Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition and the Trustee objected to debtors proposed bankruptcy plan on the ground that it was not proposed in good faith because of the "miniscule" payments to unsecured claims while debtors were living in a $400,000 home, making payments on various luxury and unnecessary items, and failing to commit one hundred percent of their disposable income to the plan. The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed. The court concluded that Congress's adoption of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 1325(a), foreclosed a court's consideration of a debtor's Social Security income or a debtor's payments to secured creditors as part of the inquiry into good faith under section 1325(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the BAP. View "In re: David Welsh, et al" on Justia Law

FHFA, the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises), issued a "directive" preventing the Enterprises from buying mortgages on properties encumbered by liens made under so-called property-assessed clean energy (PACE) programs. Plaintiffs contended that FHFA was acting as a regulator, and not a conservator. As a regulator, plaintiffs contended that FHFA must issue a regulation to effectuate its order. The court concluded that FHFA's decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-encumbered properties was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as conservator of the Enterprises. Because the courts have no jurisdiction to review such actions, the court vacated the district court's order and dismissed the case. View "County of Sonoma, et al v. FHFA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

William Jefferson & Co., Inc. (William Jefferson) lost a state administrative appeal in which William Jefferson challenged the Orange County Tax Assessor's valuation of a parcel of real property. William Jefferson then filed a suit in federal district court, alleging that its procedural due process rights were violated in the course of the administrative appeal hearing. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state administrative appeal did not deny William Jefferson procedural due process. In a separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of the agency's motion for a protective order and its denial of class certification. View "William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Board of Assessment and Appeal, et al." on Justia Law

After Lender failed to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence regarding ownership of his loan, Lender foreclosed on Borrower's property. Plaintiff filed suit against all the actors involved (Defendants), alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) , seeking injunctive relief against foreclosure, and claiming breach of contract, failure to act in good faith, and wrongful foreclosure under Nevada law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's Nevada law claims with prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint claiming a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's TILA and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, as Lender was not legally required to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence in its capacity as loan servicer; and (2) vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims regarding the foreclosure of Plaintiff's property and remanded those remaining claims to the district court. View "Gale v. First Franklin Loan Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking damages for the 31 months during which they were barred from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium imposed by local officials on new projects. Plaintiffs asserted that the moratorium violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought damages against the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly related to the city's legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, the court held that the city did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "Samson, et al. v. City of Bainbridge Island" on Justia Law

The Lands Commission appealed the district court's final judgment in this eminent domain case, wherein the United States took a fee simple interest in the property at issue on behalf of the Navy, which has continuously leased this parcel since 1949. In condemning the property, the United States sought to extinguish California's public trust rights. The court concluded that, having paid just compensation, the United States was entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation; full fee simple, free of California's public trust. The court concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevented the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it mineral royalty payments pursuant to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agreement. The court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial agreement? and (2) If the Rule Against Perpetuities did apply, is reformation available under Nevada Revised Statute 111.1039(2)? All further proceedings in the case were stayed pending receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court.

These cross-appeals arose from what the court understood to be the largest civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against firearms unlawfully possessed by a convicted felon in American history. The court addressed several issues, holding that Maria Ferro was not entitled to the protections of the so-called "innocent owner" defense, and the district court was therefore correct to hold that the entire collection was subject to forfeiture; following a comprehensive revision of the forfeiture statutes in 2000, forfeitures of instrumentalities of crimes were subject to excessiveness analysis under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause; excessiveness review must consider the individualized culpability of the property's owner and, when analyzing the offending conduct, it must focus only on the conduct that actually gave rise to the forfeiture of the property at issue, not other criminal conduct by the same person; and because the district court erred on this third point, the court remanded for the district court to undertake once again the excessiveness inquiry.

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.