Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A juvenile male appealed the district court's determination that he was an "Indian" under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided federal criminal jurisdiction for certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The juvenile claimed that he did not identify as an Indian, and was not socially recognized as Indian by other tribal members. Nonetheless, he was an enrolled tribal member, had received tribal assistance, and had used his membership to obtain tribal benefits. Therefore, because the juvenile was Indian by blood and easily met three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, the court held that he was an "Indian" under section 1153 and upheld his conviction.

Defendant was convicted of robbery and aiding and abetting robbery in Indian country in violation of U.S.C. 1153(a) and 2111. On appeal, defendant contended that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he was an "Indian" for purposes of prosecution under section 1153. The court disagreed and held that, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant was an Indian. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction.

The Tribes of the Yakima Nation claimed that the principle of Indian tax immunity had been violated by the State of Washington's current cigarette excise tax, which the Tribes argued left their retailers liable for payment of the tax when retailers sold cigarettes to non-Indians. The court held that, although some elements of Washington's cigarette tax law had been modified over the past thirty years, the court concluded that none of those changes had materially altered the legal incidence of the cigarette tax approved of in Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the state.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appealed the district court's order granting petitioner's, an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1302(7), prohibited the tribal court from imposing consecutive sentences cumulatively exceeding one year for multiple criminal violations arising from a single criminal transaction. The court held that section 1302(7) unambiguously permitted tribal courts to impose up to a one-year term of imprisonment for each discrete criminal violation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Blue Lake Rancheria, an Indian tribe, sought a refund of Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7), taxes paid by Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), an employee leasing company wholly owned by the Tribe. At issue was the scope of section 3306(c)(7)'s exception from "employment" and also at issue was whether Mainstay was the common law employer of its leased employees. The court held that the services performed "in the employ of an Indian tribe" were excepted from FUTA's definition of "employment" by section 3306(c)(7) only where a tribe or its instrumentality was a common law employer of the worker performing the services. The court held that because Mainstay was a common law employer of its leased employees during the years in question, it was not required to pay FUTA taxes with respect to those employees. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Tribe.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of its action against defendant, alleging tort, contract, and state statutory claims and seeking, among other remedies, a constructive trust and declaratory judgment over an oil and gas lease located on allotted land, wherein title to the land was held by the United States in trust for various Indian allottees. At issue was whether the district court had federal jurisdiction. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1360(b), 28 U.S.C. 1331, and 25 U.S.C. 345 did not grant federal jurisdiction and therefore, plaintiff presented no basis for concluding that the action was within the "limited jurisdiction" of federal courts. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court did not need to reach any other issues raised by the parties, including exhaustion of tribal remedies. The court noted, however, that its holding did not preclude plaintiff from seeking relief in Blackfeet Tribal Court.

Defendant was charged with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, occurring within the Colorado River Indian Tribes reservation in western Arizona. At issue was whether a district court could, over defense objection and after the administration of an unsuccessful Allen charge, inquire into the reasons for a trial jury's deadlock and then permit supplemental argument focused on those issues, where the issues in dispute were factual rather than legal. The court held that allowing such a procedure in a criminal trial was an abuse of the discretion accorded to the district courts in the management of jury deliberations. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.

This case arose when the Colorado River Indian Tribes ("CRIT") exercised jurisdiction over appellants, a non-Indian closely held corporation and its non-Indian owner, in an unlawful detainer action for breach of a lease of tribal lands and trespass. The tribal court entered judgment in favor of the tribe and appellants appealed. At issue was the extent of the CRIT's civil authority over appellants who were acting on tribal land within the reservation. The court held that under the circumstances presented, where there were no sufficient competing state interests at play, the tribe had regulatory jurisdiction through its inherent authority to exclude, independent from the power recognized in Montana v. United States. The court also held that adjudicative jurisdiction also existed in light of Supreme Court precedent recognizing tribes' inherent civil authority over non-Indian conduct on tribal land and congressional interest in promoting tribal self-government. The court further held that in this instance, by applying traditional personal jurisdiction principles, the tribal court had personal jurisdiction over a non-Indian agent acting on tribal land. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the non-Indian corporation and reversed with respect to the non-Indian owner.

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.