Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law

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A real estate development company, Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, owned by Chinese billionaire Wei Huang, was involved in a scheme to bribe Los Angeles City Councilmember Jose Huizar. Over nearly four years, Huang provided Huizar with extravagant Las Vegas trips, gambling chips, and prostitutes, seeking Huizar's support for redeveloping the L.A. Grand Hotel into Los Angeles's tallest skyscraper. Huang's strategy was to "give, give, give" to later make a "big ask" for Huizar's support on the project.A federal jury in the Central District of California convicted Shen Zhen on three counts of honest-services mail and wire fraud, one count of federal-program bribery, and four counts of interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, rejecting Shen Zhen's argument that the Government failed to establish an agreement or official action by Huizar. The court also denied Shen Zhen's proposed jury instruction on quid pro quo, finding it legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings, noting that bribery under federal law does not require an explicit agreement with the public official. The court also upheld the district court's jury instructions, which correctly required the jury to find that Shen Zhen provided benefits intending to receive official acts in return. Additionally, the court found that California's bribery statutes, although broader than the Travel Act's generic definition, were proper predicates for the Travel Act convictions because the jury convicted Shen Zhen based on elements conforming to the generic definition of bribery. The court also concluded that any evidentiary errors were harmless and did not affect the verdict. View "USA V. SHEN ZHEN NEW WORLD I, LLC" on Justia Law

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Debbie O'Gorman, facing foreclosure by creditor Grant Reynolds, transferred her property to the Lovering Tubbs Trust for no consideration. This transfer was intended to hinder Reynolds' foreclosure efforts. The Lovering Tubbs Trust and other entities involved in the transfer argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee lacked Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548 because O'Gorman's creditors were not harmed by the transfer.The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the Trustee, finding that O'Gorman's transfer was fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed this decision, noting that the Trustee had established a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer and that the appellants failed to present any admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. The court held that the Trustee had Article III standing because the transfer depleted the estate's assets, causing an injury-in-fact that was redressable by the avoidance sought. The court also clarified that actual harm to creditors is not an element of a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548. The court found that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment, as the Trustee provided direct and circumstantial evidence of O'Gorman's fraudulent intent, and the appellants failed to present any evidence to dispute this.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the bankruptcy court's denial of the appellants' request for a continuance to conduct discovery, noting that the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d) by failing to submit an affidavit or declaration specifying the facts they hoped to elicit through further discovery. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. View "IN RE: THE LOVERING TUBBS TRUST V. HOFFMAN" on Justia Law

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AGK Sierra De Montserrat, L.P. (AGK) entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) with Comerica Bank (Comerica) for the purchase of lots in a residential subdivision. The PSA included an indemnity provision requiring Comerica to indemnify AGK against claims arising from Comerica's position as the declarant. After the sale, Westwood Montserrat, Ltd. (Westwood) initiated several lawsuits against AGK, claiming declarant rights. Comerica refused to indemnify AGK, leading AGK to sue Comerica for breach of the indemnity provision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that Comerica breached the indemnity agreement and awarded AGK attorney fees incurred in the underlying lawsuits with Westwood. Additionally, the district court, relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in DeWitt v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., awarded AGK attorney fees for the present breach of contract suit against Comerica. Comerica appealed the award of attorney fees for the present litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's award of attorney fees for the present litigation. The Ninth Circuit held that DeWitt was only binding in the absence of subsequent indications from California courts that the interpretation was incorrect. Since DeWitt, California appellate courts have uniformly indicated that first-party attorney fees are not recoverable under an indemnity provision unless explicitly stated. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the attorney fees were otherwise recoverable under the PSA's attorney fees provision. The court emphasized that indemnity provisions generally cover third-party claims, not first-party litigation costs, unless specific language indicates otherwise. View "AGK SIERRA DE MONTSERRAT, L.P. V. COMERICA BANK" on Justia Law

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The case involves Jeremy and Kristy Morris, who sued the West Hayden Estates First Addition Homeowners Association (HOA) under the Fair Housing Act. The Morrises alleged that the HOA discriminated against them based on religion by attempting to prevent them from conducting a Christmas program. The jury ruled in favor of the Morrises, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. However, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA, alternatively granted a new trial, and issued a permanent injunction against future productions of the Christmas program that violate the HOA’s covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA as to the Morrises’ disparate treatment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) because they did not show that they were adversely affected by the HOA’s actions. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law on the Morrises’ claim that the HOA interfered with their right to purchase and enjoy their home free from discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial to the HOA as to the § 3617 claim and vacated the district court’s grant of an injunction to the HOA. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MORRIS V. WEST HAYDEN ESTATES FIRST ADDITION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC." on Justia Law

