Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Section 152 First of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152 First, imposes a duty on all carrier employees to engage in the Act's labor dispute resolution procedures before ceasing to perform their work. ASIG filed suit against the IBT, requesting a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment for a permanent injunction to enjoin a strike at Sea-Tac airport as unlawful under the Act. Because the employees of ASIG were carrier employees, they must comply with the Act. Because they were subject to this obligation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the strike injunction. The injunction did not violate the employees' or other defendants' First Amendment rights; it furthered the important governmental interest of regulating the economic relationship between labor and management and was no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Aircraft Service Int'l v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, farmworkers who are Mexican citizens, filed suit against Peri & Sons, a Nevada corporation that produces, harvests, and packages onions. Plaintiffs alleged that the corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Deferring to the DOL's interpretation, the court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the corporation was not required to reimburse its employees during the first week of work for inbound travel and immigration expenses to the extent that such expenses lowered their compensation below the minimum wage. The court further concluded, inter alia, that the district court erred in concluding that the farmworkers had not pled their breach of contract claims with sufficient specificity where such allegations were sufficient to give the corporation fair notice and to make plaintiffs' breach of contract claims plausible. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the farmworkers' FLSA claims to the extent that they accrued within three years of filing; reversed its dismissal of their breach of contract claims; affirmed the dismissal of their claims under Nevada Revised Statutes 608.140; and reversed the dismissal of their other statutory and constitutional claims to the extent they accrued within two years of filing. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ralphs alleging violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. On appeal, Ralphs challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration was procedurally unconscionable where, among other things, agreeing to Ralphs' policy was a condition of applying for employment and the terms were not disclosed to plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it. In regards to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded, among other things, that Ralphs' terms required that the arbitrator impose significant costs on the employee up front, regardless of the merits of the employee's claims, and severely limited the authority of the arbitrator to allocate arbitration costs in the award. Further, the state law supporting such a conclusion was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavarria v. Ralphs" on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated, alleging that USSA committed numerous violations of California labor laws, including, inter alia, requiring them to work through their meal periods. On appeal, USSA challenged the district court's certification of the meal break sub-class on the grounds that plaintiffs have not established "commonality," as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), or "predominance," as required under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims would yield a common answer that was "apt to drive the resolution of the litigation," as required by Rule 12(b)(3). The court agreed with the district court that the "nature of the work" inquiry would be a common one, focused on the legality of a single-guard staffing model, rather than a site-by-site inquiry; concluded that common issues of law or fact would predominate; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Rule 12(b)(3) was satisfied where plaintiffs' claims "will prevail or fail in unison" as required by the rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Abdullah v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a welder who injured his back in 2003, petitioned for review of the Benefits Review Board's affirmance of an ALJ's finding that petitioner's pay increases after the date of injury were reflective of his wage-earning capacity and shall be used to calculate his disability benefits. The court held that, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, scheduled wage increases given by a non-union employer to all employees in a certain class based solely upon seniority are a general increase in wages and did not increase a claimant's wage-earning capacity. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for recalculation of petitioner's partial disability benefits. View "Petitt v. Sause Brothers" on Justia Law

I-TAP, an approved apprenticeship program for Federal purposes, but not recognized by California as a state-approved apprenticeship program, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the CDIR's actions were inconsistent with the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act). The court concluded that federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed in this case; the court declined to afford controlling deference to the DOL's new interpretation of the meaning of "Federal purposes" under 29 C.F.R. 29.2 under Auer v. Robbins, but nevertheless adopted that interpretation as the most persuasive construction of the regulation at issue; the court adopted the DOL's new interpretation of Federal purposes, which required of agreements, contracts, etc., that conformity with federal apprenticeship standards be a condition for the federal assistance at issue; plaintiffs' preemption claim failed where the three projects at issue did not qualify as Federal purposes, and it was not impermissible for the CDIR to require the contractors on the projects to comply with California's apprenticeship standards; and plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Indep. Training v. Cal. Dep't Indus. Relations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former President of the United Steel Workers Local 12-369, filed suit against defendants alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of race and gender, and retaliation for having engaged in protected speech under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. The court concluded that, because the alleged retaliatory actions directed toward plaintiff impinged only upon her status as a union officer, she could not seek redress for these actions under section 609. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendants did not discriminate or retaliate against plaintiff given the district court's analysis of plaintiff's allegations, both as discrete incidents and as part of a broader course of conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USW Local 12-369 v. USW Int'l" on Justia Law