Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her claim challenging the termination of her long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132. Plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Unum on it's counterclaim for restitution of overpaid benefits. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the claim for denial of benefits for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The exhaustion requirement should have been excused because plaintiff acted reasonably in light of Unum's ambiguous communications and failure to engage in a meaningful dialogue. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Unum on plaintiff's claim for denial of benefits. View "Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "CGI Technologies and Solutions v. Rose, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that defendants' determination, that plaintiff's psychological disorder made her unfit for reinstatement from disability retirement to active service with the Caltrans, deprived her of her right to a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111-12117. At issue was whether a state employee could sue state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of Title I of the ADA. The court concluded that Congress' inclusion of a comprehensive remedial scheme in Title I precluded section 1983 claims predicated on alleged violations of the ADA Title I substantive rights. The court also concluded that plaintiff's allegations of fact did not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of thousands of retired county employees participating in county-sponsored health care plans, filed suit against the county challenging changes it made to the structure of two health benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the county. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings and with the answer provided by the California Supreme Court to the certified question in the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc.(REAOC) litigation. The court took judicial notice of the documents; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' subsidy claims and remanded so that the district court could reassess those claims in light of the California Supreme Court's opinion, and coordinate those claims with the REAOC litigation; the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' grant claims because the court found that plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to set out specifically the terms of those memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on which their claim predicated; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 12940 et seq., claim because the court found that Mr. McConnell's timely filed administrative complaint was sufficient to establish exhaustion of the administrative remedies for all class members.

Plaintiffs, television news reporters for KPIX-TV, brought suit alleging that KPIX discriminated against them on the basis of age and gender, in violation of California law, when they were laid off. The district court granted KPIX's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that, although plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, they did not present sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. The court wrote to clarify that a plaintiff could make a prima facie case of disparate-treatment age discrimination using statistical evidence, even where that evidence did not account for defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.

Plaintiffs, employees at a defense plant in Arizona, collectively bargained for the right to receive employer-provided healthcare coverage after they retired. At issue was whether those employees, now retirees, were contractually entitled to receive premium-free healthcare coverage until age 65, or whether the contracts on which the retirees relied as providing that entitlement allowed their prior employer to start charging them for their insurance. The court held that Raytheon expressly agreed to provide 100% company-paid healthcare coverage for eligible retirees; that Raytheon's obligation survived the expectation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); and that Raytheon's agreed-upon obligation could not be unilaterally abrogated by Raytheon, regardless of the rights Raytheon reserved for itself in Plan documents, because the CBAs did not incorporate the Plans' reservation-of-rights provisions with respect to employer contribution issues, as opposed to issues relating to the provision of monetary or in kind benefits for particular medical services. The court further held that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' claim for punitive and extra-contractual damages.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the surviving spouse benefit provided by the city to its retired employees discriminated on the basis of sex. Plaintiff's theory of liability was that because, in the aggregate, the city paid a larger amount of money to the married retirees who selected the surviving spouse benefits than it did to single retirees who did the same, and male retirees were more likely to be married, the surviving spouse benefit had an unlawful disparate impact on female retirees. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's disparate treatment claim because she failed to allege intentional discrimination and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's disparate impact claim because, even assuming she had Article III stand, her claim failed as a matter of law.

This case arose when plaintiff, a neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse, sought an accommodation from her employer that would have allowed her an unspecified number of unplanned absences from her job. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on her reasonable accommodation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). The court held that plaintiff's performance was predicated on her attendance; reliable, dependable performance required reliable and dependable attendance. An employer need not provide accommodations that compromise performance quality. Because regular attendance was an essential function of a neo-natal nursing position, the court affirmed.

Two non-Indian entities brought this action to enjoin Navajo Nation tribal officials from applying tribal law to them in tribal courts. They claimed that both their contract with the tribe and federal law deprived tribal officials of authority to regulate them. At issue was whether the Navajo Nation itself was a necessary party under Rule 19. The court held that the tribe was not a necessary party because the tribal officials could be expected to adequately represent the tribe's interests in this action and because complete relief could be accorded among the existing parties without the tribe. Thus, this lawsuit for prospective injunctive relief could proceed against the officials under a routine application of Ex parte Young and should not be dismissed.

Plaintiff, and drivers similarly situated, filed a class action against Affinity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to pay wages, improper charges for workers' compensation insurance, and the unfair business practice of wrongfully classifying California drivers. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court, after applying California's choice of law framework, erred when it concluded that Georgia law applied. The district court concluded that under Georgia law there was a presumption of independent contractor status and to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish that an employer-employee relationship existed. The district court found that plaintiff was unable to establish such a relationship and failed to rebut Georgia's presumption. The court held that the parties' choice of Georgia law was unenforceable in California. The court also held that under California's choice of law framework, the law of California applied. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall apply California law to determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.