Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Native American Law
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell
The Tribe filed suit alleging that the Secretary, acting through the BIA, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, 706, by determining that the Secretary was not authorized to approve the Tribe's assignments of land to certain of its members. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. At issue are the interpretation of two federal statutes: 25 U.S.C. 81 and 25 U.S.C. 77. Section 177 acknowledges and guarantees the Indian tribes' right of possession and imposes on the federal government a fiduciary duty to protect the lands covered by the Indian Nonintercourse Act. Section 81 provides that Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands but not alienate these lands without the federal government's approval. The court concluded that Congressional intent is clear. Section 177 prohibits the grant, lease, or conveyance of lands, or any title thereto from an Indian tribe unless approved by Congress. In this case, Congress has not approved the transactions at issue. Thus, the Secretary properly denied approval of the deeds under Section 81 where such conveyances would violate federal law. The court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards was not binding. The plain language of Section 81 does not support the Tribe's reading that the deeds may nevertheless be approved by the Secretary under Section 81. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law
White, et al v. University of California
In 1976, Gail Kennedy, a professor at the University of California-Los Angeles ("UCLA"), led an archaeological field excavation project on the property of the Chancellor's official residence at the University of California-San Diego. During the excavation, the archaeological team discovered a double burial site and uncovered two human skeletons (the "La Jolla remains"). Scientists estimated the remains were between 8977 to 9603 years old, making them among the earliest known human remains from North or South America. The property on which the La Jolla remains were discovered was aboriginally occupied by members of the Kumeyaay Nation. Since their discovery, the University has maintained custody of the La Jolla remains, but they have been stored at multiple locations, including UCLA, the San Diego Museum of Man, the National Museum of Natural History, and the Smithsonian Institution. Central to the heart of this case was custody of the La Jolla remains. The Tribes and their representatives claimed the right to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of the Kumeyaay Nation's member tribes. Plaintiffs Timothy White, Robert Bettinger, and Margaret Schoeninger ("the Scientists"), professors in the University of California system, opposed repatriation because they wished to continue to study the La Jolla remains. The issue this case presented to the Ninth Circuit was whether the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") abrogated tribal sovereign immunity and, if not, whether the district court properly dismissed this declaratory judgment action because the tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and could not be joined in the action. The Court concluded that NAGPRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and that the affected tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.
View "White, et al v. University of California" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Native American Law
Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Lummi Nation
This appeal arose from a proceeding brought by the Klallam under the continuing jurisdiction of a 1974 decree issued by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, and it involved a dispute over the geographic scope of the Lummi's "usual and accustomed fishing grounds." The court held that the law of the case doctrine applies only when the issue was decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition. In this case, the court held that no prior decision has yet explicitly or by necessary implication determined whether the waters immediately west of northern Whidbey Island are a part of the Lummi's usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the issue was controlled by law of the case and the court reversed the grant of Klallam's motion for summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings.View "Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Lummi Nation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Native American Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California
The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law
Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al.
This case concerned a dispute regarding plaintiffs' membership in an Indian tribe. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) order upholding the Band's decision to disenroll descendants of plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians and whether such injunctive relief could issue in the Band's absence. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, and that the Band was not a required party for the adjudication of the claims underlying the preliminary injunction because they concerned solely the propriety of final agency action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Band's motions to dismiss the claims on which the injunction rests and its consequent refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction; remanded to allow the district court to formally clarify its order in compliance with the court's understanding of it; and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal the Band's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' other claims, on which the district court expressly deferred ruling. View "Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law
Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock LUPC
The Tribes filed suit in Tribal Court against plaintiff and his builders alleging that they violated the Tribes' land use policies by building a residence on Tribal land. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the Tribes seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction barring further tribal court proceedings against him. The Tribes moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was required to exhaust tribal remedies before bringing suit in federal court. The district court granted the Tribes' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Because plaintiff was an owner of non-Indian fee land, the Tribes' efforts to regulate him were "presumptively invalid." The Tribes failed to show that at least one of two limited exceptions described in Montana v. United States applied. Because the Tribes plainly lacked the authority to regulate plaintiff's construction of a single-family house on on-Indian fee land, the district court erred in concluding that exhaustion was required. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock LUPC" on Justia Law
Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla v. Jewell
The district court found that the Secretary violated the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection when the Secretary declined to enter into a self-determination contract with the Tribe to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation. The court concluded that no reading of the ISDA authorized federal courts to grant relief when the Secretary properly denied a contract; the Tribe's argument that the BIA's failure to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation was a violation of the APA was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent; there was a meaningful distinction between Public Law 280 states and non-Public Law 280 states and such a distinction provided a rational basis for prioritizing law enforcement funding in non-Public Law 280 states; and the BIA's funding policy did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla v. Jewell" on Justia Law
Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous.
This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law
United States v. Livingston
Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction. The court concluded that the location of the gaming establishment was not an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. 1168(b) and that the indictment adequately alleged mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands; there was no error in the jury instructions where the instructions correctly defined "intent to defraud;" and there was no error in the admission of prior acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Livingston" on Justia Law
Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty.
The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law