Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mobilize the Message provides political campaigns with doorknockers and signature gatherers, which it purports to hire as independent contractors. Plaintiff Moving Oxnard Forward is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making the government of Oxnard, California, more efficient and transparent and in the past have hired signature gatherers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs claimed that the California law violates the First Amendment because it discriminates against speech based on its content by classifying their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees or independent contractors under the ABC test while classifying direct sales salespersons, newspaper distributors, and newspaper carriers under Borello.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction which sought to restrain the California Attorney General from applying California’s “ABC test,” codified in California Labor Code Section 2775(b)(1) to classify Plaintiffs’ doorknockers and signature gatherers as either employees or independent contractors. The panel accepted that classification of their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees might impose greater costs on plaintiffs than if these individuals had been classified as independent contractors, and that as a result they might not retain as many doorknockers and signature gatherers. Such an indirect impact on speech, however, does not violate the First Amendment. Section 2783 does not target certain types of speech. Unless an occupational exemption exists, the ABC test applies across California’s economy. Thus, Plaintiffs were not unfairly burdened by application of the ABC test to their doorknockers and signature gatherers. View "MOBILIZE THE MESSAGE LLC, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

While he was consulting on an environmental project for the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Plaintiff believed he was required to prepare an environmental assessment in a manner that violated federal law. Plaintiff was terminated after reporting the suspected illegality to the client and his supervisor at SpecPro. Plaintiff brought statutory and common law claims of retaliation and wrongful termination in a California state court action that was removed to federal court. Plaintiff alleged his employment was terminated in violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Cal. Labor Code Section 1102.5(b), (c).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s former employer, SpecPro Professional Services, LLC, on Plaintiff’s retaliation and wrongful termination claims. The panel first addressed the district court’s determination that Olaintiff’s disclosures to his supervisor were not actionable because the supervisor was not “a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance.” Second, the panel held that several state court appellate courts have held that disclosures to wrongdoers are protected under section 1102.5(b). The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment order on section 1102.5(b) retaliation claim. Because his claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy was derivative of his retaliation claim, the panel also reversed the grant of summary judgment on that claim. View "AARON KILLGORE V. SPECPRO PROFESSIONAL SERVICES" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Cariene Cadena and similarly situated employees (Appellants) are employed by Customer Connexx LLC (Connexx) to operate a call center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Appellants’ primary responsibilities are to provide customer service and scheduling to customers over a “softphone,” operated only through their employer-provided computers.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant Customer Connexx LLC and remanded for further proceedings in a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by call center workers. The panel concluded that the district court correctly identified the workers’ principal duties as answering customer phone calls and scheduling appliance pickups. Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit, the panel held that the workers’ duties could not be performed without turning on and booting up their work computers, and having a functioning computer was necessary before the workers could receive calls and schedule appointments. Accordingly, turning on the computers was integral and indispensable to the workers’ duties and was a principal activity under the FLSA. It, therefore, was compensable.   The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the FLSA claim and remanded to the district court for consideration of whether time spent shutting down computers was compensable, whether the time spent booting up and down the computers was not compensable under the de minimis doctrine, and whether Connexx had no knowledge of the alleged overtime such that it was not in violation of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. View "CARIENE CADENA, ET AL V. CUSTOMER CONNEXX LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 imposes liability on employers who withdraw—partially or completely—from multiemployer pension funds. After a complete withdrawal, GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund’s (GCIU) actuary calculated MNG Enterprise’s (MNG) withdrawal liability using an interest rate published by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. On MNG’s challenge, an arbitrator found (1) that MNG could not be assessed partial withdrawal liability following a complete withdrawal, (2) that it had shown the interest rate used was not the best estimate of the plan’s experience, and (3) that GCIU properly included the newspapers’ contribution histories. The district court affirmed the arbitrator’s award, vacating and correcting only a typographical error on the interest rate.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s order affirming, except for a typographical error, an arbitrator’s award regarding the withdrawal liability. The panel held that the MPPAA directs the plan actuary to determine withdrawal liability based on “actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” The panel held that the GCIU actuary’s use of the PBGC rate, without considering the “experience of the plan and reasonable expectations,” did not satisfy the “best estimate” standard. View "GCIU-EMPLOYER RETIREMENT FUND, ET AL V. MNG ENTERPRISES, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Carroll College, alleging that it refused to renew its contract as a golf coach after he complained about gender inequity at the college’s athletic department. The district court ruled that Plaintiff failed to make the prima facie case that the nonrenewal of the contract was an adverse employment action.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The panel held that the refusal to renew a contract may be an adverse employment action for a Title IX retaliation claim because it could deter a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination. The panel remanded the case to the district court to consider Carroll College’s alternative bases for summary judgment. View "BENNETT MACINTYRE V. CARROLL COLLEGE" on Justia Law

