Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Byron Pickle appealed the district court's default judgment and final judgment of forfeiture of real property. The judgment was entered after the district court granted the government's motion to strike Pickle's claim and answer based on Pickle's failure to respond to special interrogatories the government propounded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure's Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (Rule) G(6)(c)(i)(A), and denied Pickle's motion to stay. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly viewed Pickle's failure to answer the Rule G(6) special interrogatories as a per se basis for striking his claim. Because the district court’s decision to strike Pickle’s claim was based on the legally erroneous belief that Pickle’s failure to comply with Rule G(6) vitiated his statutory standing to contest the forfeiture and required dismissal of his claim forthwith, and because Pickle’s failure to answer the G(6) interrogatories would not have warranted striking his claim as a discovery sanction without giving him an opportunity to cure his lack of response, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Pickle" on Justia Law

Nathan Stoliar was convicted and sentenced for crimes related to fraudulent schemes involving the false generation of renewable fuel credits under United States law, false representations regarding the type of fuel being sold, and the export of biodiesel without retiring or purchasing renewable energy credits adequate to cover the exported amount as required under United States law. Canada filed a petition for restitution from Soliar but the district court denied the order. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Because a petitioner seeking restitution under the CVRA must also rely on a substantive restitution statute, Canada sought restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). The court concluded that Canada's claim for restitution is based on events that are insufficiently related to the schemes set forth in the indictment and the facts supporting Stoliar's guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

Appellants filed this putative class action challenging the California State Controller’s application of California’s Unclaimed Property Law (“UPL”), which provides for the conditional transfer of unclaimed property to the State of California. Appellants claimed that the procedures used both before unclaimed property is transferred to the Controller (“pre-escheat”) and after it is transferred (“post-escheat”) violate their due process rights. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ argument that the pre-escheat notice provided by the Controller is constitutionally inadequate because the Controller does not attempt to locate property owners using the data sources required by Section 1531 of the UPL was based on a misinterpretation of the statute, and Appellants’ suggested requirement that the Controller use additional databases exceeded due process requirements; (2) Appellants’ argument that the Controller’s pre-escheat notice process is inadequate because it is carried out by companies that received a portion of the escheated value and therefore have a conflict of interest was not supported by law or the alleged facts; and (3) Appellants’ challenged to the post-escheat procedure was not ripe for review. View "Taylor v. Chiang" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit alleging that the Secretary, acting through the BIA, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, 706, by determining that the Secretary was not authorized to approve the Tribe's assignments of land to certain of its members. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. At issue are the interpretation of two federal statutes: 25 U.S.C. 81 and 25 U.S.C. 77. Section 177 acknowledges and guarantees the Indian tribes' right of possession and imposes on the federal government a fiduciary duty to protect the lands covered by the Indian Nonintercourse Act. Section 81 provides that Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands but not alienate these lands without the federal government's approval. The court concluded that Congressional intent is clear. Section 177 prohibits the grant, lease, or conveyance of lands, or any title thereto from an Indian tribe unless approved by Congress. In this case, Congress has not approved the transactions at issue. Thus, the Secretary properly denied approval of the deeds under Section 81 where such conveyances would violate federal law. The court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards was not binding. The plain language of Section 81 does not support the Tribe's reading that the deeds may nevertheless be approved by the Secretary under Section 81. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law

El Dorado, a mobile home park owner located in the City of Fillmore alleged that the City interfered with an application for a subdivision of its seniors-only mobile home park by causing unreasonable delays and imposing extralegal conditions because of a fear that subdivisions would lead to El Dorado opening the Park to families. El Dorado's complaint was dismissed for lack of standing. The court concluded, however, that El Dorado had Article III standing where El Dorado suffered a concrete and particularized, actual, injury, in the form of added expenses caused by the City's interference of the application. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "El Dorado Estates v. City of Fillmore" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to engage in prohibited monetary transactions in property for his part in the purchase of two parcels of real property with fraudulently obtained loans. The district court ordered Defendant to pay $615,935 in restitution to JP Morgan Chase, a loan purchaser, and $329,767 in restitution to CitiGroup, a loan originator. Defendant appealed the restitution order. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s determination that the requirements of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act were met in this case; (2) affirmed the calculation of restitution owed to CitiGroup; and (3) vacated and remanded for the district court to recalculate the amount owed to Chase because the court applied a formula for a loan originator, although Chase had purchased the loans. View "United States v. Luis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that they hold land patents, issued by the federal government before Alaska entered the Union, giving title to certain Alaska streambeds. In 2010- 2011, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources determined that the waterways above these streambeds were navigable in 1959, the year Alaska was admitted to the Union, and remain navigable. Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, all land beneath such waterways belongs to the state, 43 U.S.C. 1311(a). Plaintiffs argue that Alaska’s determination that the waterways have been navigable since 1959 does not disturb the title to the land that was granted to them and that, under the Act, streambeds that had already been patented by the federal government were not granted to Alaska upon its statehood. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Alaska has a sufficient interest in the lands to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs’ action was “close to the functional equivalent” of a quiet title action; the lands at issue are submerged lands beneath navigable waters, which have a “unique status in the law” insofar as “[s]tate ownership of them has been considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.”View "Lacano Invs., LLC v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's decision forfeiting $132,245 for failure to report the currency when crossing the United States border in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5316 and for bulk cash smuggling in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5332, claiming that the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that a violation of section 5332, when connected with illegal activity, constitutes a serious crime that inflicts significant harm. The court concluded that claimant's offense leans more towards the high end of the gravity spectrum. Comparing the gravity of claimant's offense with the amount to be forfeited, the court concluded that forfeiture of all $132,245 does not violate the Excessive Fines clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. CYR" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Chase and WaMu, alleging claims arising out of allegedly fraudulent acts by WaMu concerning the refinancing of their mortgage. WaMu was later placed into receivership of the FDIC and the FDIC transferred plaintiffs' mortgage to Chase. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims in their complaint are "claims" for purposes of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(3)(D), and related to WaMu's acts or omissions for purposes of section 1821(d)(13)(D). Because plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under section 1821(d), the plain language of section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) stripped the district court of jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Rundgren v. Washington Mutual" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Countrywide and others involved in their residential mortgage, alleging violations of numerous federal statutes. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that plaintiffs can state a claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., without pleading that they have tendered, or that they have the ability to tender, the value of their loan; only at the summary judgment stage may a court order the statutory sequence altered and require tender before rescission - and then only on a case-by-case basis; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' rescission claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, although the limitations period in the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2614, ordinarily runs from the date of the alleged RESPA violation, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the violation; just as for TILA claims, district courts may evaluate RESPA claims case-by-case; and, therefore, in this case, the court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' Section 8 of RESPA claims on limitations grounds and remanded for reconsideration. View "Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp." on Justia Law