Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Guillen-Cervantes and Castillo were convicted of conspiring to transport and harbor illegal aliens. On appeal, Castillo challenged her forfeiture judgment, contending that it violated her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because she was unable to seek contribution from other members of the conspiracy. The court held that Castillo possessed no right to contribution under existing federal law. The court rejected Castillo's request that the court find an implied right under 18 U.S.C. 982 or forge a new right to contribution in this case, and to hold that the deprivation of that right as a consequence of her forfeiture order violated her Fifth Amendment guarantee to due process. Therefore, the court concluded that Castillo's due process claim failed because she could not demonstrate a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived. Accordingly, the court affirmed the forfeiture judgment against Castillo. View "United States v. Guillen-Cervantes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JAL, alleging that JAL retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns and constructively terminated him for reasons related to his medical and mental fitness. At issue on appeal was whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 49 U.S.C. 40103 et seq., preempted plaintiff's state law claims. The court concluded that the FAA and accompanying regulations preempted plaintiff's retaliation and constructive termination claims. The court held that federal law preempted state law claims that encroached upon, supplemented, or altered the federally occupied field of aviation safety and presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's legislative goal to create a single, uniform, system of regulating that field. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration where he conceded that the conduct giving rise to his claims occurred in U.S. airspace. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of JAL. View "Ventress v. Japan Airlines" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of felony murder and other offenses, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The court concluded that the state trial court's decision to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking an African-American venireman, when viewed in light of the totality of the relevant facts, was not an objectively unreasonable application of Batson v. Kentucky. The court also concluded that the state trial court's decision to admit a codefendant's hearsay statement was not an objectively unreasonable application of the Ohio v. Roberts framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayes v. Premo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Wells Fargo, raising multiple causes of action under state and federal law pertaining to plaintiffs' home loan and deed of trust. At issue was whether, under 28 U.S.C. 1348, a national bank is a citizen of both the state in which its principal place of business is located as designated in the banks' articles of association. The court concluded that, under section 1348, a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located. Therefore, the district court had diversity jurisdiction because there was complete diversity between plaintiffs, citizens of California, and Wells Fargo, a citizen of South Dakota. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rouse, et al. v. Wachovia Mortgage" on Justia Law

The USDA decided to change its rules to allow roads to be built through an Alaskan forest it had previously ruled should be roadless. The district court held invalid the 2003 Record of Decision (ROD) that temporarily exempted the Tongass National Forest from application of the 2001 Roadless Area Conservation Rule. Alaska appealed the order. The court concluded that the USDA's actions in settling the lawsuit and its reasoned explanation in the ROD supported the finding that the USDA believed that promulgating the Tongass exception would decrease litigation over the Roadless Rule. Under FCC v. Fox Television Stations' deferential standard, the USDA's ROD was not arbitrary and capricious. Further, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the USDA to promulgate the Roadless Rule exception to increase timber production to meet predicted future demand. Another reason for the USDA's promulgation of the ROD was because of its appreciation of the socioeconomic hardships created by the Roadless Rule. The court held that all of the USDA's reasons were acceptable under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Organized Village of Kake v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. View "Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner suffering from schizoaffective disorder and who is proceeding pro se, sought damages from California prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of his request for a guardian ad litem because the Pro Bono Coordinator advised the court that no one was available to undertake the representation. In these consolidated appeals, at issue was whether the district court erred, under Rule 17(c)(2), by declining to appoint a guardian ad litem and instead staying plaintiff's cases indefinitely until he is found to be restored to competency. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 1291, or in the alternative, as a collateral order pursuant to Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by staying plaintiff's cases until he was found competent (if ever). Such a stay order failed to adequately protect plaintiff's interest and thus did not constitute "another appropriate order" under Rule 17(c). Instead, it amounted to a dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Davis v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an American citizen born in Iran, petitioned for review of a determination letter issued by DHS, seeking disclosure of his watchlist status, a meaningful opportunity to contest inclusion on any watchlist, and removal from all government watchlists. The watchlist at issue is the Consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). In Latif v. Holder, the court held that 49 U.S.C. 46110 did not grant circuit courts jurisdiction over broad constitutional claims - such as petitioner's - that seek removal from the TSDB. The court reaffirmed its holding in Latif and clarified that it is applicable even where a traveler's claims are brought as a challenge to a DHS Travel Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) determination letter. Accordingly, the court transferred to the district court where the jurisdictional defects that prevented the court from hearing petitioner's claims would not exist. View "Arjmand v. DHS" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with attempted reentry after a prior removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that defendant's removal as an alien "not admitted or paroled" as alleged in the Notice to Appear was not "fundamentally unfair" where the termination of his temporary resident status returned him to the status of an inadmissible alien subject to removal; defendant was foreclosed from demonstrating prejudice because INA 212(h) did not provide relief for aliens removed for illegal presence in the United States without admission or parole in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), the sole basis of defendant's removal; and defendant did not preserve his claim that the IJ failed to advise him of his right to counsel and/or obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Finally, the district court's imposition of a below-Guidelines fine was not procedurally erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hernandez-Arias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an English auctioneer of thoroughbred horses, filed suit against defendant after defendant took possession of a horse but did not pay for it. The district court granted title and right of possession of the horse to plaintiff but did not award damages for the reduction in the horse's value while she was held by defendant. The district court instructed plaintiff to move to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) when it knew the amount of the damages, but the district court overlooked the 28-day deadline for motions under Rule 59(e). Relying on Garamendi v. Henin, the court held that the district court's use of Rule 60(a) in correcting the judgment to award damages was proper where the district court's overlooking of the 28-day time limit for Rule 59(e) relief was the kind of clerical error, oversight or omission that was amendable to correction under Rule 60(a). In this instance, it was obvious that the district court did not change its mind and it intended that plaintiff should receive depreciation damages for the horse. It was also obvious that the district court did not intend that plaintiff would be unable to amend the judgment after the 28-day time limit under Rule 59(e) had elapsed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Tattersalls v. DeHaven" on Justia Law