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The case involves the United States government's action to reduce federal tax liens to judgment and foreclose on real property. The government sought to foreclose on tax liens against a property owned by Komron Allahyari. Shaun Allahyari, Komron's father, was named as an additional defendant due to his interest in the property through two deeds of trust. The district court found that the government was entitled to foreclose on the tax liens and sell the property. However, the court did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale and ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status Report. Shaun Allahyari filed an appeal before the parties submitted the Joint Status Report and stipulated to the value of the property to be sold.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the district court's order was not final because it did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale. The court also clarified that for a decree of sale in a foreclosure suit to be considered a final decree for purposes of an appeal, it must settle all of the rights of the parties and leave nothing to be done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds. Because that standard was not met in this case, there still was no final judgment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "USA V. ALLAHYARI" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) in a case brought by two utilities, Southern California Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company. The utilities claimed they were entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause or under state law for having to relocate their equipment from public streets to allow for the construction of a streetcar line.The court held that the utilities did not have a property interest under California law in maintaining their facilities at their specific locations in the face of OCTA’s efforts to construct a streetcar line. The California Supreme Court recognized in a previous case that a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.The court rejected the utilities’ argument that constructing rail lines is per se a proprietary activity, not a governmental one. California common law has traditionally required utilities to bear relocation costs when governments construct subways, and there is no reason why above-ground rail lines should be treated differently.Finally, the court rejected the utilities’ supplemental state-law claim that California Public Utilities Code section 40162 places the costs of relocation on OCTA. That provision says nothing about imposing the costs of relocation on OCTA. Thus, section 40162 does not apply to OCTA’s project. View "SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

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In the case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Peace Ranch LLC challenged the constitutionality of California AB 978, a mobilehome-rent-control statute. Peace Ranch alleged that if it increases mobilehome rents more than AB 978 permits, the California Attorney General would enforce AB 978 against it. However, Peace Ranch also alleged that AB 978 does not apply to its mobilehome park. The Court of Appeals concluded that Peace Ranch had adequately established standing based on a pre-enforcement injury. The court reasoned that Peace Ranch was trapped between complying with a law that it believes does not apply to it or risking enforcement proceedings by raising rents. This dilemma, the court ruled, is the precise predicament that supports pre-enforcement standing. As such, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. View "PEACE RANCH, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

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In the case involving Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron, and Springville Investors, LLC, versus Multnomah County, the Metro Regional Government, and members of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, the plaintiffs challenged the designation of their land in Multnomah County, Oregon, as "rural reserves" under the Oregon Land Reserves Statute. They claimed that the statute and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and that the defendants’ rural reserve designations violated their federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the designation, concluding that the requirements for Burford abstention (a doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding a case in deference to state courts) were met for each of the as-applied claims. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs had abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. View "BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY" on Justia Law

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This case concerns the property rights of two uniquely Alaskan entities. On one side is Flying Crown Subdivision Addition No. 1 and No. 2 Property Owners Association (“Flying Crown”), a homeowners’ association for the eponymous subdivision in Anchorage, Alaska. Flying Crown is one of many subdivisions nestled in South Anchorage. The homes in Flying Crown back up to a small airstrip. Some of Flying Crown’s homeowners selected the subdivision for that very reason. On the other side is the Alaska Railroad Corporation (“ARRC”), a state-owned corporation that owns and operates Alaska’s railroad system. ARRC filed this action seeking to quiet title in the right-of-way and to clarify that ARRC’s interest in the right-of-way includes an exclusive-use easement. The district court properly granted summary judgment to ARRC.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the Alaska Railroad Act of 1914 authorized the creation of the Alaska Railroad, a federal railroad, and reserved railroad rights-of-way to the United States. The Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982 authorized the federal government to transfer nearly all of the Alaska Railroad property rights to ARRC. The panel held that the 1914 Act did not reveal the scope of the right-of-way retained by the government. The panel concluded that, in the Sperstad Patent, the federal government intended to reserve an exclusive-use easement under the 1914 Act. The panel further held that the federal government transferred the exclusive-use easement it retained under the 1914 Act. View "ALASKA RAILROAD CORPORATION V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION ADDITION NO. 1 & NO. 2, ET AL" on Justia Law