Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After her first termination from the City of Pasadena Police Department and subsequent reinstatement, plaintiff brought a lawsuit in state court claiming that she had been discriminated against and harassed by the City due to its perception that she had a disability. After her second termination, she reinstated her discrimination and harassment claims in an administrative proceeding, where she also argued that the termination was retaliatory. Both of plaintiff's actions resulted in a decision in favor of the City. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims in federal court based on the same theories in state proceedings. The court held that California principles of issue preclusion prevented the court from reaching these issues.

Plaintiff sued the Corps for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., by failing to interview him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. The court found that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' failure to interview and promote him. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps was reversed.

PAC sought review of an order of the Board holding that PAC violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by firing an employee for his outburst during a meeting with PAC management regarding PAC's compensation policies. The court remanded to the Board for proper balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors in light of its conclusion that the Board erred in its initial assessment that the nature of the employee's outburst weighed in favor of protection. The court granted the Board's petition for enforcement of the order with regard to the Board's findings that PAC committed unfair labor practices by inviting the employee to quit in response to his protected concerted protests of labor conditions. Accordingly, Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Board's order were vacated and Paragraphs 1 and 2(d)-(e) were enforced.

Three nonresidents of California brought a would-be class action against Oracle seeking damages under California law for failure to pay overtime. Plaintiffs' first two claims were based on work performed in California. The third claim was based on work performed anywhere in the United States. The district court granted summary judgment to Oracle on all three claims, on the ground that the relevant provisions of California law did not, or could not, apply to the work performed by plaintiffs. After certifying several questions of state law to the California Supreme Court and receiving answers from that court, the court reversed summary judgment on the first two claims and affirmed the third claim. In regards to the Labor Code claim, the court rejected Oracle's due process clause and commerce clause arguments; in regards to the California Business and Professions Code 17200 claim, the court held that the California court's holding was conclusive (that section 17200 did not apply to overtime work performed by plaintiffs); and in regards to the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1), claim, the court held that the California court's holding was conclusive (section 17200 did not apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs based solely on the employer's failure to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA).

The NLRB petitioned for enforcement of its order finding that Legacy Health violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3) by not allowing its employees to simultaneously hold bargaining unit positions and non-bargaining unit positions. The court held that, under section 10(e) of the Act, the court did not have jurisdiction to hear Legacy Health's exceptions to the NLRB's remedial order. Accordingly, the court granted summary enforcement of the NLRB's order.

Plaintiff filed a Federal Employee Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8131, 8132, claim after he was injured in a helicopter crash and received benefits totaling $409,838.11. Plaintiff then filed a civil suit against the helicopter operator and eventually the lawsuit settled for $2.3 million. At issue was whether plaintiff could deduct his litigation costs from a refund to the United States under FECA. The court held that no reading of section 8132 allowed for a FECA beneficiary to obtain a civil award and then deduct the costs of obtaining that award from a refund of benefits owed to the United States. The only plausible reading of section 8132 was to the contrary: A beneficiary could deduct his litigation costs only from his gross recovery to determine the amount, if any, of the surplus he must credit to the United States for future benefits.

Plaintiffs, current or former "franchisee" shuttle van drivers for SuperShuttle in various parts of California, filed a putative class action alleging that plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when, in truth, they were "employees" under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that they had consequently been deprived of the full protections provided to employees under the California Labor Code, including overtime and minimum wages, reimbursement of business expenses and deductions wrongfully taken from wages, and meal period pay. The district court granted SuperShuttle's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the third prong in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (Covalt) was not satisfied, the California Public Utilities Code 1759 was not implicated, and the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On remand, the district court could determine whether the SuperShuttle drivers were employees or independent contractors under California law without hindering or interfering with PUC decisions or policies.

Petitioner sought injunctive relief in district court pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 160(j), alleging that CHHP was a successor employer to Karykeion and that a majority of CHHP's registered nurses had been members of the California Nurses Association under Karykeion. Petitioner therefore alleged that CHHP's continuing failure to bargain in good faith with the chosen representative of its employees violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The district court granted petitioner's petition and issued a preliminary injunction, applying the test established in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and affirmed the order.

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.