Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a putative class action alleging violations of California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, Cal. Civ. Code 1747.08. The Act prohibits retailers from collecting personal identification information in connection with credit card transactions. Plaintiffs alleged that Redbox violated the Act by imposing that customers using credit cards provide their ZIP codes to obtain discs from Redbox kiosks. The court concluded that Redbox's alleged conduct does not violate the Act where the statute exempts certain transactions, including those where "the credit card is being used as a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or similar occurrence." Accordingly, the court dismissed the action. View "Sinibaldi v. Redbox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims against the Fund and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. For over three years, the Fund paid plaintiff monthly pension benefits he had not earned. This case arose from the events that occurred after the Fund discovered the error. The court concluded that it was bound by its own precedent, which correctly identifies surcharge as including only unjust enrichment and losses to the trust estate; the district court properly concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to relief based on estoppel as a matter of law; equitable remedies were not available to plaintiff where the order plaintiff sought necessarily would require violating the terms of the Plan by deeming an ineligible person to be eligible for pension benefits; and the surcharge remedy plaintiff sought would not restore the trust estate, but rather would wrongfully deplete it by paying him benefits he is not eligible to receive under the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's breach of fiduciary and co-fiduciary duty claims under section 1132(a)(3). The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Fund failed to comply with ERISA procedural requirements, or that it waived its determination that plaintiff never vested. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's deference to the Fund's denial of benefits. View "Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order certifying a class and a subclass of inmates in Arizona's prison system who claim that they are subject to systematic Eighth Amendment violations. Defendants argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs' claims depend upon common questions of law or fact that are answerable in one stroke. Here, plaintiffs are all inmates in ADC custody and each declares that he or she is being exposed, like all other members of the putative class, to a substantial risk of serious harm by the challenged ADC policies. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a single injunction and declaratory judgment could provide relief to each member of the proposed class and subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to five counts of distributing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional medical practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose. On appeal, defendant argued that his guilty plea lacked a sufficient factual basis, that the government breached the plea agreement and that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court concluded that, because the scope of defendant's appellate waiver concerned only his sentence and the issues raised in this appeal concerned only his conviction, defendant did not waive his right to bring this appeal. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Spear, III" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A. The court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's rationale that, because section 2261A proscribes harassing and intimidating conduct, the statute is not facially invalid under the First Amendment. Defendant's argument that section 2261A(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define "harass" or "substantial emotional distress" is equally unavailing. Defendant's threats, creation of a false Facebook page with sexually explicit photographs of his ex-girlfriend, and emails to her co-workers and friends containing explicit photographs evinced defendant's intent to cause substantial emotional distress. Therefore, defendant's unrelenting harassment and intimidation of his ex-girlfriend was not based on conduct that he could not have known was illegal. Defendant's as-applied challenge was similarly unavailing given his intent to harass and intimidate a private individual by circulating sexually explicit publications that were never in the public domain. Finally, the district court's sentence was reasonable where defendant was not entitled to any downward adjustment premised on acceptance of responsibility or on sentence disparity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Osinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated the automatic-stay provision of 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The court held that an attorney preparing an order for a judge is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court did not reach the question of whether such an action violated the automatic stay, or whether it was actionable under 11 U.S.C. 362(k). View "Burton v. Infinity Capital Management" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Coverall, a janitorial franchising company, alleging that Coverall misclassified its California franchises as independent contractors and that Coverall breached its franchise agreements. After the parties settled, a sole objector filed an objection to the proposed settlement. The court concluded that the objector presented no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in declining further adjustment from the lodestar amount; the district court acted within its proper discretion when it found that the settlement contained significant benefits for plaintiffs beyond the cash recovery, and that the award, at about the third of the lodestar amount, was reasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. factors supported the conclusion that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate; the district court has no obligation to make explicit monetary valuations of injunctive remedies; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement term that objectors be available for depositions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it approved the settlement agreement consistent with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1715(b), notice requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's approval of the proposed class action settlement under Rule 23 and the award of attorneys' fees to the attorneys of the proposed class. View "Laguna v. Coverall North America" on Justia Law

After plaintiff served four and a half years in prison and then ordered freed when his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted, he filed an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, acting under color of State law, unlawfully suppressed the criminal history of a confidential informant who was the main witness against him, failed to produce the documents reflecting that criminal history, and thus caused him to be found guilty of several counts of drug trafficking and to be sentenced to a term of ten to twenty-five years. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred because it was not filed within two years of the time plaintiff learned that the confidential informant had an extensive criminal history. The court granted Washoe County's motion to supplement the record and the court took judicial notice of the court documents presented by the motion. Under Heck v. Humphrey, plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until his conviction was held invalid. Therefore, plaintiff's claims did not accrue until the Nevada court vacated his convictions on December 2, 2008. Since plaintiff commenced his lawsuit on December 1, 2010, less than two years after December 2, 2008, his claim was timely and the district court erred in dismissing it as time-barred. The court rejected Defendant Palmer's argument for dismissing the complaint against him; plaintiff's claims against Washoe County and the City of Reno were dismissed without prejudice; and the court remanded for the district court to consider if and to what extent plaintiff's plea to the crime of Unlawful Giving Away of Controlled Substances affects his section 1983 action. View "Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Idaho state prisoner, filed suit against individual prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claiming that they had imposed an unwarranted burden on his exercise of religion. Prison officials curtailed plaintiff's opportunities for chapel access after they found out that he was utilizing the chapel facilities to further his romantic relationships with prison guards. The court joined its sister circuits and held that plaintiff may not seek damages against prison officials in their individual capacities principally because RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress's constitutional powers under the Spending Clause, and the individual defendants are not recipients of any federal funds. In regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, there was insufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Wood v. Yordy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-449.03(E)(6), and its implementing regulation, which restricts the manner in which certain medications may be used to perform abortions. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argued that, under a proper reading of its text, the Arizona law prohibits all medication abortions. The State argued that the law allows medication abortions, but only if they are performed in accordance with the on-label regimen. The court assumed without deciding that the Arizona law passes rational basis review and moved directly to the application of the undue burden test in light of Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. The court concluded that plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence that the Arizona law substantially burdens women's access to abortion services, and Arizona has introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in women's health. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their undue burden claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble" on Justia Law