Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current or former "franchisee" shuttle van drivers for SuperShuttle in various parts of California, filed a putative class action alleging that plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when, in truth, they were "employees" under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that they had consequently been deprived of the full protections provided to employees under the California Labor Code, including overtime and minimum wages, reimbursement of business expenses and deductions wrongfully taken from wages, and meal period pay. The district court granted SuperShuttle's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the third prong in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (Covalt) was not satisfied, the California Public Utilities Code 1759 was not implicated, and the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On remand, the district court could determine whether the SuperShuttle drivers were employees or independent contractors under California law without hindering or interfering with PUC decisions or policies.

Petitioner sought injunctive relief in district court pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 160(j), alleging that CHHP was a successor employer to Karykeion and that a majority of CHHP's registered nurses had been members of the California Nurses Association under Karykeion. Petitioner therefore alleged that CHHP's continuing failure to bargain in good faith with the chosen representative of its employees violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The district court granted petitioner's petition and issued a preliminary injunction, applying the test established in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and affirmed the order.

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.

Day-laborer organizations challenged a city anti-solicitation ordinance that barred individuals from standing on a street or highway and soliciting, or attempting to solicit, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle. The court agreed with the day laborers that the ordinance was a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech where the ordinance failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring element of the Supreme Court's time, place, and manner test and where the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it regulated significantly more speech than was necessary to achieve the city's purpose of improving traffic safety and traffic flow at two major intersections. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Costco appealed the district court's order granting class certification in a class action brought by Shirley Ellis, Leah Horstman, and Elaine Sasaki (plaintiffs), alleging that Costco's promotional practices discriminated based on gender. The court held that at least one plaintiff (Sasaki) had standing to bring suit. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in its analyses of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's findings on those issues and remanded for application of the correct standard. The court further held that, although the district court correctly determined that Sasaki was an adequate class representative, the court held that Ellis and Horstman were inadequate representatives for pursuing injunctive relief, given that they were former employees, and remanded for the district court to consider whether they were adequate representatives if a (b)(3) class was certified. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and remanded for reconsideration.

The court reviewed a petition by the Union from an order of the NLRB (Board) dismissing a complaint alleging unfair labor practices by Employers. The Union alleged that the Employers violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151-169, when the Employers unilaterally terminated union dues-checkoff before bargaining to agreement or impasse. The court held that the the Board's decision in Hacienda III was arbitrary and capricious because the Board provided no explanation for the rule it followed in dismissing the Union's complaint. The court also held that, although it must show deference to the Board in its promulgation of labor policy, a third open remand was inappropriate in this case because the Board, after more than fifteen years, had reached a deadlock on the merits and continued to be unable to form a reasoned analysis in support of its ruling. The court further held that, upon consideration of the merits, the Employers violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA when they unilaterally ceased dues-checkoff before bargaining to impasse. Therefore, the court granted the Union's petition, vacated the Board's ruling, and remanded to the Board so it could determine what relief was appropriate.

The Secretary of Labor filed a complaint against the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), alleging that DSHS failed to pay overtime compensation to certain social workers in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DSHS, concluding that the social workers come within the "learned professional" exemption of the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. The court held that because the social workers positions at issue required only a degree in one of several diverse academic disciplines or sufficient coursework in any of those disciplines, DSHS had not met its burden of showing that its social workers positions "plainly and unmistakably" met the regulatory requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The State of Arizona appealed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent a state law from taking effect that would have terminated eligibility for healthcare benefits of state employees' same-sex partners. The district court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because they showed that the law adversely affected a classification of employees on the basis of sexual orientation and did not further any of the state's claimed justifiable interests. The district court also found that plaintiffs had established a likelihood of irreparable harm in the event coverage for partners ceased. The court held that the district court's findings and conclusions were supported by the record and affirmed the judgment.

These consolidated cases arose out of a 2007 labor dispute between the Painters Union and Nevada contractors over whether the Union's card check established its majority status under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), thereby requiring the contractors to bargain with the Union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. One set of cases arose from the Union's charges before the NLRB that the contractors failed to bargain in good faith during the following card check. The other case arose from the district court, where the Union sought an order to arbitrate whether the card check established the Union's majority status under the terms of the CBA. In the petitions for review from the NLRB's decision, the court enforced the NLRB's order, and denied the Union's and Flooring Solutions' petitions for review. In the appeal from the district court, the court held that the dispute over whether the Union established majority status pursuant to the CBA's card check provision was primarily contractual and subject to arbitration. Therefore, the court withdrew its prior decision and replaced it with this opinion reversing the district court's order denying arbitration. The court remanded for the district court to order all parties to arbitrate whether, under the CBA's card check provision, the Union established majority status.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., action against defendant as not timely filed. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a stockbroker in 1979 and starting in 1982, plaintiff had been disabled periodically from her employment. Plaintiff applied for long-term disability benefits around January 15, 1987. The court held that plaintiff's claim did not accrue in 1990 with regard to the ERISA statute of limitations, as the district court found, but rather accrued when her claim was finally denied on January 14, 2004. Therefore, plaintiff's action, filed on February 16, 2006, commenced within the four-year statutory limitations period for ERISA claims. The court also held that the limitations provision in the policy here did not apply to disability cases in which the claimant contested the amount of benefits or claims that the benefits have been miscalculated. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.