Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hokto USA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hokuto Co., Ltd., filed suit against Concord Farms for violating its rights to marks under which it markets its Certified Organic Mushrooms, which are produced in the United States. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hokto USA and Hokuto Japan on all claims and entered a permanent injunction against Concord Farms. Determining that this was a classic gray-market case, the court concluded that, because Concord Farms offered no other evidence that its imported mushrooms were not "materially different" from Hokto USA's mushrooms, the district court correctly concluded that they were not genuine Hokto USA goods; the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Concord Farms's importation of Hokuto Japan mushrooms was likely to confuse consumers; and the district court did not err in concluding that Hokuto Japan did not engage in naked licensing where, given the close working relationship, Hokuto Japan was familiar with and reasonably relied upon Hokto USA's efforts to control the quality of the mushrooms it distributed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Hokto USA's and Hokuto Japan's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the permanent injunction, denying Concord Farms's motion for summary judgment. View "Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Petronas is a major oil and gas company located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and GoDaddy is the world's largest domain name registrar. After a third party registered the domain names "petronastower.net" and "petronastowers.net" and then used GoDaddy's domain name forwarding service to direct the disputed domain names to an adult entertainment web site, Petronas filed suit against GoDaddy alleging contributory cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GoDaddy. The court affirmed, holding that the Act did not include a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting because: (1) the plain text of the Act did not apply to the conduct that would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines applicable to trademark infringement because the Act created a new cause of action that was distinct from traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would not advance the goals of the statute. View "Petronas v. GoDaddy.com" on Justia Law

Marshak appealed the district court's preliminary injunction for HRE enjoining Marshak from using the "The Platters" mark in connection with any vocal group with narrow exceptions. At issue was whether the likelihood of irreparable harm must be established - rather than presumed, as under prior Ninth Circuit precedent - by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in the trademark context. Following eBay v. MarcExchange and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case must establish irreparable harm. The court concluded that HRE was not foreclosed from bringing the underlying suit where prior New York actions (Marshak I and Marshak II) did not have res judicata effect; HRE's trademark infringement claim and request for preliminary injunction was not precluded by the doctrine of laches; the record supported the district court's determination that HRE did not abandon "The Platters" mark; but the fact that the district curt made no factual findings that would support a likelihood of establishing irreparable harm, led the court to reverse the preliminary injunction and to remand to the district court. View "HRE v. Florida Entertainment Mgmt." on Justia Law

HFI filed suit against the Bank alleging trademark infringement and related claims, contending that the Bank's use of its "Hana Bank" mark infringed HFI's "Hana Financial" mark because its use of the word "Hana" in connection with financial services would likely cause confusion. A party claiming trademark ownership must establish priority and one of the ways that a party could establish priority was through the constructive use doctrine known as "tacking." Tacking required a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, and the jury decided the issue after receiving an instruction that correctly conveyed the narrowness of the doctrine. In this instance, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on trademark priority where, viewing the marks in context and in their entirety, the ordinary purchasers could perceive them as conveying the same idea or meaning or evoking the same mental reaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of HFI's motion for judgment as a matter of law on trademark priority and upheld the jury's verdict. View "Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Green Day and others, alleging violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., because Green Day used plaintiff's illustration, "Scream Icon," in the video backdrop of its stage show. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Green Day on all claims and the grant of attorney's fees to Green Day under the Copyright Act. The court concluded that Green Day's use of the illustration was fair use under the Copyright Act where the purpose and character of the use was transformative and not overly commercial; the nature of the work included its status as a widely disseminated work of street art; Green Day's use of the work was not excessive in light of its transformative purpose; and Green Day's use did not affect the value of the piece or of plaintiff's artwork in general. In regards to plaintiff's claims under the Lanham Act, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any trademark rights. The court concluded, however, that the district court clearly erred in finding that plaintiff's claims were objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment but vacated the award of attorneys fees. View "Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law

Mattel filed suit against MGA, claiming that MGA infringed Mattel's copyrights by producing Bratz dolls. On appeal, Mattel challenged the jury's verdict that Mattel misappropriated MGA's trade secrets and the district court's award of attorneys fees and costs to MGA under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 505. The court held that MGA's claim of trade-secret misappropriation was not logically related to Mattel's counterclaim and therefore, the court reversed the district court's holding that MGA's counterclaim-in-reply was compulsory. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs under the Act, the court affirmed that award. View "Mattel, Inc., et al v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a recognized figure in aviation history and defendants are retired commercial airline captains who became friends with plaintiff in the 1980s. Defendants sell aviation-related memorabilia, including items related to or signed by plaintiff. In 2008, plaintiff brought claims against defendants, including violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., California's common law right to privacy, and California's statutory right to publicity, Cal. Civ. Code 3344. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff contended that the district court should not have struck his declaration, which contained comprehensive details he did not remember at his deposition. He also contended that, under California's single-publication rule, defendants "republished" statements about him on their website - when they modified unrelated information on their website. The court rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Yeager, et al v. Bowlin, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against Rearden Commerce, asserting numerous claims related to a conflict between the parties' marks and names. The district court granted Rearden Commerce's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' trademark-related claims. Specifically, the district court found Rearden Commerce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellants' claims of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, common law trademark infringement, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Rearden Commerce. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law