Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against defendants (collectively, the Plan) for refusing to pay certain long-term disability benefits. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants and dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice due to his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Plan. The court held that the district court adopted the Plan's reading of ERISA, 29 C.F.R. 250.503-1(i) without the benefit of the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of that provision. Therefore, deferring to the Secretary's plausible approach, the court held that where a claimant sought review of his or her disability claims, the quarterly meeting rule was restricted to multiemployer plans. Accordingly, the Plan was required to render a decision within 90 days of plaintiff's administrative appeal and failed to do so. Consequently, plaintiff's claims must be deemed exhausted and the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants claiming that she had been demoted in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights by attending a school board meeting and sitting next to her boss, who was fired at the meeting. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that defendants' efficiency interests were greater than plaintiff's interest in free association. The court held that it appeared that the triggering factor in defendants' action was simply plaintiff's decision to sit next to her boss at the public school meeting, without even speaking to him. The court also held that, because defendants produced no evidence that plaintiff's association with her boss actually disrupted the office or her performance, or reasonably threatened to cause future disruption, defendants failed to show that its interests in work-place efficiency outweighed plaintiff's First Amendment interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Two-thousand unlicensed junior accountants brought a wage-and-hour class action against their employer, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC"), alleging, among other things, that PwC failed to pay them mandatory overtime under California law. At issue was whether unlicensed accountants in California were categorically ineligible, as a matter of law, to fall under the professional exemption and the administrative exemption from mandatory overtime. The court held that neither exemption was categorically inapplicable to unlicensed accountants as a matter of law and PwC established material fact questions on whether the accountants fell under either exemption. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment in favor of accountants and held that the exemption defenses must be resolved at trial.

San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies ("deputies") shot and killed Shane Hayes inside his home after the deputies arrived at Hayes' residence in response to a domestic disturbance call from a neighbor. Plaintiff, Hayes' daughter, asserted a claim for negligence based in part on the deputies' preshooting conduct, specifically their alleged failure to properly assess the situation before entering the house. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputies and found that the deputies owed Hayes no duty of care in their preshooting conduct. The district court did not address whether the deputies' preshooting conduct could be considered a breach of any standard of care, if such a duty were owed. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: "Whether under California negligence law, sheriff's deputies owe a duty of care to a suicidal person when preparing, approaching, and performing a welfare check on him." In light of the court's decision to certify the issue presented, the opinion filed in this case on March 22, 2011 was withdrawn.

Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment in his civil rights action arising from the suspension of his medical staff privileges at the University Medical Center of Southern Nevada ("UMC"), a county hospital organized under the laws of Nevada, as well as the denial of his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The principal issue on appeal was whom, if anyone, could appellant sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his constitutional injury. The court held that the district court erred in determining that only the MEC, not named a party to the suit, could be liable for appellant's alleged section 1983 claims. The court also held that, because appellant alleged sufficient facts that the individually named voting members of the MEC acted under color of state law in effecting the unconstitutional deprivation of his protected property interest, amending his complaint to include reference to section 1983 would not be futile or prejudice defendants.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") had a paid chaplaincy program that employed Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American clergy. These chaplains served all inmates but other religions were also served by volunteer chaplains. A Wiccan volunteer chaplain and a small group of inmates challenged the paid chaplaincy program asserting that the Wiccan chaplain should be eligible for employment in the paid-chaplaincy program. The court held that the inmates failed to exhaust their claims or brought them in an untimely fashion and the chaplain was pursuing constitutional claims that were derivative of the inmates' claims rather than his own. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly dismissed and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Wiccan chaplains' claims because, for the most part, he lacked standing. The court agreed that the district court need not exercise jurisdiction over these derivative claims. The court also held that, although the Wiccan chaplain had standing to pursue his personal employment claims, and also constitutional claims for different treatment as a volunteer chaplain and retaliation, ultimately he could not prevail on those claims.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.

Defendants, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lunde Electric Company ("company"), appealed convictions stemming from the misappropriation of employee 401(k) contributions to pay the company's operating expenses. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. 664, for embezzlement or conversion of elective deferrals, and 18 U.S.C. 1027, for false or misleading statements in a required Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C 1001 et seq., document. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Counts 17 and 18 under section 664 where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 1991 Profit Sharing Plan had been restated before defendants retained their employees' elective deferrals in the company's general account; where defendants commingled their employees' contributions with the company's assets to prop up their failing business and therefore, intentionally used their employees' assets for an unauthorized purpose; where they sent participants account statements showing 401(k) balances which were in fact non-existent; where defendants' decision to deviate was the wilful criminal misappropriation punished by section 664; and where defendants were alerted repeatedly about their obligation to remit the deferrals and defendants hid their actions from employees. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Count 21 under section 1027 where defendants' initial decision to mislead their own employees about the solvency of their retirement plans by filing false account statements and false Form 5500s were the behaviors targeted by section 1027.

Plaintiffs, working as auditors in The Boeing Company's ("Boeing") IT Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") Audit group, filed SOX whistleblower complaints under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S.C. 1514(a)(1), with the Occupation Safety and Health Administration after they were terminated by Boeing when they spoke with a reporter from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer ("Post-Intelligencer") about Boeing's compliance with SOX. At issue was whether plaintiffs' disclosures to the Post-Intelligencer were protected under section 1514(a)(1), which protected employees of publicly-traded companies who disclose certain types of information. The court held that section 1514(a)(1) did not protect employees of publicly-held companies from retaliation when they disclosed information regarding designated types of fraud or securities violations to members of the media.

Plaintiff and defendant, the United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"), appealed a jury verdict awarding plaintiff unpaid overtime, meal, and rest-period wages. The district court originally certified a class comprised of full-time supervisors employed by UPS under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and appointed plaintiff as class representative under California's Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Order No. 9, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8 11090. At issue was whether the district court erred in subsequently decertifying the class on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish that common issues of law or fact predominated over individual ones. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class where the district court held that plaintiff had not established predominance, had relied heavily on a survey that was neither reliable nor representative of a class, that his remaining evidence similarly was not representative of the class, and did not address the "primarily engaged" element of the exemptions under the IWC Wage Order No. 9.