Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claimed that prison officials engaged in retaliatory conduct, of which the governmental actors were aware, because of plaintiff's mother's website, which exposed prison corruption and fought for inmates' rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and plaintiff appealed. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court held that repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" requirement are strikes as "failures to state a claim" when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification within a reasonable time. Plaintiff accrued two strikes for Ninth Circuit dismissals, and three additional strikes for district court dismissals. Therefore, plaintiff has more than met the requirement for a revocation of in forma pauperis status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Knapp v. Hogan, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute regarding plaintiffs' membership in an Indian tribe. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) order upholding the Band's decision to disenroll descendants of plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians and whether such injunctive relief could issue in the Band's absence. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, and that the Band was not a required party for the adjudication of the claims underlying the preliminary injunction because they concerned solely the propriety of final agency action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Band's motions to dismiss the claims on which the injunction rests and its consequent refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction; remanded to allow the district court to formally clarify its order in compliance with the court's understanding of it; and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal the Band's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' other claims, on which the district court expressly deferred ruling. View "Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Chinese national, unlawfully obtained two driver's licenses issued by the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). At issue was whether defendant's possession of those licenses could be punished under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). The court concluded that section 1546(a) could not be read to criminalize the mere possession of an unlawfully obtained CNMI driver's license. Because the government presented no evidence that defendant possessed any other document covered by the statute, defendant's section 1546(a) conviction could not stand. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for making a false statement to a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction under section 1546(a) and affirmed his conviction under section 1001(a)(2), remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failing to register and/or update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 14 months' imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. Joining its sister circuits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. 3583(h), which authorized an additional term of supervised release following revocation of supervised release, permitted imposition of a lifetime term of supervised release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Crowder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his motion to reopen. The court concluded that petitioner was correct that the Board's place-of-filing rule was a procedural claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar to the Board's authority to consider a motion to reopen. The originating statute, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7), did nothing to diminish the Board's jurisdiction or authorize the Board to diminish its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Hokto USA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hokuto Co., Ltd., filed suit against Concord Farms for violating its rights to marks under which it markets its Certified Organic Mushrooms, which are produced in the United States. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hokto USA and Hokuto Japan on all claims and entered a permanent injunction against Concord Farms. Determining that this was a classic gray-market case, the court concluded that, because Concord Farms offered no other evidence that its imported mushrooms were not "materially different" from Hokto USA's mushrooms, the district court correctly concluded that they were not genuine Hokto USA goods; the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Concord Farms's importation of Hokuto Japan mushrooms was likely to confuse consumers; and the district court did not err in concluding that Hokuto Japan did not engage in naked licensing where, given the close working relationship, Hokuto Japan was familiar with and reasonably relied upon Hokto USA's efforts to control the quality of the mushrooms it distributed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Hokto USA's and Hokuto Japan's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the permanent injunction, denying Concord Farms's motion for summary judgment. View "Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction after pleading guilty to unlawful reentry into the United States. The court held that a prior felony conviction under Florida Statutes section 800.04(4)(a) for lewd and lascivious battery did not qualify as a crime of violence because the crime did not constitute a forcible sex offense or statutory rape within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Caceres-Olla" on Justia Law

After the jury had been empaneled, the district court accepted defendant's guilty plea, declared a mistrial, and discharged the jury. After successfully moving to rescind his guilty plea, defendant sought to avoid trial altogether by invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection of his right to have the first empaneled jury decide his case. The court concluded that, in this case, it was difficult to understand why defendant should be treated differently from one who was coerced into pleading guilty before a jury was empaneled. Defendant already had achieved a remedy for the alleged violation of Rule 11 - withdrawal from the plea agreement. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from improper attempts by the prosecutor or the judge to avoid having the empaneled jury reach a verdict, but it did not give an added benefit to a defendant when alleged misconduct happened to occur after the jury had been empaneled but bears no relations to the identity, composition, or proceeding of that particular jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Mondragon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for aiding and abetting offenses. In this case, there was evidence that defendant suffered from a low I.Q. or a learning disability and there was no written waiver. The court concluded that the jury-trial waiver was invalid because the district court failed to take necessary precautions to ensure that defendant's jury-trial waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. Although the court reversed defendant's conviction on all counts, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's aiding and abetting convictions and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated and the government could retry defendant on all counts. View "United States v. Shorty" on Justia Law