of a federal court under CAFA. Accordingly, the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over this removed PAGA action under CAFA. And because, in light of Urbino, there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under section 1332(a), plaintiff's motion to remand should have been granted. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. View "Baumann v. Chase Investment Services" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Foster Farms under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, and California law. The parties disputed whether plaintiff sought FMLA leave in order to care for her ailing father in another country. The court concluded that an employee can affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave, even if the underlying reasons for seeking the leave would have invoked FMLA protection. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there was substantial evidence that plaintiff elected not to take FMLA leave. The jury had ample evidence to render a verdict against plaintiff due to her noncompliance with Foster Farms's "three day no-show, no-call rule." Because the district court issued a limiting instruction regarding plaintiff's prior FMLA leave, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award costs of suit to Foster Poultry. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms" on Justia Law

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Retired Employees and their spouses filed suit against the County, alleging that the Retired Employees have an implied vested right to the pooling of their health care premiums with those of current employees ("pooled premiums"). The court affirmed the district court's order granting the County's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Retired Employees failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact where they did not show any link to Retired Employees' claim of an implied right to an ongoing pool premium; a practice or policy extended over a period of time did not translate into an implied contract without clear legislative intent to create that right - and intent that Retired Employees has not demonstrated in this case; Retired Employees' assertions that its involvement in negotiations with the County revealed an implied contract right to the pooled premium also lacked evidentiary support; and the nature of Retired Employees' evidence underscored the absence of any definitive intent or commitment on the part of the County to provide for the pooled premium. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the County's motion for summary judgment. View "REAOC v. County of Orange" on Justia Law