Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In July 2019, the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s appeal without elaboration. Claimant challenged, among other rulings, the ALJ’s analysis of her testimony. Claimant did not assert any constitutional challenges to the district court. The district court entered a judgment reversing the ALJ’s denial of benefits and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. The Commissioner filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend or alter the judgment, arguing that the court had clearly erred by overlooking the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting Claimant’s testimony. The district court agreed with the Commissioner and entered an order granting the Rule 59(e) motion   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the amended judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  The court upheld the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for benefits because claimant did not show that the removal provision caused her any actual harm. Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a district court to alter or amend a judgment if the court determines that its original judgment was clearly erroneous. Because the district court properly concluded that it had clearly erred in its original ruling in favor of Claimant, the court’s granting of the Commissioner’s Rule 59(e) motion fell within the court’s considerable discretion View "JODY KAUFMANN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought benefits under the Social Security Act based on various physical and mental impairments. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that she was not disabled and denied her claim. The district court affirmed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of claimant’s application for benefits under the Social Security Act based on various physical and mental impairments.The court decided that recent changes to the Social Security Administration’s regulations displaced case law requiring an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to provide “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion. The “relationship factors”, such as length and purpose of the treatment relationship, frequency of visits, and extent of examinations the medical source has performed are still relevant. However, the ALJ no longer needs to make specific findings regarding those factors. Under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.In this case, the ALJ acknowledged the doctor’s opinion that the claimant had marked and extreme limitations in various cognitive areas; but the ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with the overall notes in the record. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding. View "LESLIE WOODS V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the SSA in a putative class action alleging that reducing the Social Security benefits of class members based on the receipt of a foreign social security pension violated the Windfall Elimination Program (WEP), its implementing regulation, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada with Respect to Social Security.The panel concluded that the WEP applies to a Social Security beneficiary who receives benefits under the Canada Pension Plan. Therefore, the SSA and the district court properly interpreted the WEP and the U.S.-Canada Agreement. In this case, Plaintiff Rosell's Canadian pension was based at least in part on his earnings for noncovered service, and thus the agency correctly reduced the couple's Social Security benefits. View "Michener v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an ALJ's decision in favor of student B.W. The panel held that goals (as opposed to services) in B.W.'s first grade Individualized Education Program (IEP) were not inadequate; Capistrano did not have to file for due process to defend the first grade IEP; and Capistrano did not have to have an IEP in place for the second grade. The panel remanded for the limited purpose of considering attorneys' fees. The panel addressed other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Capistrano Unified School District v. S.W." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming the ALJ's 2019 decision denying claimant's application for social security disability benefits. The panel concluded that, although the ALJ's conclusion that claimant was not disabled at the time of the hearing was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not adequately consider claimant's symptoms over time. The panel explained that the ALJ's failure to consider these changes over time impacted both her assessment of claimant's credibility and her analysis of the medical opinions. Therefore, on remand, the ALJ shall consider whether claimant was disabled and thus entitled to benefits, for some qualifying, earlier portion of his alleged disability period. View "Smith v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Wade filed her claim for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income in 2015. An ALJ denied Wade’s claim in 2017, finding her not disabled. Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Wade filed suit, seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court granted Wade’s IFP motion and, in 2020, entered judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. Wade proceeded IFP with her appeal. The Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ erred, reversed the order affirming the denial of benefits, and remanded for further administrative review. Wade then submitted a bill of appellate costs, seeking $169.65 from the government for copies of briefs and excerpts of record.The Ninth Circuit denied the request. A party who proceeds IFP and prevails on appeal is not entitled to recover taxable costs from the United States, 28 U.S.C. 1915(f)(1); “judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other proceedings, but the United States shall not be liable for any of the costs thus incurred.” View "Wade v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Alliance alleged that County and City policies and inaction have created a dangerous environment in the Skid Row area, claiming that the County violated its mandatory duty to provide medically necessary care and that the municipalities have facilitated public nuisance violations by failing to clear encampments, violated disability access laws by failing to clear sidewalks of encampments, and violated constitutional rights by providing disparate services to those within the Skid Row area and by enacting policies resulting in a state-created danger to area residents and businesses. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the escrow of $1 billion to address homelessness, offers of shelter to all unhoused individuals in Skid Row within 180 days, and numerous reports. The court found that structural racism was behind Los Angeles’s homelessness crisis and its disproportionate impact on the Black community.The Ninth Circuit vacated. The plaintiffs lacked standing on all but their ADA claim; no claims were based on racial discrimination. The district court impermissibly resorted to independent research and extra-record evidence. There was no allegation that any individual plaintiff was Black nor that there was a special relationship between the City and unhoused residents nor that any individual plaintiff was deprived of medically necessary care or general assistance. Two plaintiffs who use wheelchairs and cannot traverse Skid Row sidewalks because of homeless encampments had standing to bring ADA claims but had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. View "LA Alliance for Human Rights v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the high school and school district in an action brought by plaintiff under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, a student with attention deficit disorder, sought damages after he was assaulted and seriously injured by another student at a high school football game. Petitioner argues that guidance issued by the DOE in various Dear Colleague Letters should be binding, and that the school's failure to adopt all of the Letters' suggestions for preventing harassment of disabled students amounts to disability discrimination.The panel concluded that guidance issued by the DOE in the Letters was not binding and that plaintiff may not use the Letters to leapfrog over the statutory requirements to assert a cognizable claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The panel explained that the Letters do not adjust the legal framework governing private party lawsuits brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, plaintiff's claims—which rely entirely on the enforceability of the Letters as distinct legal obligations—fail. In this case, the Letters did not make plaintiff's need for social accommodation "obvious," such that failure to enact their recommendations constituted a denial of a reasonable accommodation with deliberate indifference. Furthermore, no request for a social-related accommodation was ever made and no prior incidents of bullying or harassment involving plaintiff were observed or reported by the school prior to the assault during the football game. View "Csutoras v. Paradise High School" on Justia Law

After two administrative hearings, Brown was awarded disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits by an ALJ, who concluded that, as of April 25, 2018, Brown was “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 416(i), 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A), but rejected Brown’s claim that he was disabled prior to that date. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions to set aside the ALJ’s determination and to conduct a new disability hearing before a different, and properly appointed ALJ. The ALJ who conducted Brown’s hearings was not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Because this proceeding did not arise from a direct appeal from a decision of one or more invalidly appointed officers, nor was it a direct petition for review that might similarly have brought the entirety of the administrative decision before the court, the Commissioner may not challenge the portions of that decision that are favorable to Brown. The court held that it had no authority under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). to set aside, or to disturb, the grant of benefits for the time period on or after April 25, 2018, View "Brown v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies of plaintiffs' action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Plaintiffs claim that the district court is failing its responsibilities to students under the IDEA by not timely identifying and evaluating students with disabilities, and, after identifying them, by providing them with insufficiently individualized, "cookie-cutter" accommodations and services. Although plaintiffs argue that exhaustion was not required because they are challenging district-wide policies that only a court can remedy, plaintiffs are unable to identify such policies. The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs have not satisfied any of the limited exceptions recognized by caselaw to the exhaustion requirement contained in 20 U.S.C. 1415(l). In this case, plaintiffs challenged what amounted to failures in practice by the school district, rather than policies or practices of general applicability. View "Student A v. San Francisco Unified School District" on Justia Law