Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under 28 U.S.C. 1919, when a suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court "may order the payment of just costs." This case required the court to parse the term "just" and consider what constituted "just costs." Here, the district court awarded costs to defendants on the ground that they were necessarily incurred in defending in the action. Because the district court implied a presumption of award of costs that was absent in the permissive statute, and because it equated incurred costs with "just costs," the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion under section 1919.

Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt of court in violation of 18 U.S.C. 402 for "ghostwriting" eight pleadings for a pro se litigant in a civil lawsuit. Defendant appealed his conviction on four grounds, contending that: (1) he was denied his statutory right to a jury trial; (2) he could not be prosecuted for criminal contempt under section 402 on the basis that he did not comply with Local Rules 10-1 and 10-2; (3) Nevada Revised Statute 7.285 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; and (4) he did not violate section 7.285. The court held that the failure to try defendant by jury mandated reversal of his criminal contempt conviction where deprivation of the right to a jury trial constituted a structural error requiring reversal. The court also held that local court rules, including Rule 10-1 and 10-2, did not constitute rules within the meaning of section 402 and thus could not serve as predicates for criminal convictions. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction based on the first two claims and did not reach the remaining claims.

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case concerned California's adoption of an initiative constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the video recording of the trial, which had purportedly been prepared by the trial judge for his in-chambers use only and was later placed in the record and sealed by him. The order, issued by his successor following his retirement, would permit the broadcast of the recording for all to view. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the recording of the trial notwithstanding the trial judge's commitment to the parties that the recording would not be publicly broadcasted. The district court further abused its discretion by holding that the determinations made by the trial judge regarding the placement of the recording under seal did not bind a different judge presented with a motion to unseal - a conclusion the court regarded as an "implausible" and "illogical" application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with instructions to maintain the recording under seal.

The prosecutor in this case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jerry R. Albert, accused defendant of having lied to the federal magistrate presiding at an earlier hearing. Without telling the court or defense counsel, the prosecutor presented to court and counsel an altered version of the prior hearing's question and answer and the altered version of such dialogue made it appear as though defendant had contradicted herself on a material point, when she plainly had not. When the prosecutor's misrepresentation was discovered by defense counsel, he moved for a mistrial, which the court swiftly granted. Defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, on double jeopardy grounds, but the district court denied that motion. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion where the defense had consented to a mistrial and there was no evidence that the prosecution was attempting to "goad" the defense into making the mistrial request -rather, the evidence revealed that this was a case of a prosecutor crossing the line an an attempt to "win at all costs." In addition, the court took several steps to ensure that the prosecutor's actions were properly investigated and that he was disciplined if the relevant authorities deemed it proper.

Brian Fitzgerald appealed for a second time the district court's award to him of $33,333 in quantum meruit - for his services in a medical malpractice case appellee had settled on behalf of Wende Nostro, a client Fitzgerald had referred to appellee - based on the unjust enrichment he conferred on appellee. The court held that the initial measure of Fitzgerald's quantum meruit award was one-third of appellee's $500,000 recovery from the Nostro settlement, or $166,666. The court further held that the $166,666 amount should be reduced to the extent Fitzgerald decreased the overall value to appellee of the Nostro case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions that the district court enter a final quantum meruit award of $100,000 for Fitzgerald.

Plaintiff, the former General Counsel of McAfee, alleged that McAfee maliciously prosecuted and defamed him in an attempt to deflect attention from large-scale backdating of stock options within the company. McAfee moved to strike plaintiff's claims pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The district court denied the motion as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims, but granted it as to his claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Both sides appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that his claims have the requisite degree of merit to survive McAfee's anti-SLAPP motion: McAfee had probable cause to believe plaintiff was guilty of a crime and plaintiff's claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed in No. 10-15670 and reversed in 10-15561.

Taxpayers appealed the district court's denial of their Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a 1967 tax judgment against them. Taxpayers argued that the government committed fraud on the court during their 1967 suppression hearing and their subsequent appeal to this court. Taxpayers also argued that the judgment should be vacated under United States v. Throckmorton because taxpayers' business associate who sometimes served as their attorney, gave information to the government. The court concluded that, although the evidence uncovered by taxpayers showed some misconduct on the part of the government, it was insufficient to demonstrate fraud on the court. The court also held that because taxpayers have not shown that the business associate was their attorney rather than their business associate at the time he informed on taxpayers, the court rejected taxpayers' Throckmorton claim.

This case arose when the SEC instituted an enforcement action against several companies, which, among other things, led to the court appointment of a receiver. Debtor was an attorney who represented some of the defendants in this enforcement action. At issue was whether the exception to discharge in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19) applied when the debtor himself was not culpable for the securities violation that caused the debt. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was subject to discharge; the district court disagreed and held that the debt was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The court held that section 523(a)(19) prevented the discharge of debts for securities-related wrongdoings only in cases where the debtor was responsible for that wrongdoing and debtors who could have received funds derived from a securities violation remained entitled to a complete discharge of any resulting disgorgement order. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

This was an appeal by objector, a Nevada attorney, seeking review of the Nevada district court's order denying his motion to quash a subpoena for bank records of his client trust account. The district court concluded that it did not have the authority to consider objector's motion since the subpoena was issued by another district court. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal in the circumstances of this case because the bank had no incentive to disobey the subpoena and force an otherwise appealable contempt order. The court affirmed the district court because it correctly interpreted the provisions of Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing issuance and quashing subpoenas.