In March 2018, the officers were involved in the fatal shooting of a homeless man. The Oakland Police Department investigated the incident, concluding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and complied with Police Department policy. The Chief of Police agreed. Separately, the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the investigative body of the City’s civilian oversight Police Commission, investigated the incident and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable. The Compliance Director disagreed with the Chief of Police and the CPRA, instead recommending termination of the officers for unreasonable use of force. After their termination, the officers sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief in state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court. The panel held that this was a case arising under state law that properly belonged in the state courts. Recognizing that under Section 1331, a case can “arise under” federal law in two ways, the panel determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both branches of federal question jurisdiction. First, the panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal cause of action branch because federal law did not create the causes of action asserted. The panel next held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the substantial federal question branch. View "FRANCISCO NEGRETE V. CITY OF OAKLAND" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the question of whether the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) may order an employer to reimburse a union for legal fees incurred during the contract bargaining process. The Ninth Circuit held that it may, and granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its compliance order.The Board found that the employer engaged in unusually aggravated misconduct sufficient to warrant more than a traditional remedy, and ordered the employer to reimburse the union for the costs and expenses the union incurred during collective bargaining sessions. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s findings and enforced its orders in full. The parties could not reach an agreement on the total amount the employer should be required to pay in remedies, and in July 2018, the Regional Director for NLRB Region 27 issued a compliance specification detailing how much the employer owed.The court rejected the employer’s argument that D.C. Circuit precedent established that the Board lacked the power to order the reimbursement of legal fees. The court held that the D.C. Circuit’s opinions were specifically limited to the context of litigation, and they did not bar the award at issue here. The National Labor Relations Act grants the Board broad discretion to impose remedies for unfair labor practices. The court held that the award of legal fees, in this case, was exactly the sort of remedy that courts have upheld as within the Board’s statutory remedial authority. View "NLRB V. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING, LLC" on Justia Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of National Railroad Passenger Corporation and other railroad companies, the Ninth Circuit held that, as to railroad employees, the federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act preempts California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act, which requires employers to provide employees with paid sick leave that they may use for specified purposes.   RUIA provides unemployment and sickness benefits to railroad employees, and it contains an express preemption provision disallowing railroad employees from having any right to “sickness benefits under a sickness law of any State.” Looking at the plain meaning of the statutory text, the court concluded that the preemption provision broadly refers to compensation or other assistance provided to employees in connection with physical or mental well-being. The court concluded that RUIA’s statutory framework and stated purposes confirm the breadth of its preemptive effect.   The court found unpersuasive an argument by the California Labor Commissioner and union-intervenors that RUIA does not preempt the California Act as to railroad employees because the benefits the Act offers are different in kind than RUIA’s benefits. The court also found unpersuasive (1) an argument that RUIA should be interpreted as preempting only the kinds of state laws that existed at the time RUIA was amended to provide for sickness benefits; and (2) various textual arguments in support of a narrower interpretation of the preemption provision. View "NAT'L RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. V. JULIE SU" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of California the following three questions of state law: (1) Is time spent on an employer’s premises in a personal vehicle and waiting to scan an identification badge, have security guards peer into the vehicle, and then exit a Security Gate compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16? (2) Is time spent on the employer’s premises in a personal vehicle, driving between the Security Gate and the employee parking lots, while subject to certain rules from the employer, compensable as “hours worked” or as “employer-mandated travel” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16? (3) Is time spent on the employer’s premises, when workers are prohibited from leaving but not required to engage in employer-mandated activities, compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16, or under California Labor Code Section 1194 when that time was designated as an unpaid “meal period” under a qualifying collective bargaining agreement? View "GEORGE HUERTA V. CSI ELEC. CONTRACTORS, INC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought five claims arising under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), all concerning alleged wage and hour violations, against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (collectively, “Walmart”). The district court dismissed some of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims on the ground that they were unmanageable and dismissed her remaining PAGA claims as a discovery sanction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained California’s Labor Code allows employees to sue an employer for violating provisions designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers. Following the enactment of PAGA in 2004, employees may stand in the shoes of the Labor Commissioner and recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. Sections 2699 9(a) and 2699.3 of PAGA contain requirements for such actions.   The court held that the recently decided Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, — S. Ct. —, 2022 WL 2135491, at *3 (2022), case expressly foreclosed Walmart’s argument that Plaintiff was barred from pursuing her PAGA claims because she did not seek class certification under Rule 23. In addition, given their differing coverage, PAGA and Rule 23 are fully compatible and do not conflict for purposes of the first step of an Erie analysis. The court also rejected Walmart’s argument that the district court correctly rejected some of Plaintiff's PAGA claims as unmanageable under its inherent authority. The court held that Rule 26(a) applied to claims for damages. Plaintiff's PAGA claims seek civil penalties, not damages, so Rule 26(a) does not apply to her PAGA claims. View "CHELSEA HAMILTON V. WAL-MART STORES, INC." on Justia Law