Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation.The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

Kyle and Jill Welsh, members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) and owners of WW Young Money, LLC, leased tribal land to operate a smoke shop. After renewing their lease in 2020, tribal officials notified the Welshes in 2021 that their lease was terminated, alleging violations of the CRIT property code, including untimely rent payments, continued occupancy after a demand to vacate, and property damage. The Welshes responded by filing a civil RICO action in federal court, alleging that the tribal officials engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included illegal lease termination, conversion of inventory, extortion, and providing false information to law enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint. It held that the tribal officials were entitled to sovereign immunity because their alleged conduct occurred within the scope of their authority and in their representative capacities. The court also ruled that CRIT was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, as it had a legally protected interest in the lease, and that the action could not continue without the tribe, whose joinder was barred by sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the tribal officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual capacities for money damages, and any recovery would come from them personally, not from CRIT. The appellate court also determined that CRIT was not a required party because the outcome would not affect its real property or contractual rights, as the plaintiffs did not seek to reinstate the lease. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and remanded for consideration of whether the complaint states a valid claim and if leave to amend should be granted. View "WELSH V. LOUDBEAR" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws.After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

A Canadian mining company operated a lead-zinc smelter in British Columbia, discharging millions of tons of slag and contaminated effluent containing hazardous substances into the Upper Columbia River over several decades. This pollution injured fish and benthic organisms in the river, which holds significant cultural and practical importance for a federally recognized Native American tribe whose reservation borders the river. The tribe sought damages for the interim lost use of these injured natural resources, including losses with a cultural dimension, such as reduced fishing and diminished ability to use the river for traditional purposes.Litigation began in 2004, with individual tribal members, later joined by the tribe and the State of Washington, bringing claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against the company. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found the company liable for response costs and, after a trial, awarded the tribe investigative expenses and attorney’s fees. The case then proceeded to a third phase to determine liability for natural resource damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the company on the tribe’s claims for interim lost use damages, reasoning that CERCLA does not authorize recovery for injuries to “cultural resources” or for damages with a cultural component.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CERCLA authorizes recovery for interim lost use of injured natural resources, even when those lost uses have a cultural dimension, provided the damages are for injury to natural resources as defined by the statute. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial to determine whether the tribe sustained damages from lost uses of injured natural resources. View "CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION V. TECK COMINCO METALS LTD" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law