Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against manufacturers of dry cleaning equipment brought, inter alia, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly held that plaintiffs' allegations that the manufacturers contributed to waste disposal, by the design of machines that generated waste and by the instructions they gave on use of these machines, were insufficient as a matter of law to support a civil action under the RCRA because all of the manufacturers' alleged contributions were passive. The court held that to state a claim predicated on RCRA liability for "contributing to" the disposal of hazardous waste, a plaintiff must allege that defendant had a measure of control over the waste at the time of its disposal or was otherwise actively involved in the waste disposal process. Mere design of equipment that generated waste, which was then improperly discarded by others, was not sufficient. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that "contribution" required more active involvement than was alleged as to the manufacturers.

Plaintiff sued defendants, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Alaska Department of Transportation (Alaska), and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), in federal court, alleging causes of action for inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, nuisance, breach of fiduciary duties, and civil rights violations. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the action against the BLM and Alaska on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court held that federal sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, and civil rights violations claims against the United States, but that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 25 U.S.C. 345, could provide a waiver of the government sovereign immunity for plaintiff's nuisance and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Additionally, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's action against Alaska in its entirety. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.

Plaintiff sued R.R. Street & Co., Inc. (Street), which designed and manufactured a machine used in the dry cleaning business, and several other defendants for contribution to environmental cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675. Plaintiff also raised various state law causes of action, including claims for trespass and nuisance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Street on all claims and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff failed to present evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to its CERCLA claim, nuisance claim, and trespass claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Street.

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action.

Defendants, the owner and operator of a Nevada company that inspected homes for construction defects and encouraged homeowners to file claims against their builder under a Nevada statute, appealed an injunction enjoining them from conducting further inspections. Del Webb Communities, Inc. (Del Webb), the developer of a retirement community where defendants inspected many homes, sued, alleging that defendants' business practices violated federal and state law. The court held that the general prohibition against operating "by means of illegal, unlicensed and false practices" was too vague to stand. Accordingly, the court affirmed the remaining provisions of the injunction but rejected the district court's reliance on Nevada's common law of champerty to create a tort cause of action for which Del Webb could obtain relief. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction in part and affirmed in part.

Plaintiff sought damages from the United States for injuries to a child allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic heavy metal thallium from soil dumped into a landfill adjacent to the child' residence and school. The child, by her guardian ad litem, appealed a decision of the district court finding that the United States acted "reasonably" and did not breach any duty in conducting the soil remediation projects. The district court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the "discretionary function" exception to tort liability of the United States applied in this case. The court held that because the district court erred in holding that the "discretionary function" exception barred the Navy's liability on and the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, and clearly erred in finding that the Navy acted "reasonably" and not in breach of its duty in conducting the remediation of contaminated soil in the project at issue here, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court, nevertheless, held that it was unnecessary to reassign the case to a different judge on remand.

Plaintiff, a Christian congregation church, sued the City of Yuma when the city prevented the church from conducting church services in a building it had bought for that purpose. At issue was the "equal terms" provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The court held that the church's claims for declaratory judgment and injunction were moot where the church no longer owned the building, so the city could not be required to issue a conditional use permit for the building to the church. Nor could the church be entitled to a declaration that a code provision and statute violated federal law because they no longer affected the church. The court also held that, because the city required religious assemblies to obtain a conditional use permit, and did not require similarly situated secular membership assemblies to do the same, it violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Therefore, the court did not reach the church's argument that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to adjudicate the church's claims as to damages.

This case arose when the Colorado River Indian Tribes ("CRIT") exercised jurisdiction over appellants, a non-Indian closely held corporation and its non-Indian owner, in an unlawful detainer action for breach of a lease of tribal lands and trespass. The tribal court entered judgment in favor of the tribe and appellants appealed. At issue was the extent of the CRIT's civil authority over appellants who were acting on tribal land within the reservation. The court held that under the circumstances presented, where there were no sufficient competing state interests at play, the tribe had regulatory jurisdiction through its inherent authority to exclude, independent from the power recognized in Montana v. United States. The court also held that adjudicative jurisdiction also existed in light of Supreme Court precedent recognizing tribes' inherent civil authority over non-Indian conduct on tribal land and congressional interest in promoting tribal self-government. The court further held that in this instance, by applying traditional personal jurisdiction principles, the tribal court had personal jurisdiction over a non-Indian agent acting on tribal land. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the non-Indian corporation and reversed with respect to the non-Indian owner.