Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ronald Myers pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing an implement for counterfeiting state securities and transporting a stolen motor vehicle across state lines. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $40,406 in restitution. Myers completed his sentence in 2010 but was reincarcerated in 2013 on other charges. Since then, over $30,500 has been deposited into his inmate trust account, mostly from family and friends, with a smaller portion from prison wages. Myers still owes over $35,000 in restitution.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted the government's motion to turn over funds from Myers's inmate trust account to apply to his restitution obligation. The court rejected Myers's request for an evidentiary hearing to determine which funds were prison wages, concluding that the government had provided sufficient evidence of the account's composition. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), applies to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources, not just one-time financial windfalls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that § 3664(n) applies to substantial resources from any source, including gradual accumulations from family and friends, and not just to one-time windfalls. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, as the existing documentary evidence was sufficient. The court concluded that the turnover order did not contravene the judgment's restitution provisions and was consistent with the MVRA's goal of ensuring prompt restitution to victims. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mya Noelia Fallon, applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under the Social Security Act, citing epileptic seizures and cognitive and behavioral limitations. Her application included assessments from her neurologist, Dr. Joseph Drazkowski, and licensed professional counselor (LPC) Terry Galler, who noted significant cognitive impairments and anxiety disorders. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Fallon not disabled, giving minimal weight to the opinions of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler, and discrediting other medical and lay testimony.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona partially reversed the ALJ's decision, finding errors in the discounting of some witnesses but agreeing with the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Drazkowski's and LPC Galler's opinions. The case was remanded for further consideration. On remand, the ALJ again found Fallon not disabled, incorporating the prior evaluations. Fallon appealed, and the district court affirmed the ALJ's decision, refusing to revisit its prior conclusions about the medical opinions based on the law-of-the-case doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies in the social security context, meaning that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider the evaluations of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler. The court explained that a social-security applicant has two options to preserve the right to appeal: immediately appeal the remand order or proceed on remand, understanding that the district court may decline to revisit settled issues. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that Fallon forfeited her ability to challenge the evaluations by not raising the issue in her first appeal. View "FALLON V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

John Hudnall, a former financial advisor, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming he had been unable to work since May 1, 2015, due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia. His application included a function report from his wife, Miyuki Sato, detailing his limitations in daily activities and self-care. Despite this, the Social Security Administration denied his application and request for reconsideration. Hudnall then sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied his claim, finding him not disabled based on medical evidence and Hudnall's self-reported activities, without explicitly addressing Sato's lay evidence.Hudnall appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Administration. Hudnall then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that under the Social Security Administration's new regulations, effective March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony. The court found that these regulations, which state that ALJs are not required to articulate how they considered evidence from nonmedical sources, are within the Commissioner of Social Security's broad authority and are not arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in discounting Sato's evidence without explanation. The court resolved all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "HUDNALL V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed two successive applications for disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Her first application, alleging disability beginning June 24, 2017, was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 18, 2018. While appealing this denial to the district court, she filed a second application for benefits for a later period. Washington State Disability Determination Services (DDS) reviewed the second application and awarded benefits, determining she was disabled starting September 19, 2018, the day after the ALJ denied her first application.The district court partially ruled in her favor on the first application and remanded it for further proceedings. The Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions. On June 23, 2021, the ALJ reopened the second application and denied the benefits previously granted by DDS. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was disabled beginning July 14, 2020, on her first application. The district court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening and denial of benefits on the second application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening of the second application. The Appeals Council did not reopen the second application, and the ALJ’s reopening occurred more than two years after the award, which is only permissible in cases of fraud or similar fault. Finding no evidence of fraud or similar fault, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in reopening and reversing the award of benefits on the second application. The court remanded for the district court to direct the agency to award benefits according to DDS’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the first application, concluding that the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff was not disabled between June 24, 2017, and September 19, 2018, was supported by substantial evidence. View "NEVIN V. COLVIN" on Justia Law

Consuelo Griselda Nerio Mejia challenged the denial of her disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA). After an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her application, concluding that despite her severe impairments, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy, Nerio Mejia filed a civil suit. She raised three objections to the ALJ's decision, but the district court only addressed her claim that the ALJ improperly rejected her symptomology testimony, finding that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for doing so. The court reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings.The United States District Court for the Central District of California found that the SSA's position was not substantially justified, making Nerio Mejia eligible for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). However, the district court reduced the fee award, excluding time spent on two additional issues that the court did not address, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hardisty v. Astrue. The court concluded that fees for work on issues not decided by the court were not compensable under the EAJA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order reducing the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied Hardisty, which did not address the compensability of fees for undecided issues. The appellate court found that the district court's ruling was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart and the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Ibrahim v. United States Department of Homeland Security. These cases establish that a fully compensatory fee should be awarded when a plaintiff achieves excellent results, even if some issues were not decided. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to award the full amount of fees requested by Nerio Mejia. View "MEJIA V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

The case involves Lorain Ann Stiffler, who applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming disability due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, a mood disorder, right knee problems, and a processing disorder. Her application was initially denied and denied again upon reconsideration. Dr. Khosh-Chashm, who diagnosed Stiffler with major depressive disorder, concluded that she had extreme mental functioning limitations and lacked the cognitive and communicative skills required for gainful employment. However, state agency medical consultants Dr. Goldberg and Dr. Bilik disagreed, concluding that Stiffler was not disabled but had moderate limitations on her ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain concentration, work with others, make simple work-related decisions, and complete a normal workday and workweek.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the denial of Stiffler's application for disability benefits. The ALJ rejected Dr. Khosh-Chashm's opinion, finding it unsupported by and inconsistent with the medical evidence and Stiffler's significant daily activities. The ALJ also found no conflict between the testimony of the vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), concluding that Stiffler could work as a marking clerk, mail clerk, or laundry worker.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, which had upheld the ALJ's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Khosh-Chashm's medical opinion and concluded that there was no conflict between Stiffler's limitation to "an environment with few workplace changes" and the DOT's Reasoning Level 2. View "STIFFLER V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert Conway, appealed a decision by the district court that upheld the denial of his social security benefits by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ had found that Conway could perform "medium work" based on the testimony of a vocational expert. Under Terry v. Saul, the term "medium work" was presumed to imply a six-hour standing and walking limitation.However, Conway argued that this presumption was rebutted during the cross-examination of the vocational expert. When asked if someone could perform medium work if they were only able to be on their feet for six hours maximum, the expert responded that the three sample occupations provided would not be possible and it would be difficult to provide substitute unskilled, medium occupations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Conway, finding that the vocational expert's significantly different responses revealed that the expert did not understand the ALJ’s hypothetical to impliedly include a six-hour standing and walking limitation. As such, the expert’s response to the ALJ’s question had no evidentiary value to support the ALJ’s finding that Conway could perform jobs in the national economy. The court concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings. View "CONWAY V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, which upheld the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of a claimant's application for supplemental security income. The claimant argued that the Social Security Administration's 2017 revised regulations for evaluating medical opinions were partially invalid because they did not provide a reasoned explanation for permitting an administrative law judge to avoid articulating how he or she accounts for the "examining relationship" or "specialization" factors under the Social Security Act or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court found that the Commissioner's decision to promulgate the 2017 medical evidence regulations fell within his wide latitude to make rules and regulations, particularly those governing the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence to establish the right to benefits. The court also joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that the regulations were valid under the APA, as the agency's response to public comment and reasoned explanation for the regulatory changes established that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. View "CROSS V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

Plaintiff first applied for disability insurance benefits on September 3, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of December 1, 2017. His date last insured for the purpose of benefits eligibility was June 30, 2018. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied his application initially and on reconsideration, and he requested an administrative hearing. After the December 14, 2020, hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff then sought review in the district court, and the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel explained that at step two of the sequential analysis, claimants need only make a de minimis showing for the ALJ’s analysis to proceed past this step and that properly denying a claim at step two requires an unambiguous record showing only minimal limitations. The seven-month period for which Plaintiff seeks disability benefits falls within a two-and-a-half-year gap in his medical treatment records. The panel held that Plaintiff made the requisite showing to meet step two’s low bar, where he submitted evidence that he suffered from multiple chronic medical conditions that both preceded and succeeded the gap in his treatment. The panel concluded that this cumulative evidence was enough to establish that Plaintiff’s claim was nonfrivolous and to require the ALJ to proceed to step three. Therefore, the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim at step two was premature. View "BRIAN GLANDEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on January 30, 2020, alleging disability since March 1, 2017,due to PTSD, depression, anxiety, insomnia, headaches, and a right knee injury. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. A medical expert confirmed that Plaintiff would be markedly limited when interacting with others. The medical expert suggested that Plaintiff’s Residual Function Capacity (RFC) includes “some limitations in terms of his work situation.” Once the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff sought judicial review. The district court affirmed the agency’s denial of benefits. On appeal, Plaintiff only challenged the ALJ’s finding that his mental impairments were not disabling.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the ALJ did not err in excluding Plaintiff's VA disability rating from her analysis. McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an ALJ is required to address the Veterans Administration disability rating) is no longer good law for claims filed after March 27, 2017. The 2017 regulations removed any requirement for an ALJ to discuss another agency’s rating. The panel held that the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony about the severity of his symptoms by enumerating the objective evidence that undermined Plaintiff’s testimony. The panel rejected Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s experts. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet all of the specified medical criteria or equal the severity of a listed impairment. View "JEREMY KITCHEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law